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iAbstract
This dissertation consists of an introductory chapter and four empirical essays on
behavioral responses to income tax incentives. The introductory chapter presents the
conceptual background of the welfare analysis of income taxation, highlighting the
crucial roles of behavioral elasticities and the structure of the behavioral response. In
addition, I present an overview of recent empirical literature on behavioral responses
to income taxes.
The first essay studies the extent and significance of income-shifting behavior among
the owners of privately held corporations in Finland. The dual income tax system in
Finland offers considerable incentives and opportunities for income-shifting between
wages and dividends for business owners. Extensive panel data at both the owner and
firm level together with Finland’s dividend tax reform of 2005 enable us to credibly
analyze the empirical significance of income-shifting. The results show that income-
shifting is evident. The income-shifting response is homogenous across different owners
and firms. However, the size of the income-shifting incentive affects the extent of
income-shifting activity, indicating that the costs of income-shifting are non-negligible.
The second essay focuses on distinguishing between real responses and income-
shifting. Previous literature shows that income taxes affect the behavior of high-income
earners and business owners. However, it is still unclear how much of the response is
caused by real economic activity (labor supply, effort etc.), and how much is due to
income-shifting and other tax-planning activities. This distinction is important because
it can greatly affect the welfare implications. We build a model that formalizes the
analysis of the elasticity of taxable income under income-shifting possibilities. We
show that income-shifting accounts for over two thirds of the overall behavioral response
among the owners of privately held corporations in Finland. This considerable income-
shifting response halves the marginal excess burden of income taxes among Finnish
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business owners, compared to the traditional framework where the overall behavioral
response determines the welfare loss.
The third essay studies the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) in Finland. To identify
the average ETI, I use changes in flat municipal income tax rates as an instrument for
changes in the overall marginal tax rates. This instrument is not a function of individual
income, which is the basis for an exogenous tax rate instrument. In general, instruments
based on predicted tax rate changes as used in many previous studies do not have this
feature. In addition, I estimate behavioral responses for the subcomponents of taxable
income, such as working hours, fringe benefits and tax deductions. This structure of
the overall ETI has rarely been studied in previous literature. My preferred estimate
of ETI in Finland is 0.27, which indicates moderate but non-negligible welfare effects.
The subcomponent analysis suggests that working hours and wage rates respond less
than tax deductions and irregular forms of compensation such as fringe benefits. This
implies that the overall behavioral response is not driven by changes in deep individual
utility arguments, such as the opportunity cost of working.
The fourth essay analyzes the role of different frictions in explaining different be-
havioral responses to similar tax incentives. Recent literature shows that optimization
frictions attenuate behavioral responses to tax incentives, compared to the underlying
long-run structural elasticity. However, the literature has not addressed the role of dif-
ferent frictions in explaining heterogeneous responses to tax incentives. To study this
issue, we analyze to what extent and in what manner taxpayers respond to different
tax incentives. We compare the behavioral effects induced by different tax and transfer
incentives and institutions within similar or even the same individuals in Finland. We
use a local estimation approach and the bunching method in order to produce clear and
comparable evidence. We find that taxpayers do not respond at all to small changes in
tax incentives, but do respond to large and salient incentives. Moreover, the patterns
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of response indicate that some taxpayers are unable to respond even to large incentives,
and some are unaware of the tax incentives.
Keywords: income taxation, behavioral responses, individuals
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Tiivistelmä
Tämä väitöskirja sisältää johdantoluvun ja neljä itsenäistä empiiristä artikkelia ve-
rotuksen vaikutuksesta yksilöiden käyttäytymiseen. Johdantoluku esittelee verotuksen
taloudellista tehokkuutta käsittelevää teoreettista kirjallisuutta. Lisäksi johdantoluvus-
sa esitellään keskeisimmät empiiriset tulokset tuloverotuksen käyttäytymisvaikutuksis-
ta.
Väitöskirjan kaksi ensimmäistä artikkelia käsittelevät yrittäjien käyttäytymisvaiku-
tuksia. Ensimmäisessä artikkelissa tarkastellaan yrittäjien tulonmuuntoa. Verokannus-
timista johtuva tulonmuunto vähentää verotuloja sekä heikentää verotuksen taloudel-
lista tehokkuutta. Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan vuoden 2005 yritys- ja osinkoverouudis-
tuksen vaikutuksia. Uudistus kannusti listaamattomien osakeyhtiöiden omistajia mak-
samaan itselleen mieluummin palkkaa kuin nostamaan osinkoja. Tulosten perusteella
verokannustimien muutos vaikutti selvästi omistajien käyttäytymiseen, ja tulonmuun-
toaktiivisuus oli hyvin samanlaista eri omistajaryhmissä ja erilaisissa yhtiöissä. Lisäksi
havaitaan, että verokannustimen koko vaikutti tulonmuuntoon palkka- ja osinkotulojen
välillä.
Toisessa artikkelissa erotellaan tuloverotuksen aiheuttamat reaaliset käyttäytymis-
vaikutukset tulonmuunnon aiheuttamista vaikutuksista. Aikaisempien tutkimusten pe-
rusteella verotus vaikuttaa selvästi yrittäjien käyttäytymiseen. On kuitenkin epäsel-
vää, kuinka suuri osuus kokonaisvaikutuksesta aiheutuu reaalitaloudellisista päätöksis-
tä ja kuinka suuri osa verosuunnittelusta. Erilaisten käyttäytymisvaikutusten erottelu
on tärkeää, sillä erilaiset tavat reagoida verokannustimiin vaikuttavat arvioihin vero-
tuksen taloudellisesta tehokkuudesta. Artikkelissa tutkitaan listaamattomien osakeyh-
tiöiden omistajien käyttäytymistä Suomessa. Tulosten perusteella yli kaksi kolmasosaa
verotuksen aiheuttamasta käyttäytymisvaikutuksesta on selitettävissä tulonmuunnolla.
vHuomattava tulonmuuntovaikutus pienentää merkittävästi arviota verotuksen aiheut-
tamasta taloudellisesta tehokkuustappiosta.
Kolmannessa artikkelissa tutkitaan verotettavan tulon joustoa Suomessa. Verotetta-
van tulon jousto mittaa sitä, kuinka monta prosenttia veropohja muuttuu, kun yhdestä
lisäeurosta käteen jäävä osuus muuttuu yhden prosentin. Verotettavan tulon jouston
avulla voidaan kokonaisvaltaisesti arvioida tuloverotuksen aiheuttamaa tehokkuustap-
piota. Korkeampi tuloveroaste voi esimerkiksi vähentää tehtyjä työtunteja sekä lisätä
verosuunnittelua. Verotettavan tulon jousto huomioi eri kanavat, joilla tuloveroihin voi-
daan reagoida. Tutkimuksessa hyödynnetään kunnallisverotuksessa tapahtuneita muu-
toksia. Kunnallisverotus tarjoaa hyvän vertailuasetelman erilaisten henkilöiden välil-
le, sillä kunnallisveroprosentti ei riipu henkilön tuloista. Lisäksi kunnallisveroprosentin
muutokset muuttavat veroasteita kaikissa tuloluokissa. Tulosten perusteella verotetta-
van tulon jousto on Suomessa keskimäärin 0,27. Tuloveroprosentin vaikutus veropohjan
kokoon on tilastollisesti merkitsevä, mutta tuloverotuksen aiheuttama taloudellinen te-
hokkuustappio on kuitenkin maltillinen. Tulokset antavat myös viitteitä siitä, että työ-
tunnit ja tuntipalkka reagoivat heikommin veroasteen muutoksiin kuin epäsäännölliset
tulot, kuten luontoisedut ja verovähennysten määrä.
Neljännessä artikkelissa tarkastellaan käyttäytymisvaikutuksiin tai niiden puuttu-
miseen vaikuttavia tekijöitä. Viimeaikaisen tutkimuskirjallisuuden perusteella käyttäy-
tymisvaikutuksiin liittyvät kitkatekijät, kuten jäykät työmarkkinat sekä epätietoisuus
verosäännöistä ja -kannustimista, heikentävät veronmaksajien reagointia verokannus-
timiin. On kuitenkin edelleen epäselvää, miten erityyppiset kitkatekijät selittävät ha-
vaittua käyttäytymistä, ja miten erilaiset tekijät vaikuttavat havaitun käyttäytymis-
vaikutuksen kokoon ja muotoon. Tutkimuksessa vertaillaan erilaisten verokannustimien
vaikutusta samankaltaisten tai samojen henkilöiden käyttäytymiseen. Tutkimuksessa
hyödynnetään paikallista ja tulojakauman muotoon perustuvaa estimointimenetelmää
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(nk. bunching -menetelmä). Menetelmällä saadaan luotettavaa ja vertailukelpoista evi-
denssiä verokannustimien käyttäytymisvaikutuksista. Tulosten perusteella kitkatekijät
vaikuttavat merkittävästi veronmaksajien käyttäytymiseen. Veronmaksajat eivät rea-
goi pieniin kannustimiin, mutta jos verokannustimet ovat merkittäviä sekä selkeitä ja
helppo ymmärtää, niin käyttäytymisvaikutuksia havaitaan. Lisäksi havaitaan, että työ-
markkinoihin liittyvät kitkatekijät heikentävät keskimääräisiä käyttäytymisvaikutuksia
vaikka verokannustimet olisivat merkittäviäkin.
Asiasanat: verotus, käyttäytymisvaikutukset, yksityishenkilöt
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Throughout the modern history of economics, the literature has defined the features
of a good tax system. Perhaps the most essential characteristics are the following: first,
a tax system should be productive enough in order to provide the appropriate amount
of public goods such as street lighting and defense, and other tax-funded goods and
services such as health care and primary education. Second, a tax system should be
efficient and distort individual choices as little as possible, compared to a hypothetical
situation with no taxes. Third, a tax system should be equitable and generate the
desired redistribution of income. Finally, a good tax system should be simple, easy to
understand and inexpensive to administer.
All of the above features affect one another. The need for larger tax revenue might
increase the complexity of a tax system if additional tax instruments are implemented.
Also, increasing tax revenue might require an increase in existing tax rates, which
increases distortions and decreases efficiency. Furthermore, reinforcing the redistribu-
tional goals might contradict economic efficiency, as increasing the progressivity of the
tax system might increase behavioral responses at the top of the income distribution.
In summary, designing real-life tax systems requires many trade-offs between different
objectives, and a good tax system is a functional combination of its characteristics.
One of the focal trade-offs in economic policy lies between equity and efficiency.
Many policies that increase equity and the redistribution of income also increase the
distortions caused by taxes. Similarly, more efficient tax systems are usually less eq-
uitable. Therefore, in order to address this central issue, we need credible empirical
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evidence of both the effectiveness of equitable policies and the efficiency of real-life tax
systems.
How different individuals respond to tax incentives is at the core of public finance
and modern tax policy debate. Basic economic theory shows that taxation is more
efficient the less individuals respond to taxes. In other words, behavioral responses
to taxation define the scope of the welfare loss induced by taxes. Therefore, along
with equity considerations, behavioral responses are the key factor to consider when
designing income tax schedules.
This doctoral thesis focuses on behavioral responses to income taxes and the effi-
ciency of income taxation. The thesis consists of four essays which analyze these issues
from different perspectives.
The first two essays analyze behavioral responses focusing specifically on the ineffi-
ciency caused by tax avoidance. The first of these papers studies the extent and signif-
icance of income-shifting between tax bases among owners of privately held businesses.
The second paper distinguishes between real responses and income-shifting between
tax bases, highlighting the importance of separating these effects when evaluating the
effectiveness of income taxation among individuals with income-shifting opportunities.
The last two papers focus on the structure and composition of behavioral responses.
The third essay studies the effectiveness of income taxation among Finnish income-
earners using the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) framework (Feldstein 1995, 1999)
and changes in local municipal tax rates. In addition to overall responses, this essay
characterizes the significance of the different components of the overall elasticity. The
fourth essay studies the mechanisms behind different responses to tax incentives. This
essay emphasizes that the observed behavioral responses may be moderate because of
different frictions related to optimization behavior, such as unawareness of the details
of the tax code and inability to respond to tax incentives due to labor market rigidities.
1.1. Conceptual background 3
1.1. Conceptual background
A lump-sum tax is a tax which is levied based on some unchangeable characteristic
of an individual. A simple lump-sum tax would be a head tax of the same size for
all individuals, regardless of their income levels. By definition, lump-sum taxes do
not induce any behavioral responses, and therefore do not distort economic decision-
making. However, lump-sum taxes are rarely applied in actual tax systems, as they
perform badly in implementing the equity and redistributional aspects of taxation.
Also, there are only a few individual characteristics that are truly unchangeable, and
it might be difficult for the government to correctly observe them for each individual.
Therefore, most real-life tax systems comprise different types of distortive taxes, such as
proportional and progressive income taxes in which the tax burden increases along with
income. Nevertheless, non-distortive lump-sum taxes provide an intuitive theoretical
benchmark when analyzing the excess burden caused by distortive taxes.
Early theoretical studies on the economic efficiency of taxation show that behavioral
responses to taxes define the optimal tax rates for distortive taxes. Ramsey (1927)
shows in his famous article that the optimal tax rate on a good depends inversely on
the elasticity of demand for that good. Thus in order to minimize the excess burden of
taxation, tax rates should be lower the more demand responds to changes in relative
prices.
However, generalizations of this Ramsey rule do not take equity considerations into
account. For example, according to empirical literature, high-income individuals are
more responsive to income taxes and have a larger income tax elasticity (Saez, Slem-
rod and Giertz 2012). This would lead to lower taxation of high incomes, which in
general cannot be considered as an equitable policy. In the case of consumption taxes,
the Ramsey rule leads to higher taxation of necessity goods such as food. This is
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again regressive, since low-income individuals spend a larger share of their income on
necessities.
The pioneering article by Mirrlees (1971) considers equity aspects as well as asym-
metric information in setting out the optimal income tax rate schedule. In short, the
Mirrleesian optimal income tax model is built such that a function of individual utili-
ties is maximized subject to the government budget constraint, taking into account the
fact that individuals can respond to taxes. Also, in the model the government cannot
observe the different ability types of individuals. This creates the baseline information
asymmetry problem of income taxation.
Intuitively, social welfare, measured as the function of individual utilities, increases
when the distribution of income is more equal. However, larger income tax rates can
have a negative impact on working, which decreases social welfare. This labor supply
elasticity with respect to income taxes therefore limits the ability of government to set
high tax rates.
There are not many general rules that can be derived from the baseline Mirrlees
model. The most famous lessons are that the optimal income tax rate schedule is not
linear, and that marginal tax rates are always between 0 and 100% (at the intensive
margin of labor supply).
After the Mirrlees (1971) article, there have been many studies that have aimed
to produce more applicable policy rules for income taxation. Many studies have used
simulation-based methods to set out an optimal income tax schedule. This literature
is surveyed in Tuomala (1990). Using a similar modeling framework as Mirrlees, the
seminal article by Saez (2001) derives optimal income tax rates using behavioral elas-
ticities and the observed shape of the income distribution. This enables him to define
the shape of an optimal income tax rate schedule using numerical simulations. Overall,
despite the rather complicated structure of optimal income tax models, the literature
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underlines that policy recommendations with regard to income tax schedules are tightly
related to the behavioral responses caused by income tax rates.
Another relevant question is what is the appropriate statistic for measuring the
behavioral response and the effectiveness of income taxation. Since the groundbreaking
work of Harberger (1964), many studies have estimated the elasticity of labor supply
with respect to the income tax rate. In summary, this literature has found only small
elasticities for individuals at the intensive margin of labor supply, which has led to
the conclusion that income taxation entails only minor efficiency costs for individuals
who are already working. On the other hand, estimated labor supply elasticities at the
extensive margin are usually larger, which indicates that the elasticity of the choice to
participate in the labor force is significant. (Meghir and Phillips 2010).
A significant contribution by Feldstein (1995, 1999) changed the view of small wel-
fare losses at the intensive margin. Feldstein shows that the compensated elasticity
of taxable income (ETI) with respect to the net-of-tax rate (one minus the marginal
tax rate) is the sufficient statistic to analyze the overall welfare loss of income taxes.
Theoretically, in the taxable income model, individuals optimize such that the marginal
cost of both creating and reporting taxable income equals the net-of-tax rate.
The intuition in the Feldstein model is that it does not matter how individuals
change their behavior due to income tax. Changes in labor supply, deduction behavior,
tax avoidance, tax evasion etc. all reflect the inefficiency of income taxation, and all of
these channels are reflected in the taxable income (gross income minus tax deductions
and tax credits) of an individual. I analyze ETI in Finland in the second, third and
fourth essay of the thesis.
The taxable income model of Feldstein implicitly assumes that the marginal social
cost of reducing labor supply or work effort equals the marginal social cost of tax avoid-
ance and tax evasion. Chetty (2009a) argues that this is not the case in practice. For
example, in many cases, the costs of tax avoidance and tax planning include transfers
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to other agents in the economy (e.g. compensations to tax consultants), which cre-
ates a fiscal externality that is not included in the Feldstein model. Also, individuals
might overestimate the costs of tax avoidance and tax evasion, which results in opti-
mization errors. These are important issues because ETI is shown to be larger among
high-income earners and business owners (see e.g. Saez et al. 2012), who, compared
to regular wage earners, have more opportunities to legally avoid and illegally evade
taxes.
Chetty (2009a) shows that if the real social cost of evasion or avoidance does not
equal the net-of-tax rate, the marginal excess burden can be characterized by the
weighted average of taxable income elasticity and gross income elasticity. Intuitively,
Chetty (2009a) demonstrates that ETI might overestimate the welfare loss of the in-
come tax if a large proportion of the response comes in the form of tax avoidance. In
the extreme case, if all of the response comes from tax avoidance activity that involves
no real social costs, the deadweight loss equals zero even if the ETI itself is large. I
analyze this issues in the second essay of the thesis.
Also, the baseline ETI model does not account for the fact that taxable income is
an endogenous parameter itself. The government can affect the definition of taxable
income, for example by changing the approved amount of tax deductions or tax-exempt
income. Thus by altering the concept of taxable income, the government can affect
ETI (Slemrod and Kopczuk 2002, Kopczuk 2005). Therefore, in addition to overall
ETI estimates, it is relevant to know what components of taxable income (e.g. labor
supply, effort, tax deductions, tax evasion etc.) are responsive to tax rates and which
are not. I study the anatomy of ETI in the second and third essay.
Some recent papers also discuss the implications of optimization frictions for the
observed elasticity estimates. For example, Chetty (2012) and Chetty et al. (2011) show
that the observed elasticities are small because of various frictions affecting individual
behavior, such as job search costs and adjustment costs, and the salience of the tax
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rules. These attenuate the observed elasticities below the underlying responsiveness,
which we would observe in the absence of these frictions. This underlying long-run
structural elasticity is the parameter of main interest in welfare analysis.
To define the structural elasticity, we would need to estimate the underlying struc-
tural tax responsiveness in the absence of frictions, which tends to be challenging.
However, in order to know more about the nature and economic implications of these
frictions, we would also need to know what types of frictions actually hinder behav-
ioral responses, and whether different frictions cause different patterns of behavioral
response in the long run. I analyze this issue by studying different income tax and
income transfer systems in Finland in the fourth essay of the thesis.
Finally, there is a somewhat heated debate among economists on the suitability of
structural and reduced-form approaches to estimate sufficient parameters for welfare
analysis (see e.g. Angrist and Pischke 2010, and Chetty 2009b). A typical structural
model defines a thorough theoretical model of economic behavior, and uses it to estimate
or calibrate the relevant behavioral parameters. The reduced-form approach focuses on
a careful identification of the causal relationship by using a research design that exploits
experimental or quasi-experimental variation without setting up a specific economic
model of individual behavior.
Both of these approaches have their pros and cons. Structural models can be used
to characterize the welfare implications of non-existent tax systems. However, they rely
on many critical economic assumptions which may or may not hold empirically. On
the other hand, reduced-form analysis can provide more reliable statistics on behavioral
responses within a specific tax system. Nevertheless, parameters derived from a well-
defined quasi-experimental setup are not necessarily generalizable to large-scale welfare
analysis or to other tax systems.
The ETI framework provides a midway between these two approaches. In the lit-
erature, ETI is typically estimated using a quasi-experimental identification strategy.
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Under rather general structural conditions, the ETI parameter is all we need for welfare
analysis. In other words, it is not necessary to estimate a large set of deep primitives in
a full structural model in order to evaluate the marginal excess burden of the income
tax. Therefore, the ETI approach provides the sufficient statistics for analyzing the
efficiency of income taxation (Feldstein 1999, Chetty 2009b).
1.2. Overview of recent empirical literature
The groundbreaking work of Feldstein (1995,1999) initiated a new wave in empirical
public finance and the analysis of welfare losses. Empirically, the key issue is that the
taxable income of individuals is widely available. Compared to labor supply elastic-
ity, which requires (survey) information on individual working hours, the elasticity of
taxable income can be analyzed using register-based tax record data, which tend to be
available in most developed countries.
Feldstein analyzed the US tax reform of 1986 using panel data and a difference-
in-differences style approach. He finds that tax rate cuts affecting the high-income
individuals resulted in a surge in taxable income, resulting in a large ETI of 1-3 among
top income earners. Estimates this range imply that income taxation has large wel-
fare costs, even suggesting that decreasing the income tax rate would have immediate
positive welfare effects.
Feldstein’s contribution gave rise to several subsequent studies that more carefully
consider underlying income trends, mean reversion of income and other important
econometric issues. By applying net-of-tax rate instruments which account for only
the legislative changes in income taxes, along with a larger set of individual control
variables, Auten and Carroll (1999) estimate an ETI of 0.55 when studying the same
1986 tax reform as Feldstein. Similarly, Moffit and Wilhelm (2000) estimate the ETI
to be in the range of 0.3-1 when using various tax rate instruments and the 1986 tax
reform in the US.
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One of the most well-known empirical ETI studies, by Gruber and Saez (2002),
uses long panel data and a number of US tax reforms to study ETI. They aim at a
careful consideration of underlying income trends and mean reversion. Gruber and
Saez (2002) estimate an ETI of 0.17 for low-income earners and 0.57 for high-income
earners. In addition, they analyze the responsiveness of gross income. They obtain an
earnings elasticity of 0.17 for gross income among high-income earners. This suggests
that a considerable part of the response stems from itemized deductions rather than
changes in real economic activity. Giertz (2010) follows the methods of Gruber and
Saez (2002), and estimates an ETI of 0.30 by using more extensive and more recent
panel data. In addition, Giertz (2010) underlines that ETI estimates are sensitive to
empirical specification and the chosen time period. This partly indicates the difficulty
of separating underlying income trends and mean reversion effects from the estimated
ETI.
A recent survey by Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012) summarizes the empirical ETI
literature, along with an extensive methodological discussion of ETI estimation. In
particular, they discuss the pros and cons of cross-sectional and panel data estimation
approaches. Saez et al. (2012) conclude that cross-sectional approaches might be more
robust than panel data methods, especially when using tax rate variation only at a
certain part of the income distribution. This is because it is rather difficult to explicitly
control for mean reversion and other non-tax-related changes in the income distribution
when using panel data.
However, extensive and even population-wide panel data from outside the US enable
rich individual-level controlling, which alleviates these concerns. In turn, combining
wide-ranging controlling of individual characteristics and the inclusion of multiple tax
reforms across the income distribution enhances the usefulness of individual-level panel
data in ETI estimation (Kleven and Schultz 2013).
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Most empirical ETI studies to date use US data sets. However, some recent studies
also focus on other countries and regions. The particular advantages of many recent
papers outside the US are the availability of more comprehensive data and richer tax
rate variation.
For the Nordic countries, Blomquist and Selin (2010) study ETI in Sweden. They
analyze Swedish tax reforms in the 1980s and estimate an ETI of around 0.20 for men
and 1 for women. As a methodological contribution, Blomquist and Selin (2010) derive
an instrument based on imputed income which is less correlated with transitory income
shocks, compared to the widely-used net-of-tax rate instrument based on taxable income
in the base period.
Kleven and Schultz (2013) estimate ETI in Denmark using a number of tax reforms
and panel data for all Danish taxpayers. They obtain ETI estimates in the range of
0.05-0.3. Similarly, Chetty et al. (2011) obtain only small ETI estimates for Denmark.
For Norway, a recent study by Thoresen and Vattø (2013) reports elasticities below 0.1.
In a previous paper, Aarbu and Thoresen (2001) reported zero elasticity for Norway.
Unfortunately, there are no previous comprehensive ETI studies available for Finland.
One exception is Pirttilä and Uusitalo (2005), who approximate the ETI to be around
0.3 in Finland.
In addition to overall responsiveness to income taxes, some previous studies con-
sider the issue of income-shifting between tax bases or between time periods. Gor-
don and Slemrod (2000) offer an overview of the income-shifting literature, and show
evidence of tax-motivated income-shifting between personal and corporate tax bases
among corporate owners in the US. In addition, Devereux, Liu and Loretz (2014) find
income-shifting between corporate and personal tax bases in the UK. Also, Sivadasan
and Slemrod (2008) find that a decrease in the effective tax rate on wages led to a
significant increase in managerial wage compensation for partners of partnership firms
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in India. Goolsbee (2000) reports that a significant part of the behavioral response to
the 1993 tax rate increase in the US was due to re-timing of executive compensation.
In the Nordic countries, Pirttilä and Selin (2011) provide evidence of income-shifting
between the capital income and earned income tax bases in Finland after the introduc-
tion of the dual income tax system in 1993, after which capital income was taxed
separately at a flat tax rate. In addition to overall ETI, Kleven and Schultz (2013)
estimate cross-tax elasticities between labor and capital income in Denmark. They find
statistically significant cross elasticities, which indicates that tax-motivated income-
shifting occurs. le Maire and Schjerning (2013) show evidence of significant intertem-
poral income-shifting among Danish entrepreneurs. Fjaerli and Lund (2001) find that
income tax rates and income-shifting largely affect the choice of income type for en-
trepreneurs in Norway. Similar type evidence is also available for Sweden (see e.g.
Alstadsaeter and Jacob 2012).
To my knowledge, there are no papers available which explicitly study how the (es-
timated) ETI is comprised. Related to this, Blomquist and Selin (2010) find significant
wage rate responses using Swedish data. This indicates that effort responses are a sig-
nificant factor in the overall ETI. Moffit and Wilhelm (2000) find that the increase in
top incomes after the 1986 tax rate cut in the US was not accompanied by an increase
in working hours, suggesting that the positive ETI is not caused by an increase in labor
supply.
In summary, recent ETI estimates based on panel data and quasi-experimental tax
rate variation imply that income taxation does induce statistically significant behavioral
responses. However, the estimates are well below the initial estimates of Feldstein (1995,
1999). Accordingly, the evidence based on recent studies suggests that the associated
welfare effects of income taxation are moderate at most.
In addition, the structure of the response holds potentially important welfare im-
plications. Existing empirical evidence tends to indicate that a significant part of the
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overall response among high-income earners is due to income-shifting. This implies that
income taxation has only a limited effect on real economic activity in this group. Nev-
ertheless, more evidence on the structure of the behavioral response is still needed in
order to make more precise policy conclusions about the effects of income taxes. Finally,
the long-run effect of income taxes might be more significant economically, although it
is difficult to estimate it using quasi-experimental variation in tax rates.
The most recent wave of behavioral tax literature uses kink points and other discon-
tinuities in the tax code to estimate the local behavioral response. Saez (1999, 2010)
initiated this literature by showing that the excess mass of individuals at a marginal tax
rate kink is proportional to the local ETI at the kink point. In other words, if taxable
income elasticity is significant, we should find individuals bunching around the points
in the income distribution where the marginal tax rate exhibits a sharp discontinuous
jump.
One important advantage of the bunching approach is that the excess mass can
be visibly observed from the income distribution. In addition, the bunching method
avoids the intractable econometric issues of tax rate instrumentation and counterfactual
income trends related to quasi-experimental estimation utilizing tax rate variation over
time. However, the bunching method only delivers local estimates, but income taxes
might also have an effect further away from the discontinuity point.
Saez (2010) finds no or only small excess bunching for wage earners in the US,
which indicates small or zero local taxable income elasticity. However, he finds that
the self-employed bunch actively at some (but not all) kink points, which indicates that
tax evasion might largely explain the observed bunching response.
Similarly, Bastani and Selin (2014) find no excess mass around the kink points of
the Swedish tax schedule for wage earners. However, they find significant bunching for
entrepreneurs. In contrast, Chetty et al. (2011) find significant excess mass for wage
earners at some but not all kink points of the Danish income tax rate schedule. The
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bunching effect is pronounced at larger kink points, indicating that the size of the local
discontinuity might matter. Nevertheless, the implied elasticities at the kink points
are small (<0.1). In common with earlier studies, Chetty et al. (2011) find distinctive
bunching behavior among entrepreneurs.
Kleven and Waseem (2013) use local changes in average tax rates to estimate (struc-
tural) earnings elasticities in Pakistan. The jump in the average tax rate creates a
notch in the budget set, which creates large incentives to bunch just below the notch
point. Kleven and Waseem (2013) find clear bunching at these notches, especially for
entrepreneurs, but also for wage earners.
Finally, in order to evaluate long-run structural elasticities, some recent papers
examine how behavioral frictions affect the observed elasticities. Chetty et al. (2011)
show that bunching is more pronounced at large kink points in Denmark. Similarly,
using panel data methods, Kleven and Schultz (2013) show that ETI is larger when the
change in the net-of-tax rate is larger. This evidence implies that estimates based on
large tax rate changes provide a better benchmark for the long-run structural elasticity
if behavioral frictions hinder individuals from responding to smaller tax rate changes. In
addition, Kleven and Waseem (2013) use tax notches in Pakistan to uncover structural
elasticities. They find that the observed elasticities are largely affected by behavioral
frictions. However, these studies do not address the actual type of the (observed)
friction. In order to deduce the potential implications of different frictions, we need to
have an assessment of the composition of frictions affecting the extent and structure of
behavioral responses.
1.3. Summary of the essays
1.3.1. Business Owners and Income-Shifting between Tax Bases: Empir-
ical Evidence from a Finnish Tax Reform. Income-shifting is a common example
of a tax avoidance channel. Income-shifting between differently taxed tax bases is
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generally recognized in the literature, but only a few studies offer credible empirical
estimates of the extent of it (Gordon and Slemrod 2000, Sivadasan and Slemrod 2008,
Pirttilä and Selin 2011).
This paper provides new and intuitive evidence on the extent and significance of
income-shifting behavior. We focus on carefully quantifying the extent and signifi-
cance of income-shifting among the owners of privately held corporations in Finland.
In addition to average income-shifting responses, we analyze the heterogeneity of the
response among different types of firms and owners. We also study how the costs of
income-shifting and the size of the incentive affect the income-shifting response.
In general, income-shifting possibilities and opportunities to avoid taxes are larger
among high-income earners and business owners. Income-shifting incentives are es-
pecially pronounced within a so-called dual income tax system (DIT), in which wage
income and capital income are taxed separately with different tax rate schedules.
In Finland, the owners of privately held corporations can withdraw income from
their firm as a combination of wages and dividends, which are taxed with different tax
rules and regulations. Thus these owners have ample possibilities to engage in active
income-shifting in order minimize tax payments each year.
We use the dividend tax reform of 2005 in Finland as a source of variation in income-
shifting incentives. The reform abolished the single taxation of dividend income, and
thus increased the dividend tax rates for many owners of privately held corporations. In
general, the reform increased the incentives to replace dividend payments with wages.
Importantly, the reform changed dividend tax rates differently: for some owners there
were only small changes in tax rates whereas some owners faced large changes in income-
shifting incentives.
Variation in incentives together with population-wide data both at the owner and
firm level enable us to credibly estimate the extent of income-shifting behavior. The
extensive data allow us to precisely define the tax-optimal composition of total gross
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income (wages + dividends) which minimizes tax payments for each owner before and
after the reform. Analyzing how changes in the tax-optimal income composition affect
the changes in the realized income composition gives us a unique and novel approach
to estimate income-shifting responses.
We find that income-shifting behavior is evident among Finnish business owners.
Changes in the tax-optimal income composition have a notable and robust effect on
changes in the observed income composition. Furthermore, we find that the effect
is homogenous between different firms and owners. This implies that income-shifting
behavior cannot be explained or predicted by observed characteristics. However, the
size of the income-shifting incentive affects the response, as owners with larger incentives
are more active in income-shifting. This suggests that costs related to income-shifting
are relevant.
1.3.2. The Elasticity of Taxable Income and Income-Shifting: What is
“Real” and What is Not? Previous empirical literature shows that income taxes
generate significant behavioral responses among high-income earners and business own-
ers. However, it is not clear how much of this overall response is due to changes in real
economic behavior such as labor supply and effort, and how much is caused by tax
avoidance.
This paper distinguishes between real economic responses and income-shifting be-
tween different tax bases. Based on a theoretical framework, we build an empirical
model which formalizes the analysis of the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) un-
der income-shifting possibilities. In addition, we discuss how the explicit inclusion
of income-shifting affects the welfare analysis of income taxation. As an empirical
example, we analyze the behavioral responses among the owners of privately held cor-
porations in Finland. Within the Finnish dual income tax system, owners can withdraw
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income from their firm as a combination of wages and dividends, which are taxed with
separate tax rate schedules and tax rules.
In the standard model of the marginal excess burden, it does not matter how indi-
viduals respond to income taxes, as all behavioral responses (labor supply, effort, tax
avoidance, tax evasion etc.) indicate similar welfare effects (Feldstein 1999). However,
income-shifting might distort this line of thought for at least two reasons. First, the
shifted income is usually also taxed. Thus not all of the overall response is a pure dead-
weight loss. Second, due to potential and likely fiscal externalities, the real social costs
associated with income-shifting might be low, which further decreases the efficiency loss.
In the extreme case in which the income-shifting costs are mainly payments to other
agents in the economy (such as tax consultants), the marginal excess burden largely
stems from real responses (Chetty 2009b).
Our results show that over two thirds of the overall ETI of dividend income is
due to tax avoidance through income-shifting. For wage income, the only statistically
significant response comes through the income-shifting channel.
Our empirical example highlights that welfare evaluations based on overall ETI
estimates might be misleading for individuals with income-shifting possibilities. In the
case of Finnish business owners, the marginal excess burden of dividend taxes decreases
from 0.9 to 0.4 when we account for the fact that the shifted income is also taxed. If
income-shifting induces no real social costs, the excess burden further decreases to 0.3.
Finally, in addition to income-shifting responses, we find that dividend taxes also
induce real responses. These effects are present even when analyzing broader firm-level
income components that are less subject to tax avoidance, such as the turnover of the
firm. In contrast, wage taxes appear not to induce any real effects.
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1.3.3. Taxable Income Elasticity and the Anatomy of Behavioral Re-
sponse: Evidence from Finland. This paper studies the elasticity of taxable in-
come (ETI) using Finnish register-based data. In order to identify average ETI, I use
changes in flat municipal income tax rates as instruments for the changes in net-of-tax
rates. This instrument is not based on individual income, which provides the basis
for an exogenous instrument. In addition to average ETI, I study the structure of the
response by analyzing how the subcomponents of ETI, such as labor supply and de-
duction behavior, react to changes in tax rates. This anatomy of the overall response
(Slemrod 1996) has rarely been studied in the literature.
Under general conditions, ETI measures the marginal deadweight loss of income
taxation (Feldstein 1999). In addition to labor supply responses, ETI covers changes in,
for example, effort and productivity, deduction behavior, tax evasion and tax avoidance.
All of these margins are (more or less) important when considering the overall efficiency
of a tax system.
Nevertheless, detailed knowledge of how different subcomponents of ETI respond is
useful when designing the income tax system and the detailed structure of tax reforms,
especially from the point of view of minimizing the excess burden of income taxation.
In addition, the analysis of different subcomponents provides information on the actual
economic nature of the response. It is rather difficult for policymakers to influence
deep individual utility arguments, such as the opportunity cost of working. However,
for example, it is easier to influence tax deduction behavior through minor adjustments
to tax regulations.
Recent literature highlights that frequently used predicted net-of-tax rate instru-
ments are not necessarily consistent (see Blomquist and Selin 2010 and Weber 2014).
These instruments are functions of individual income in the base period, and thus possi-
bly endogenous in a model where changes in taxable income are regressed with changes
in the instrumented net-of-tax rate.
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In this study I use changes in municipal tax rates as instruments. The flat municipal
income tax rate is independent of individual income level, which is the basis for an
exogenous instrument in the ETI model. In addition, changes in municipal tax rates
have an effect on net-of-tax rates throughout the income distribution, and different
municipalities have changed their tax rates differently in different years. These improve
the identification of the average elasticity parameter, while avoiding some of the usual
difficulties in ETI estimation, namely non-tax-related changes in the shape of the income
distribution and the mean reversion of income.
My preferred estimate for the average ETI in Finland is 0.27. The preferred em-
pirical specification includes extensive individual and regional controlling. This point
estimate implies a marginal excess burden of around 15%, which is in line with most
recent ETI studies. Intuitively, this suggests that income taxation in Finland induces
non-negligible but not extensive efficiency losses.
The subcomponent analysis suggests that working hours and wage rates respond
less than tax deductions and irregular forms of compensation. This tentatively implies
that the overall behavioral response does not stem from profound economic parameters
such as the opportunity cost of working. Thus even though the average ETI estimate
is not trivial, changing the income tax rate seems to have only a limited effect on labor
supply and work effort, especially for full-time workers.
1.3.4. Unwilling, Unable or Unaware? The Role of Different Behavioral
Factors in Responding to Tax Incentives. Many empirical studies find varying
behavioral responses to similar tax incentives. Recent literature indicates that differ-
ent optimization frictions could explain the differing responses. Optimization frictions
prevent (some) taxpayers from responding to tax incentives in a manner implied by the
underlying long-run structural elasticity (Chetty 2012, Kleven and Waseem 2013). The
various frictions include, for example, search costs and other labor market rigidities
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(Chetty et al. 2011) and knowledge about tax rules and inattention (Chetty, Friedman
and Saez 2013, Chetty and Saez 2013). However, previous literature has not systemati-
cally addressed what types of institutions cause what kind of frictions, and how different
frictions affect the extent and nature of the behavioral response.
In this paper we study to what extent and in what manner individuals respond to
different tax incentives. Using detailed and population-wide panel data, we compare
behavioral effects induced by different tax and transfer schemes within similar or even
the same individuals in Finland. We use the bunching method in order to produce clear,
robust and comparable evidence. We study how individuals respond to local changes in
marginal income tax rates, and how university students respond to a distinct notch in
their budget set caused by an income limit within the national study subsidy program.
We find no bunching at the kink points of the marginal income tax rate schedule.
This result holds for any subgroup we study, including the self-employed and university
students. In general, the no-bunching result could be due to the small underlying
responsiveness, unawareness of the location of the kink points or the concept of marginal
tax rates, or an inability to adjust taxable income with reasonable costs.
However, our results suggest that the inability to respond does not fully drive the
negligible bunching at kink points. Based on the evidence for self-employed individuals
and university students, kink points do not induce responses even though these groups
are clearly able to affect their reported taxable income or labor supply in other similar
situations (personal gross income reported in round numbers by the self-employed,
and significant bunching at income notches by students). This suggests that either
unawareness or low elasticity could explain the negligible bunching at kink points, at
least for the self-employed and students.
Earning income above a sharp income limit results in Finnish university students
losing part of their study subsidy. We find that students bunch actively at this dis-
tinctive and relatively salient income notch. However, bunching around the notch is
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not sharp, and many students are located in the dominated region of behavior where
they could earn more disposable income by not exceeding the income limit. These ob-
servations suggest that the inability to respond affects the overall behavioral response.
However, these pieces of evidence imply that individuals react to sufficiently strong tax
incentives even when the ability to respond is attenuated.
Overall, our findings support the view that frictions play an important role in ex-
plaining observed taxpayer responses. However, in future research it is important to
distinguish more specifically between different types of frictions. Different reasons for
responding or not responding can entail different welfare implications. For example,
if behavioral responses are attenuated by unawareness, it is possible that individuals
will not respond in the future either, at least without a notable change in awareness of
the regulations. In contrast, if responses are affected by the inability to respond, the
underlying long-run structural elasticity might be larger than the observed response if
individuals are able to adjust their behavior over time.
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CHAPTER 2
Business Owners and Income-Shifting between Tax Bases:
Empirical Evidence from a Finnish Tax Reform1
Abstract. This study examines the extent of income-shifting between tax bases
among the owners of privately held businesses. The dual income tax system in Fin-
land offers noticeable incentives for income-shifting between wages and dividends for
business owners. The dividend tax reform of 2005 enables us to study how this par-
ticular form of tax avoidance reacts to an exogenous change in tax rates. Our results
support highly active income-shifting behavior. We find that the income-shifting ef-
fect is homogeneous across different owners and firms. However, we find that the size
of the tax incentive affects the size of the response, indicating that costs related to
income-shifting are important.
Keywords: business owners, income-shifting, income taxation
JEL codes: H24; H25; H32
2.1. Introduction
In many countries business owners and entrepreneurs have a range of opportunities
to shift income between different tax bases in order to reduce overall tax payments.
Therefore, it is important to know how income-shifting incentives affect the extent
of this behavior. Income-shifting is generally recognized, but only a few studies offer
empirical estimates of its size (Gordon and Slemrod (2000); Devereux et al. (2014);
Sivadasan and Slemrod (2008)). Our aim is to provide clear and intuitive evidence on
the extent and significance of income-shifting behavior.
1This essay is joint work with Jarkko Harju (Government Institute for Economic Research VATT).
An earlier version of this paper is one of the chapters of the academic dissertation of Jarkko Harju,
published in the Government Institute for Economic Research Publications series, 64, November 2013.
Another version of this paper is published in the Government Institute for Economic Research Working
Papers series, 43, December 2012.
26 Business owners and income-shifting
In general, income-shifting is especially relevant for the owners of privately held
businesses. Compared to wage earners, business owners have a wider scope of legal
possibilities to engage in income-shifting, as they can more easily apply different types
of income as a source of personal compensation.2 Income-shifting possibilities and
tax incentives are pronounced within a so-called dual income tax system (DIT). In a
typical DIT, the marginal tax rate schedules for labor income and capital income differ
significantly from one another.
In this study we carefully quantify the extent and significance of income-shifting
between different tax bases among the owners of privately held corporations in Finland.3
In addition, we analyze the heterogeneity of income-shifting among different types of
firms and owners. We also study how the size of the incentive affects the income-shifting
response.
We exploit the extensive corporate and dividend tax reform of 2005 in Finland as
a source of tax rate variation. The reform increased marginal tax rates on dividends
by abolishing the single taxation of dividends. Thus the reform increased incentives to
pay wages instead of dividends as a form of personal compensation for many business
owners. Importantly, income-shifting incentives changed differently among the owners.
For some owners there were only small changes in tax rates, whereas some owners faced
large changes in income-shifting incentives.
Total tax record data from the Finnish Tax Administration and the opportunity to
link tax record information from the owner-level to the firm-level create an interesting
starting point to analyze income-shifting responses. The extensive data allow us to
2In addition to many tax bases, income-shifting can also occur in other forms. A well-known example
is intertemporal income-shifting, for example, in the form of anticipating the forthcoming tax rate
change (see for example Goolsbee (2000) and le Maire and Schjerning (2013)). This paper focuses on
the longer run effect of income-shifting between tax bases.
3Privately held corporations are defined as corporations that are not listed on a public stock exchange.
In the Finnish tax system, dividends from listed and privately owned corporations are taxed at different
tax rates and tax regulations.
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precisely define the tax-optimal composition of total gross income for each owner before
and after the reform. Analyzing how changes in the tax-optimal income composition
affect the changes in the realized income composition gives us a unique and novel
approach to estimate income-shifting responses. Combining this approach with the
variation stemming from the tax reform of 2005 offers us credible empirical evidence on
the extent of income-shifting behavior.
We find clear support for the view that business owners are active in income-shifting.
Tax-optimal income composition has a clear and robust effect on the realized income
composition. However, although changes in income-shifting incentives are large, we
do not find a one-to-one income-shifting response with respect to tax incentives. This
implies that not all of the owners behave according to a simple tax-minimizing model.
We observe only little heterogeneity in the income-shifting response between dif-
ferent owners or firms. This indicates that income-shifting behavior is not focused on
certain types of firms and owners. However, we find that the size of the change in
the tax incentive affects the income-shifting responses. This suggests that the costs of
income-shifting are important.
Earlier empirical studies concerning income-shifting among business owners have
been rather rare. Gordon and Slemrod (2000) offer an overview of the income-shifting
literature and show evidence of tax-motivated income-shifting between personal and
corporate tax bases among corporate owners in the US. Devereux et al. (2014) also find
evidence of active income-shifting between corporate and personal tax bases in the UK.
In addition, Sivadasan and Slemrod (2008) find that a decrease in the effective tax rate
on wages led to a significant increase in managerial wage compensation for partners of
partnership firms in India. In addition, Pirttilä and Selin (2011) show that the relative
share of capital income increased among entrepreneurs after the implementation of the
Finnish DIT system in 1993. Moreover, concentrated ownership structure is shown to
increase tax planning among business owners in the US (Chetty and Saez (2010)).
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Within other Nordic Countries, Alstadsæter and Jacob (2012) discuss different tax
avoidance channels within the Swedish DIT system, and find evidence of income-shifting
between tax bases. Fjaerli and Lund (2001) find support for the hypothesis of active
income-shifting among entrepreneurs in Norway. In Denmark, le Maire and Schjerning
(2013) provide evidence of income smoothing and intertemporal income-shifting among
the self-employed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents the institutional
background of the Finnish DIT schedule and describes the main attributes of the 2005
tax reform. Section 2.3 depicts the theoretical background for our empirical analysis.
Section 2.4 presents the empirical model and descriptive statistics. Section 2.5 presents
the results, and Section 2.6 discusses the main findings.
2.2. Finnish dual income tax system and the tax reform of 2005
Since 1993 Finland has applied the principle of Nordic-type dual income taxation
(DIT). In DIT, earned income (wages, pensions, fringe benefits etc.) is taxed at a
progressive tax rate schedule, whereas personal capital income (interest income, capital
gains, dividends from listed corporations etc.) is taxed at a flat tax rate. A distinctive
feature of the DIT system is that the flat tax rate on capital income is set much
lower than the highest marginal tax rates on earned income. The lower flat tax rate for
capital income was motivated for various reasons, for example, broadening the tax base,
decreasing the scope for tax arbitrage, and increased global capital mobility which all
argue in favor of taxing capital income more leniently.4
Within the DIT system, the wide gap between the marginal tax rates on capital
income and earned income creates a tricky task for the legislator: How to formalize
the taxation of business owners in such a manner that it prevents income-shifting from
4A more detailed discussion on the Nordic type DIT can be found for example in Nielsen and Sørensen
(1997) and Sørensen (2005).
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heavily taxed earned income to more leniently taxed personal capital income? At the
same time, the lawmaker needs to assure that the return on invested capital is not
overtaxed.
In the Finnish system, this issue is arranged by limiting the amount of flat-taxed div-
idends. Dividends are split into two parts according to the net assets (assets-liabilities)
of the firm. The amount of dividends taxed at the capital income tax rate is based on
computational normal rate of return on net assets of the firm. This imputed rate of re-
turn (9%) is set to be the same for all owners of privately held corporations. Dividends
less than the computational normal return are flat-taxed, and any dividends exceeding
this amount are taxed with the progressive tax rate schedule.5
2.2.1. The Finnish dual income tax system until 2005 . Until 2005, Finnish
DIT applied a full imputation system of corporate taxes to remove the double taxation
of dividends, in which dividend income is taxed both as corporate profits and personal
income. In the full imputation system, dividends were exempt from corporate taxes.
Thus all dividends were effectively single taxed before 2005. To summarize, taxation of
wages and dividends from privately held corporations was organized according to the
following rules and principles:
• Dividends:
– Dividends up to the imputed normal return on the net assets of the firm
(assets−liabilities) were subject to the flat personal capital income tax
rate of 29%.
5For example, with net assets of 400,000 €, the maximum amount of dividends taxed at the flat tax
rate is 36,000 € when the imputed return is set to 9% (0.09*400,000=36,000). In other words, any
dividends received from the firm below 36,000 € are effectively taxed at the flat tax rate, and any
dividends above this amount are subject to progressive taxation with top marginal tax rates above
the flat rate. The value of net assets is calculated based the asset and debt values of the firm in the
previous year. The individual net asset share of the owner is calculated based on the ownership share
of the firm. Also, there are some individual adjustments to the net assets. For example, if the owner
or her family members live in a dwelling which is owned by the firm, the value of this dwelling is not
included in net assets when calculating the imputed return.
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– Dividends exceeding the imputed normal rate of return were taxed with
the progressive tax rate schedule.
– Corporate taxes were fully credited against the dividend tax liability of
a shareholder, resulting in single taxation of both flat taxed and progres-
sively taxed dividends.
• Wages were subject to the progressive tax rate schedule (0-56% in 2002). Wages
were single-taxed as they were deductible from firm profits.
• Wages and progressively taxed dividends were not taxed with similar tax rules.
Some tax deductions and tax credits were only allowed on wage income. In
contrast, progressively taxed dividends were not subject to firm-level social
security contributions.6
2.2.2. The dividend tax reform of 2005 . From 2005 onward, the full imputa-
tion system was abolished, and Finland switched to a system with double taxation of
dividends. After the reform, dividends are taxed according to the following principles:
• All dividends became subject to a corporate tax of 26%.
• The splitting rule of dividends according to the imputed rate of return on firm
net assets remained unchanged.7
• The flat-tax dividends below the imputed return and under 90,000 € remained
single-taxed, and are only subject to the flat corporate tax rate of 26%.
• 70% of all other dividend income is taxable in individual taxation, which results
in partial double taxation of dividends.
• Wages and progressively taxed dividends are still taxed differently in terms of
social security contributions.
6Firm-level social security contribution rate is 2-6% of wages, depending on the level of total wages
paid and the depreciations made by the firm.
7However, the imputed rate of return decreased slightly from 9.6% to 9%.
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The taxation of dividend income below the amount corresponding to the imputed re-
turn on net assets (9%) did not change significantly in the reform. Effectively, the flat
dividend tax rate for dividends below the imputed return and under 90,000 € decreased
from 29% to 26%. In contrast, the double taxation rule increased the dividend tax rate
for dividends above the imputed return. In addition to individual-level progressive tax-
ation, progressively taxed dividends became subject to the flat corporate tax rate of
26%. Thus after the reform, the minimum effective tax rate for progressively taxed
dividends is 26%, compared to 0% before the reform. Furthermore, the flat tax rate in-
creased from 29% to 40.5% for flat-tax dividends over 90,000 €. However, this concerns
only a relatively small number of owners.
One important aspect of the reform was its primary motive. According to the
European Union Court of Justice, the pre-reform Finnish system of full corporate tax
imputation was not in accordance with European Union legislation. Full imputation was
granted only to domestic shareholders. Also, the imputed tax credit was not granted
to Finnish shareholders whose firms operate abroad. These violated EU regulations on
equal tax treatment of all EU citizens. Therefore, Finnish legislators were more or less
forced to change the tax system towards a more unified tax treatment. This procedure
has important implications for our study. As the reform was not driven by the economic
and fiscal conditions in Finland, the tax reform of 2005 can be considered exogenous
from the point of view of the owners of privately held corporations.
Finally, the content of the 2005 tax reform was made public already in late 2003.
This enabled the owners to anticipate the changes induced by the reform.8 Also, special
transition rules were applied in 2005 to temporarily alleviate the double taxation of
dividends. For these reasons, we focus on analyzing the income-shifting effect by using
a longer time period of 2002-2008.
8For evidence of anticipation effects, see Kari et al. (2008).
32 Business owners and income-shifting
2.2.3. Tax incentives for income-shifting . There are many possibilities for
tax avoidance within the Finnish DIT system. For example, the owners of privately
held corporations may seek to minimize taxes by dynamically optimizing the level of
net assets, and in a static year-to-year context, by choosing an optimal combination of
wages and dividends as their personal compensation from the firm. In this paper we
focus on the latter case. Importantly, there are only a few minor legal limitations on
whether income is withdrawn as wages or dividends from a privately held corporation
in Finland.9
The tax-optimal division of total income between wages and dividends is relatively
complex. The dividend tax rate schedule comprises of both flat-tax and progressive
regions, which depend on the net assets of the firm. The amount of flat-tax dividends
can be simply calculated based on the net assets position of the firm. However, wage
taxes depend on the level of progressively taxed dividends, and vice versa. Wages
and progressively taxed dividends are part of the same tax base even though they are
effectively taxed with different tax rates. This complicates the optimization process.
When optimizing the income composition, the owner needs to simultaneously consider
both the effect of net assets and wage income on the tax rate of dividends. We discuss
this issue in the light of our empirical analysis in Section 2.4.2.
The dividend tax reform of 2005 changed the income-shifting incentives differently
among the owners of privately held corporations. Figure 1 illustrates the changes in
income-shifting incentives due to the tax reform of 2005. The Figure presents the
marginal tax rates (MTR) on wages and dividends before (2002) and after (2007) the
9A corporation cannot distribute dividends more than it holds distributable assets. These include,
for example, accumulated profits and non-tied equity. With some firms this might limit the scope for
income-shifting. Wages cannot be paid when there is no work contribution to the firm. Otherwise
wages may be regarded as a veiled distribution of profits. However, this is a minor issue in our
analysis since our sample of corporate owners hold an executive position in the firm, and are thus by
default assumed by the tax authorities to work for the firm. In contrast to wages and dividends, other
alternatives to withdraw income from the firm are restricted. These include, for example, shareholder
loans and share repurchases.
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reform with both zero firm-level net assets and with net assets of 170,000 € (median
net assets in the data set).10
From Figure 1 we can see that wages and dividends were almost equally taxed before
the reform for owners with no firm net assets (upper left graph). Differences in tax rates
come from the differences in social security payments and tax deductions between wage
and dividend income. Dividend taxes increased significantly for this group after 2005
(upper right graph). The double taxation of dividend income increased dividend taxes,
making the MTR on dividends higher than the MTR on wages. Thus for the owners
with low net assets, the reform induced incentives to shift income from dividends to
wages. However, as only 70% of dividends are taxable in individual taxation after the
reform, the difference between marginal tax rates decrease at large income levels.
There were no significant changes in the taxation of flat-tax dividends below 90,000€.
Before the reform, dividends were in general taxed more leniently than wages for owners
with median-level net assets (lower left graph). The reform of 2005 increased dividend
taxes for dividends above the flat-taxed region, which brings the MTR on wages and
dividends closer to each other (lower right graph).
In addition, the reform did not induce significant changes in income-shifting incen-
tives for owners with very large net assets. However, high-income owners with flat-tax
dividends above 90,000 € faced a large change in the MTR on dividends (from 29%
to 40.5%). Table A1 in the Appendix presents the marginal tax rates on wages and
dividends in numbers for the years 2002 and 2007 and for firm net assets of 0 €, 170,000
€ and 1,000,000 €.
10Wage tax rates and progressive dividend tax rates include central government taxes, average mu-
nicipal taxes, applicable individual social security contributions and all automatic deductions and tax
credits on either dividend income or wage income or both. In addition, MTR on wages includes firm-
level social security contributions. MTR on dividends includes the corporate taxes paid on dividends
after the reform.
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Figure 1. Marginal tax rates (MTR) on wages and dividends: Years
2002 (left) and 2007 (right). Above no net assets, below net assets of
170,000 € (in nominal euros each year)
We do not include mandatory pension and health insurance contributions as a tax
on wages in this study. Our empirical analysis is limited to owners who own at least 50%
of the firm alone or together with immediate family members, and hold an executive
position in the firm. These owners are termed YEL owners in the Finnish tax legisla-
tion. YEL owners are subject to special pension insurance rules. YEL owners report
a so-called YEL income to the insurance company from which mandatory insurance
payments are accumulated from.
Importantly, YEL income does not need to coincide with actual wages paid for
the owner. In other words, YEL income can be above or below actual wages paid
without implications or sanctions. Thus mandatory insurance contributions have no
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direct effect on the decision to divide total income into wages and dividends, and are
therefore excluded from the income-shifting analysis.11
However, annual wages might be correlated with the reported YEL income. Some
owners might report the actual wage income withdrawn from the firm as the YEL
income. For these owners, pension and health insurance contributions increase or de-
crease one-to-one with changes in actual wage income. If insurance contributions are
regarded as taxes, this reduces the incentives to pay out more wages. Therefore, in-
surance contributions might mitigate incentives to pay more wages as a response to
increased dividend taxation, which would decrease our income-shifting estimate.
2.3. Theoretical framework
The following model depicts the background for our empirical analysis of tax-
motivated income-shifting. In the model, the owner of a privately held corporation
both owns a significant part of the corporation and works for the firm. We assume that
the owner makes all the relevant decisions about the distribution of profits. Distributed
profits are paid out to the owner as a combination of wages and dividends. Wages and
dividends are taxed at different tax rate schedules.
The owner receives positive utility from her net-of-tax income (i.e. net wages and net
dividends) while costs related to income-shifting reduce utility. The utility function is of
the form U(W+D, γ), whereW is net wages andD is net dividends, and γ is the income
shifted from wages to dividends. The payout budget constraint is Π − R = W g + Dg,
11There are regulations for both the lower and upper limits of YEL income, which are, however, also
independent of actual taxable wage income. Insurance payments determine pensions when retired,
as well as the amount of many income-bound social benefits before retirement (e.g. public health
insurance). Thus owners have incentives to report a realistic YEL income which reflects the actual
income earning potential. There were no relevant changes in contribution rates or other regulation on
insurance payments for YEL owners in the time period we study. The overall average rate of insurance
payments on YEL income was 21.1% in 2002 and 20.8% in 2007.
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where Π is total profits from the firm before taxes, R is retained earnings, and W g and
Dg are gross wage income and gross dividend income from the firm.
As in Fjaerli and Lund (2001), we focus on the choice of the optimal combination
of wages and dividends conditional on given total profits Π and retained earnings R.
In other words, we do not model the income-generating process of the firm nor the
optimal level of retained and/or distributed profits, and thus simply assume Π and R
to be exogenous.12 We follow this assumption throughout the paper.
More formally, the owner’s optimization problem is to maximize
(2.3.1) U(W +D, γ) = (1− tW )(W˜ g − γ) + (1− tD)(D˜g + γ)− φ(γ)
subject to
(2.3.2) Π−R = W g +Dg
In the model, W˜ g and D˜g represent wage income and dividend income in the absence of
income-shifting opportunities. Thus (W˜ g−γ) = W g is the observed gross wage income,
and (D˜g + γ) = Dg is the observed gross dividend income. φ(γ) denotes the cost of
income-shifting, i.e. the cost of changing the tax base. For simplicity, we assume that
φ(γ) is convex, smooth, and φ(0) = 0 and φ′(0) = 0.
12The choice of retained earnings (R) is relevant in dynamic tax optimization. R increase net assets,
which are the base for determining the flat-taxed dividends in the Finnish DIT system. Other than
purely tax-motivated issues also define the amount of R (for example, essential investments and im-
perfect capital markets). In the analysis, we assume that R is already optimized, or simply taken as
given. However, the endogenous nature of R does not change the relevance of the static year-to-year
tax minimization problem of choosing the tax-optimal combination of wages and dividends. Also,
without year-to-year tax optimization, the benefits from dynamic tax avoidance diminish or vanish
altogether.
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In equation (2.3.1), tW = tW (W g, Dg, I) and tD = tD(W g, Dg, I) are the average
tax rates on wages and dividends, respectively. Both tax rates are always between zero
and one. The tax rate on wage income consists of personal income taxes plus firm-
level social security contributions. The tax rate on dividends includes dividend taxes
plus corporate taxes associated with withdrawn dividends. Wages are assumed to be
deductible from firm profits whereas dividends are not. Also, both tax rates depend
on income earned outside the firm, denoted by I. This income includes, for example,
wages from a secondary job and dividends from other non-listed firms. I is assumed to
be exogenous in the model.
Within this general framework, tW is also a function of dividends, and tD is a
function of wages. This implies that the amount of wages withdrawn from the firm
is allowed to have an effect on the tax rate on dividends, and vice versa. Also, we
assume that the tax rate schedules of wages and dividends are “well-behaved”, smooth
and monotonically increasing functions of W g, Dg and I.
We focus on income-shifting responses with given total income. Thus, to simplify
the model, we assume that W˜ g and D˜g are constant. Therefore, we get the optimal
income-shifting behavior by taking the first-order condition with respect to γ, which
gives us the following result
(2.3.3)
(
tW +
∂tW
∂γ
)
−
(
tD +
∂tD
∂γ
)
= φ′(γ)
Equation (2.3.3) says that the combination of gross wages and gross dividends is optimal
when the difference between the marginal tax rate on wages tW + ∂tW∂γ = MTRW and
the marginal tax rate on dividends tD + ∂tD∂γ = MTRD equals the marginal cost of
income-shifting.
38 Business owners and income-shifting
In our empirical analysis, we relate the change in the observed income combination
of wages and dividends (W g, Dg) to the change in the tax-optimal income combination
that minimizes tax payments. Our empirical benchmark of tax-minimizing income-
shifting behavior refers to the conceptual case where φ′(γ) = 0. With zero income-
shifting costs at the margin, the optimality condition is simply
(2.3.4) MTRW = MTRD
Equation (2.3.4) shows that in order to minimize tax payments, owners adjust γ such
that the marginal tax rates are equal. This optimality condition determines the com-
bination of gross wages and gross dividends which minimizes taxes. We denote this
tax-optimal gross income combination by (W ∗, D∗).
In addition, our framework provides an intuitive approach to study the significance
of income-shifting costs. These costs might be incurred by, for example, the oppor-
tunity cost of time or as payments to tax consultants. If owners choose their income
compositions such that MTRW = MTRD and thus (W g, Dg) = (W ∗, D∗), it would
indicate both high tax responsiveness of income-shifting as well as low (marginal) costs
of income-shifting. Instead, deviations from the tax-optimal condition imply that mar-
ginal income-shifting costs are non-negligible, and that these costs affect the decision
on the composition of income. Intuitively, this would suggest that income-shifting is
more active when tax incentives are larger.
Finally, assumptions behind the theoretical optimality conditions do not generally
hold in practice. First, real-life marginal tax rate schedules are not smooth and con-
tinuous. If anything, the schedules are more or less discontinuous piecewise linear
functions of income, which implies, for example, that the actual tax-minimizing income
combination rarely satisfies the condition MTRW = MTRD. Second, optimization
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errors might occur for at least some owners.13 Nevertheless, comparing actual income
combinations to the tax-optimal combination (W ∗, D∗) that minimizes tax payments
provides the conceptual background for analyzing the extent and significance of purely
tax-motivated income-shifting behavior.
2.4. Empirical analysis
2.4.1. Data. Our data set comes from the Finnish Tax Administration and it
includes information on the financial statements and tax records of Finnish businesses
and business owners for the years 2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008.14 We use it both in a
cross-sectional and balanced panel form. The unique characteristic of the data is that
they contain basically all Finnish businesses (all public and privately held corporations,
partnerships, sole proprietors etc.).
In this study we focus exclusively on the owners of privately held corporations. The
data contain all important tax information for the income-shifting analysis, for example,
taxable wages and dividends paid to the owner by the firm, and income earned from
other sources by the owner. By linking the firm-level and the owner-level data together
we can analyze the effects of tax changes on owners’ income-shifting behavior while
consistently controlling for various firm and individual-level effects.
The owner-level data include only those individuals who received positive dividends
from the firm during a tax year. Furthermore, we concentrate only on those owners
who work in their own firm in an executive position and own at least 50% of the firm
13Also, search costs and other optimization frictions might also matter in optimization behavior (Chetty
(2012)). Fjaerli and Lund (2001) suggest that benefits received from paying social security contribu-
tions increase wages as a form of compensation, although no compelling evidence has been found to
support this view. Also, wages can be seen as a socially more acceptable form of personal compensation.
All of these issues imply a deviation from the optimality conditions (2.3.3) and (2.3.4).
14As mentioned before, the content of the 2005 tax reform was made public already in late 2003.
Kari et. al (2008) show evidence that privately held corporations anticipated the reform by increasing
dividend payments right before the reform, and decreasing them right afterward. Therefore, we do not
use the years closest to the reform in our baseline analysis in order to alleviate the effects caused by
anticipation on the longer-run income-shifting response between tax bases.
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alone or together with immediate family members. We discuss the implications of data
and sample restrictions in the end of Section 2.5.
2.4.2. Empirical model . This section describes the empirical model we use in
our analysis. Our aim is to study how the tax-optimal income composition affects the
decision to withdraw different types of income from the firm. This relationship can be
described with the following cross sectional equation
(2.4.1) W gi,t = β ∗W ∗i,t +Xi,t + Ci + αt + εi,t,
where W gi,t is realized gross wages from the firm for each owner i in year t. Xi,t is a
matrix of firm and owner-level variables that affect the amount of gross wage income
and the income composition. Ci describes time-invariant variables that affect gross
wages, such as the innate ability of the owner.15 αt is the time trend, and εi,t is
the error term. Finally, W ∗i,t is the tax-optimal gross wage with given total income
Πi,t − Ri,t = W gi,t + Dgi,t. This is the variable of main interest in our analysis.16 The
parameter β denotes the average income-shifting effect on the actual gross wage income
withdrawn from the firm.
The tax-optimal gross wage W ∗i,t summarizes the effects that both the tax rate
schedules of wages and dividends have on the actual realized gross wage. As we have
the data actually used to tax the owners, we have all the information needed to define
the tax-minimizing valuesW ∗i,t andD∗i,t for every owner each year. The tax-optimal gross
wage is calculated using tax register information on the owner’s total gross income from
the firm (W gi,t+D
g
i,t), net assets of the firm, gross earned income from other sources and
15In the data, the available controls for Xi,t and Ci at the owner level are gender, age, other capital
income, the ownership share of the firm and location dummies. On the firm level, the controls are
turnover, number of employees, profits, total assets, and location and industry dummies.
16Fjaerli and Lund (2001) use a similar explanatory variable in their study.
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the tax code and regulations for the year in question. In order to define (W ∗i,t, D∗i,t) for
each owner, we formulate a function that gives the tax-minimizing amount of wages and
dividends for each possible total gross income level with respect to every combination of
net assets and other earned income. Table A2 in the Appendix presents an illustrative
example of the changes in tax optimal gross wages due to the tax reform of 2005.
As is well known in the microeconometric literature, estimating the causal effect of
the tax code on the composition of realized income using equation (2.4.1) is difficult in
practice. Many of the time-invariant variables that might affect income-shifting behav-
ior are generally unobserved, which violates the exogeneity condition cov(W ∗i,t, εi,t) = 0.
Therefore, we use panel data and the tax reform of 2005 to estimate the model. Taking
first differences of equation (2.4.1) between t and t+ j gives us our estimable model
W gi,t+j −W gi,t = (αt+j − αt) + β ∗ (W ∗i,t+j −W ∗i,t) +(2.4.2)
(Xi,t+j −Xi,t) + (εi,t+j − εi,t).
In this first-differences (FD) model, the time-invariant component Ci gets canceled
out by definition. In contrast to the cross sectional one-year analysis in Fjaerli and
Lund (2001), we focus on identifying the effect of the tax-optimal income component
on the composition of income using exogenous individual variation in W ∗i,t in time.
Our main interest is in the coefficient β, which expresses the average effect of a
change in tax-optimal gross wages on the change in realized gross wages, conditional
on given total gross income in t and t + j. The change in the tax-optimal gross wage
W ∗i,t+j−W ∗i,t = 4W ∗i,t captures all the changes in the individual tax code. In addition to
changes in wage taxes, 4W ∗i,t also captures changes in dividend and corporate taxation.
The testable hypotheses in the FD model are the following: If changes in the tax code
explain the changes in the composition of income, β should be statistically significant
42 Business owners and income-shifting
and greater than zero. A one-to-one income-shifting response implies that β = 1.
Also, adding control variables to the model should not affect the value of β, and the
coefficients for the controls should not be statistically significant if the change in the
tax code is the dominant factor behind the change in the division of income.
2.4.3. Identification. With regard to identifying parameter β, an important fea-
ture is that the tax reform of 2005 changed the income-shifting incentives differently
among similar business owners. In other words, 4W ∗i,t = W ∗i,t+j − W ∗i,t varies across
otherwise similar individuals in the data. Owners with similar total gross income
(W gi,t + D
g
i,t), other income, ownership share, firm total assets, profits and turnover
but with different levels of firm net assets faced different changes in the marginal tax
rates on dividends, and thus get different values of4W ∗i,t. Owners with high level of net
assets faced only modest changes in their marginal tax rates, whereas owners with low
net assets faced larger tax incentives to rearrange their total gross income. Also, differ-
ent levels of other earned income create variation in tax optimal gross wages, as income
earned outside the firm affects the MTR on wages and progressively taxed dividends
withdrawn from the firm. We assume that other earned income is exogenous.
A typical strategy in empirical tax research is to use marginal tax rates as explana-
tory variables when identifying behavioral effects of tax rate changes. However, using
4W ∗i,t as a regressor instead of 4(MTRWi,t −MTRDi,t) helps to alleviate the issue of
endogenous correlation between the income-shifting incentives and realized gross wages
W gi,t. The optimal wage W ∗i,t is not mechanically correlated with W
g
i,t or D
g
i,t at a given
level of total gross income, whereas marginal or average tax rates themselves are. In
most income tax systems, larger wages are associated with higher marginal tax rates
and vice versa, causing these variables to be endogenously correlated in a FD model.
However, realized gross wages do not affect the value of the tax-optimal gross wage, as
W ∗i,t is the same for any combination of W
g
i,t and D
g
i,t at a given level of (W
g
i,t + D
g
i,t).
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Therefore, in the presence of exogenous tax rate variation,4W ∗i,t is exogenous in the FD
model and does not necessarily require an instrumental variable. In contrast, marginal
tax rates would need an instrument, and valid instruments for them are not widely
available (see e.g. Saez et al. (2012)).
To identify β, we need to assume that in the absence of the reform, owners with
a large positive 4W ∗i,t do not change their W gi,t differently than owners with smaller
changes in 4W ∗i,t (and vice versa). We have no explicit reason to assume that with
given total income in t and t+ j, the change in the realized gross wage 4W gi,t depends
on other factors than income-shifting incentives, conditional on individual and firm-
level covariates. In the model, we control for other individual and firm-level variation
in a rich way. In equation (2.4.2), (Xi,t+j − Xi,t) includes changes in the ownership
share and other capital income on the owner’s side, and changes in turnover, number
of employees, profits and total assets on the firm side.
The empirical approach of using the tax-optimal income component as a measure
for income-shifting is not solely linked to Finnish institutions or the dual income tax
schedule. This approach generalizes to any case where there are two or more differently
taxed tax bases available to the taxpayer. This also applies to different types of income
which differ only with respect to tax deductions or allowances.
2.4.4. Descriptive statistics. One particular advantage of our empirical approach
is that we can describe the extent of income-shifting behavior in a visually clear and
convincing manner. After defining the tax-optimal combination of gross wages and
gross dividends, we can compare the optimal gross wages to realized gross wages. Fig-
ure 2 presents the distribution of the difference between the tax-optimal gross wages
and realized gross wages for the years 2002 and 2007. Tax-optimal behavior indicates
that this difference would be equal to zero. In other words, W gi,t−W ∗i,t = 0 if the owner
has optimized her wage ‘perfectly’ with respect to the tax code.
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Figure 2 presents the distribution of W gi,t−W ∗i,t around the tax-optimal point W gi,t−
W ∗i,t = 0 in the range of +/- 10,000 € (in bins of 200 €). The Figure shows that
income-shifting behavior is evident. There are clear spikes in the distribution at the
level of 0 in both 2002 and 2007. Thus both before and after the reform a notable
number of owners withdrew exactly the tax-optimal amount of wage income from the
firm. This implies that the tax codes on both wages and dividends affect the total
income composition of the owners, as there are no other explicit reasons for the owners
to pay out exactly the tax-optimal amount of wages. In relative terms, over 40% of
the owners in our sample optimized their wages perfectly in 2007. However, in 2002,
we observe less complete wage optimization, as slightly under 15% of owners optimized
their wages.
The monetary gains from income-shifting were smaller before 2005. This means
that gains from optimizing the income composition are, on average, larger after the
abolition of the single dividend tax system. This might explain the larger spike at the
tax-optimal point after the reform in 2007. We further discuss the size of tax incentives
and the costs of income-shifting in Section 2.5.
Figure 3 describes the relationship of the key variables in our study, the change in
realized gross wages 4W gi,t = W gi,t+j −W gi,t and the change in tax-optimal gross wages
4W ∗i,t = W ∗i,t+j − W ∗i,t between the years 2002 and 2007. There is a clear positive
relationship between the variables. On average, large 4W ∗i,t are followed by similar
4W gi,t, which indicates that changes in the realized division of gross income are closely
related to the changes in the tax code. Thus the owners who faced large changes in
the tax-optimal income composition also changed their realized wages more than the
owners who faced no or only small changes in tax incentives.
We fit a non-parametric Kernel estimate with a 95% confidence interval into Figure 3
to illustrate this effect and its statistical significance. Furthermore, the Figure illustrates
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Figure 2. The distribution of the difference between realized gross
wages and tax-optimal gross wages in 2002 (left) and 2007 (right)
that there is a considerable amount of variation in both realized and tax-optimal gross
wages in the data.
Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix present descriptive statistics for the key variables
in our analysis. Table A3 presents the variables at the owner level, and Table A4
describes the characteristics at the firm level. Finally, Figure A1 in the Appendix
presents the kernel density estimate distributions of wages and dividends received by
the owners of privately held corporations both before (2002) and after (2007) the tax
reform of 2005.
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2.5. Results
We estimate the first-differences equation (2.4.2) using a balanced panel data consisting
of the years 2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008, and adding year dummies to the model. We
estimate the equation in levels, as many observed and optimal wages and optimal divi-
dends are zeros both before and after the reform. Therefore, for example, a logarithmic
model would lose too much information.
The results are presented in Table 1. The first column shows the effect of a change
in tax-optimal gross wages on a change in the realized gross wages without control
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variables. The second column estimates are derived using the full set of individual and
firm-level controls.17
The owners of privately held corporations react to tax changes very actively. The
tax schedule has a remarkable and statistically significant effect on the decision to divide
income into wages and dividends. The coefficient for the optimal gross wage implies
that a one euro change in the tax-optimal gross wage affects realized gross wages by
66 cents on average. The estimate differs statistically from 1, so the income-shifting
response is not “perfect”.
Adding control variables does not change the results. The coefficient for optimal
gross wages with controls is very close to the coefficient without them, which supports
the view that the tax schedule is the main factor affecting the income composition. Fur-
thermore, adding controls does not affect the fit of the model. The R-squared statistic
increases only by 0.01 compared to the model with 4W ∗i,t as the only explanatory
variable.
We also use a two-year difference model for the years 2002 and 2008 to estimate
the longer-run average effect. These results are presented in Table A6 in the Appendix.
When using the data for 2002 and 2008, the point estimate for income-shifting is ap-
proximately 0.68. This estimate is not statistically different from that using the panel
data for all four years. This indicates that our results are robust and independent of
the length of the difference.18
The coefficients of the control variables are mostly insignificant or very small, which
again indicates that the changes in the tax system are the driving force behind the
17We also estimate the cross sectional model in equation (2.4.1) with a full set of control variables. The
cross section OLS estimates for the years 2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008 are presented in Table A5 in the
Appendix. The results show that the point estimates for the coefficients of tax-optimal gross wages
(W ∗) are between 0.90-1.05 and highly significant in every year. These results imply that income-
shifting incentives and realized behavior seem to be highly correlated. Fjaerli and Lund (2001) get
qualitatively similar results in their cross sectional analysis for Norway.
18The results are robust using all pairs of pre and post-reform years. Other results are available from
the authors upon request.
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decision on income composition. However, the ownership share appears to have a
negative effect on realized gross wages. When ownership is concentrated, the owner
has more power to make tax optimal decisions on income composition. In this case,
increased ownership appears to open up a way to pay out more low-taxed dividends at
the expense of wages (given the changes in the tax code). This result is also expected
in the light of previous literature. Chetty and Saez (2010) find that tax-optimization
is more active among corporate owners who own larger shares of the firm.
In addition, a change in the turnover of the firm has a positive and statistically
significant effect on the difference in realized gross wages, although the size of the effect
is very small. This can be interpreted as indicating that the growth of the firm (in
the sense of turnover) has a small increasing effect on wage compensations, given the
change in the tax code. All the other coefficients for firm-level controls are statistically
insignificant, including the number of employees, profits and total assets. Therefore,
changes in most of the firm-side variables have no significant effect on the division of
income on average.
Figure 2 in Section 2.4.4 above gives indicative evidence which supports the hypoth-
esis that costs and benefits matter in income-shifting behavior. The Figure shows that
tax-optimal behavior is much more common after the reform of 2005. One explana-
tion for this finding is that income-shifting became more profitable in monetary terms.
After the reform, the introduced double taxation of dividends exceeding the imputed
return increased the difference of dividend and wage tax rates in many cases, which
also increased monetary gains from income-shifting.
In addition, we use a quantile regression approach to illustrate how the size of the
incentive affects the response. In Figure 4, we plot the estimates at separate percentile
points with the 95% confidence intervals using equation (2.4.2) with the full set of
controls. The dashed line in the Figure denotes the average estimate.
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(1) (2)
VARIABLES DWage DWage
DW ∗ 0.662*** 0.661***
(0.007) (0.013)
DOwnership share -71.580**
(33.259)
DTurnover^ 0.129***
(0.046)
DTotal assets^ 0.200
(0.206)
DProfits^ -0.167
(0.176)
DEmployees 9.927
(9.469)
DOther capital
income^
-0.549
(0.382)
Observations 17,237 17,237
R-squared 0.347 0.348
Notes: Owner-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05. First-differences
model estimated by OLS using balanced panel data for 2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008: the dependent variable is
the difference in realized gross wages.
^ In 1,000 euros
Table 1. Estimation results
As can be seen from the Figure, the point estimates are larger at higher percentiles.
At the 95th percentile point, the estimate is not statistically different from 1. In
contrast, the estimates are smaller for those whose tax incentives were not affected as
much by the tax reform. Thus it appears that the income-shifting response is positively
correlated with the size of the incentive change.
To further study the heterogeneity of the income-shifting effect, we estimate the
model by firm and owner-level characteristics. We categorize firms into four equally
sized groups and estimate equation (2.4.2) separately for these groups. We use base-
year (2002) turnover, total assets and the number of employees as continuous variables
to study if there are differences in income-shifting responses with respect to the size of
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Figure 4. Quantile regression results
the firm. We also estimate the model by age and gender of the owner. In addition, we
examine if there are differences in income-shifting activity between industries.
The results for different subgroups are presented in Table A7 in the Appendix. In
general, the income-shifting responses are homogeneous between different groups. There
are no significant differences in income-shifting activity between women and men, age
groups or the size of the firm. Thus these results suggest that the average income-
shifting response is not driven by certain types of owners or firms. However, some
differences can be detected at the industry level. For example, the owners of firms in
financing and agricultural industries shift income more actively than others.
There are some issues regarding the empirical setup that might affect the results.
First, our data are limited to owners who receive dividends from their firms in each year.
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This might bias the estimated average income-shifting effect among Finnish business
owners. Also, the direction of the potential bias is somewhat unclear. The owners who
do not pay any dividends might be more or less active in tax-motivated income-shifting
compared to the owners who pay dividends. However, it is plausible that the owners
not included in the data might be less active in income-shifting, especially before the
reform of 2005 when there was in general larger tax incentives to pay dividends.
Second, our FD analysis uses balanced panel data for a relatively long time period
(2002-2008). This implies that our estimating sample includes only owners who were
successful enough to continue their business activity throughout this period. It might
be that these owners are also more active in income-shifting. Thus this might cause an
upward bias in our average estimate.
Third, our sample is limited to owners who own at least 50% of the firm alone or
together with family members. It is presumable that these owners are more responsive
to tax incentives than those who own less than 50%. The owners with more than
50% of the shares of the firm have more power to make tax-optimal decisions on profit
distributions.
Finally, as mentioned in Section 2.2, pension and health insurance contributions
might affect the income-shifting behavior. Insurance contributions are based on self-
reported YEL income, which need not to coincide with the actual gross wage income
of the owners in our estimating sample. However, wages and YEL income might be
correlated among some owners. If insurance contributions are considered as taxes, this
might decrease the incentives to increase wage payments as a response to dividend tax
increase. This might create a downwards bias to our estimate, as we do not include
insurance contributions based on YEL income as taxes when defining the tax-optimal
wages.
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2.6. Discussion
The main objective of this paper is to provide clear and intuitive evidence on the
extent of income-shifting between tax bases among private business owners. We do this
by relating the change in the actual income composition of the owner to the change in
the tax-optimal income composition. In addition, we explore the heterogeneity of the
income-shifting response among different owners and firms, and study how the size of
tax incentives affect income-shifting behavior.
In many tax systems, business owners can minimize taxes by choosing an optimal
combination of different income types as their personal compensation from the firm.
The corporate and dividend tax reform of 2005 in Finland significantly changed the
income-shifting incentives for many business owners. In the reform, the taxation of
dividends tightened, which increased the incentives to pay wages as a form of personal
compensation.
In the light of behavioral tax research, the reform had an appealing feature: the
incentives to replace dividends with wages varied among approximately similar corpo-
rate owners. This variation in incentives together with extensive micro data, including
information on both the owner and firm-level, enable us to credibly analyze the extent
of income-shifting behavior.
We find strong and robust evidence that owners are active in income-shifting. Our
main result shows that a one euro change in the tax-optimal gross wage results in a 66
cent change in realized gross wages on average. This indicates that the effect of the tax
code on the composition of income is significant both statistically and economically.
However, our estimate is statistically different from 1, which implies that not all of the
owners behave according to a simple tax-minimizing model.
The income-shifting response appears to be homogeneous between different firms
and owners. For example, the size of the firm does not affect the estimate. This implies
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that income-shifting behavior is not focused on certain types of firms and owners, and
thus it cannot be explained by observable characteristics.
However, our results show that larger income-shifting incentives clearly increase the
size of the income-shifting response. Quantile regression results indicate that responses
are larger when incentives to shift income are larger. This (indirectly) implies that the
monetary benefits from income-shifting affect the response.
These results suggest that a decrease in tax revenue caused by income-shifting can
also be influenced by affecting the costs of tax optimization. At least to some extent,
the costs and benefits of income-shifting can be affected by simply adjusting the tax
regulations, and by decreasing the difference of the marginal tax rates on different
tax bases. Finally, it is important to note that our analysis focuses solely on the
income-shifting response. Tax rate changes might also have a significant effect on other
behavioral margins, such as investments or entrepreneurial activity.
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Appendix
MTR on wages MTR on
dividends (no
net assets)
MTR on
dividends
(net assets
170k)
MTR on
dividends
(net assets
1,000k)
Income 2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007
5,000 18.1 11.6 23.1 32.3 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
10,000 23.9 17.0 19.3 35.1 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
15,000 37.4 32.6 36.3 36.6 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
20,000 43.4 32.6 42.3 41.3 23.1 32.3 29.0 26.0
25,000 43.4 43.1 42.3 46.7 23.1 35.1 29.0 26.0
30,000 43.4 43.1 42.3 46.7 32.3 36.6 29.0 26.0
35,000 49.4 48.5 48.3 49.5 36.3 41.3 29.0 26.0
40,000 49.4 48.5 48.3 49.5 42.3 46.7 29.0 26.0
45,000 49.4 48.5 48.3 49.5 42.3 46.7 29.0 26.0
50,000 49.4 48.5 48.3 49.5 48.3 49.5 29.0 26.0
55,000 56.4 48.5 55.3 49.5 48.3 49.5 29.0 26.0
60,000 56.4 48.5 55.3 49.5 48.3 49.5 29.0 26.0
65,000 56.4 56.5 55.3 53.7 48.3 49.5 29.0 26.0
70,000 56.4 56.5 55.3 53.7 48.3 49.5 29.0 26.0
75,000 56.4 56.5 55.3 53.7 55.3 49.5 29.0 26.0
80,000 56.4 55.6 55.3 53.2 55.3 53.7 29.0 26.0
85,000 56.4 55.6 55.3 53.2 55.3 53.7 29.0 26.0
90,000 56.4 55.6 55.3 53.2 55.3 53.7 29.0 26.0
95,000 56.4 55.6 55.3 53.2 55.3 53.2 29.0 32.3
100,000 56.4 54.8 55.3 52.8 55.3 53.2 23.1 35.1
Notes:
MTR on wages is calculated with dividend income equal to zero, and vice versa. MTR on wages includes
average municipal taxes, central government income taxes, automatic tax deductions and tax credits and
average firm-level social security contributions (3%). MTR on wages does not include pension and health
insurance contributions, as these are based on self-reported YEL income which is not determined by wage
income (see Section 2). MTR on wages does not include deductions based on insurance contributions. MTR
on dividends includes corporate taxes on withdrawn dividends (after 2005). MTR on dividends includes all
automatic tax deductions and tax credits. MTR on progressively taxed dividends includes average municipal
taxes and central government income taxes. Marginal tax rates are calculated using Stata and the Finnish
JUTTA microsimulation model.
Table A1. Marginal tax rates (MTR) on wages and dividends with dif-
ferent levels of firm net assets, years 2002 and 2007 (in nominal euros)
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Total
gross
income
Net
assets
Tax optimal
gross wage
2002
Tax optimal
gross wage
2003
Tax optimal
gross wage
2007
Tax optimal
gross wage
2008
15,000 10,000 7,700 7,300 14,500 14,100
50,000 10,000 7,700 7,300 49,100 49,100
100,000 10,000 7,700 7,300 67,500 66,000
15,000 100,000 12,000 12,200 14,500 14,000
50,000 100,000 7,700 7,300 41,000 41,000
100,000 100,000 7,700 7,300 67,500 66,000
15,000 500,000 12,000 12,200 14,500 14,000
50,000 500,000 12,000 12,200 14,500 14,000
100,000 500,000 7,700 7,300 55,000 55,000
Notes:
The optimal gross wage levels are defined assuming that the owner owns 100% of the shares and that the owner
has no earned income from other sources.
In general, earned income from other sources lowers the tax optimal gross wage, especially before the reform.
For example, assume the owner has 2,500 € of other earned income with total gross income from the firm being
50,000 € and net assets 100,000 €. The tax optimal gross wage in 2003 is in this case 4,800 € (compared to
7,300 € without other earned income). However, with the same combination of total gross income, net assets
and other earned income, the optimal gross wage does not change after the reform (41,000 € in both 2007 and
2008). This is due to the fact that after 2005 the tax rates for progressively taxed dividends increased sharply.
After the reform, it is not in general optimal for the owner to replace wages with dividends after receiving a
modest amount of other earned income.
Table A2. Tax-optimal gross wages before (2002, 2003) and after (2007,
2008) the 2005 tax reform with different levels of total gross income and
net assets of the firm (in nominal euros)
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Figure A1. The distributions of wage and dividend income of the own-
ers of privately held corporations in 2002 and 2007 (in nominal euros)
Year Stat Wages
Optimal
wages Dividends
Optimal
dividends
Total
income
Ownership
share
2002 Mean 19,806 5,317 27,105 41,594 46,911 0.82
Median 18,485 7,463 12,222 28,797 34,567 .93
SD 16,986 3,499 82,510 84,965 85,066 0.23
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
2003 Mean 19,244 4,794 32,744 47,194 51,988 0.84
Median 17,223 7,011 15,000 31,783 36,996 .95
SD 17,318 3,401 142,723 144,477 144,533 0.23
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
2007 Mean 23,083 26,033 32,767 29,817 55,850 0.82
Median 20,440 23,888 14,910 11,267 40,170 .99
SD 22,443 19,416 99,552 100,123 102,931 0.22
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
2008 Mean 23,980 26,233 35,487 33,234 59,468 0.82
Median 20,880 23,739 15,400 12,680 42,300 .99
SD 24,064 20,041 103,706 105,115 107,824 0.22
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
Table A3. Descriptive statistics (2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008): Main
owners (in nominal euros, estimation sample)
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Year Stat Turnover Employees Total
assets
Net
assets
2002 Mean 782,450 10.35 400,805 285,155
Median 227,617 4 141,598 100,222
SD 4,092,140 32.98 2,174,166 1,669,665
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
2003 Mean 946,741 10.27 529,807 381,950
Median 289,713 4 192,240 114,693
SD 3,982,281 30.64 2,375,763 5,233,616
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
2007 Mean 1,082,630 10.60 723,319 448,007
Median 321,193 4 253,792 152,155
SD 3,155,168 36.14 2,985,295 2,378,661
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
2008 Mean 1,152,018 10.63 811,968 516,807
Median 329,951 4 272,411 168,326
SD 3,329,805 36.25 3,452,935 2,791,899
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
Table A4. Descriptive statistics (2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008): Firms (in
nominal euros, estimation sample)
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(2002) (2003) (2007) (2008)
VARIABLES Wage Wage Wage Wage
W ∗ 1.050*** 1.054*** 0.904*** 0.919***
(0.075) (0.071) (0.014) (0.015)
age 731.402*** 796.057*** 152.225 13.974
(178.766) (177.301) (166.080) (180.098)
age sq. -8.102*** -9.032*** -1.295 0.104
(1.912) (1.852) (1.650) (1.771)
male 2,054.167*** 1,887.503*** 222.468 103.157
(632.076) (610.805) (471.941) (500.517)
ownership
share
-5,615.921*** -6,330.395*** -3,311.677*** -1,888.356**
(1,003.374) (975.413) (773.002) (881.820)
turnover^ 0.086 -0.033 0.190 0.351**
(0.153) (0.260) (0.127) (0.171)
total assets^ -0.227 0.988** 0.304* 0.338**
(0.228) (0.471) (0.184) (0.164)
profits^ 8.841*** -0.275 -0.554* -0.037
(2.300) (3.150) (0.330) (0.240)
employees 18.056 28.357 5.856 3.568
(23.840) (25.448) (5.471) (7.255)
capital
income^
-1.132*** -11.207 0.610
(0.424) (9.352) (1.833)
Constant -4,342.653 -2,223.960 2,042.214 2,317.819
(4,351.468) (4,047.587) (4,210.924) (4,606.181)
Observations 5,160 5,611 6,244 6,237
R-squared 0.115 0.114 0.637 0.613
Notes: Owner-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
^ In 1,000 euros
Table A5. Cross-section results for the years 2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008
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(1) (2)
VARIABLES DW DW
DW ∗ 0.681*** 0.680***
(0.012) (0.016)
DOwnership share -9.120
(52.054)
DTurnover^ 0.130
(0.083)
DTotal assets^ 0.183
(0.279)
DProfits^ -0.629
(2.465)
DEmployees -7.535
(12.391)
DOther capital income^ -0.352
(0.228)
Observations 5,613 5,613
R-squared 0.348 0.349
Notes: Owner-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01.
^ In 1,000 euros
Table A6. Results for the years 2002 and 2008
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Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover Employees Employees
0-25th p 26-50th p 51-75th p 76-100th
p
0-25th p 26-50th p
VARIABLES DW DW DW DW DW DW
4W ∗ 0.676*** 0.597*** 0.646*** 0.613*** 0.604*** 0.626***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.033) (0.025) (0.034)
Observations 1,528 1,529 1,529 1,529 2,009 1,387
R-squared 0.383 0.345 0.365 0.253 0.317 0.332
Employees Employees Total
assets
Total
assets
Total
assets
Total
assets
51-75th p 76-100th
p
0-25th p 26-50th p 51-75th p 76-100th
p
VARIABLES DW DW DW DW DW DW
4W ∗ 0.606*** 0.655*** 0.738*** 0.711*** 0.640*** 0.647***
(0.027) (0.033) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033)
Observations 1,301 1,418 1,529 1,529 1,529 1,528
R-squared 0.377 0.302 0.359 0.417 0.380 0.262
Age Age Age Age Male Female
0-25th p 26-50th p 51-75th p 76-100th
p
VARIABLES DW DW DW DW DW DW
4W ∗ 0.601*** 0.628*** 0.606*** 0.583*** 0.623*** 0.590***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.037) (0.017) (0.033)
Observations 1,597 1,587 1,623 1,308 5,247 868
R-squared 0.330 0.348 0.283 0.274 0.318 0.355
Agriculture Mining Industry ConstructionCommerce Hotels
VARIABLES DW DW DW DW DW DW
4W ∗ 0.836*** 0.561*** 0.692*** 0.570*** 0.600*** 0.638***
(0.108) (0.081) (0.048) (0.035) (0.030) (0.092)
Observations 70 156 842 1,070 1,500 137
R-squared 0.537 0.394 0.335 0.308 0.322 0.430
Logistics Finance Estate Education Health
care
Other
services
VARIABLES DW DW DW DW DW DW
4W ∗ 0.563*** 0.964*** 0.636*** 0.693*** 0.658*** 0.579***
(0.078) (0.107) (0.028) (0.124) (0.068) (0.108)
Observations 462 63 1,433 48 208 125
R-squared 0.254 0.660 0.342 0.590 0.423 0.346
Note: Owner-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01.
Table A7. Results for different subgroups, 2002-2008

CHAPTER 3
The Elasticity of Taxable Income and Income-shifting: What is
“Real” and What is Not?1
Abstract. Previous literature shows that income taxation significantly affects the
behavior of high-income earners and business owners. However, it is still unclear how
much of the response is due to changes in effort and other real economic activity, and
how much is caused by tax avoidance and tax evasion. This distinction is important
because it affects the welfare implications and policy recommendations. In this pa-
per we distinguish between real responses and tax-motivated income-shifting between
tax bases. We show how the explicit inclusion of income-shifting affects the welfare
analysis of income taxation. In our empirical example we find that income-shifting
accounts for over two thirds of the overall elasticity of taxable dividend income among
Finnish business owners. The large income-shifting response significantly decreases
the marginal excess burden compared to the standard model in which the overall elas-
ticity defines the welfare loss. However, in addition to income-shifting, we find that
dividend taxation significantly affects the real behavior of owners
Keywords: elasticity of taxable income, tax avoidance, income-shifting, real re-
sponses
JEL codes: H24; H25; H32
3.1. Introduction
Income taxes are known to generate significant behavioral effects among high-income
earners and business owners (see a survey by Saez, Slemrod and Giertz 2012). However,
the interpretation of the behavioral response is often difficult because business owners
and high-income earners have many margins in which they can respond to taxes. In
addition to real responses (labor supply, effort etc.), they have many opportunities
to legally avoid or illegally evade taxes. Although previous research shows that tax
1This essay is joint work with Jarkko Harju (Government Institute for Economic Research VATT).
Earlier versions of this paper are published in the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation
Working papers series, WP 13/13, November 2013, CESifo Working paper series, 4905, July 2014, and
Government Institute for Economic Research Working paper series, 56, September 2014.
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avoidance is a significant behavioral margin for these groups (see e.g. Slemrod and
Gillitzer 2014), it is still unclear how much of the overall response is due to changes in
real economic activity, and how much is due to avoidance.
Income-shifting is one of the most relevant tax avoidance channels for business
owners and high-income earners (see e.g. Gordon and Slemrod 2000, Goolsbee 2000).
Distinguishing between real responses and income-shifting between different tax bases
is important because the nature of the response largely affects the welfare conclusions
and policy recommendations (Slemrod 1995, Piketty, Saez and Stantcheva 2014). For
example, real responses stemming from deeper behavioral parameters such as labor-
leisure preferences are not under direct government control. In contrast, income-shifting
can be governed more easily by re-designing the details of the tax system.
Traditionally, the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) quantifies the excess burden of
the income tax (Feldstein 1995, 1999). However, income-shifting between tax bases is
one of the most relevant issues that might overstate ETI as a measure of welfare losses.
ETI with respect to its own marginal tax rate does not account for the fact that other
tax bases might have positive tax rates. Thus income-shifting is not a full deadweight
loss if the shifted income is also taxed (Saez 2004, Chetty 2009).
Our main contribution to the literature is to distinguish between real responses and
income-shifting responses. We show how the explicit inclusion of income-shifting affects
the welfare analysis of income taxation. Based on previous theoretical literature (e.g.
Piketty et al. 2014), we build an empirically implementable model of ETI under income-
shifting possibilities. Adding the difference of the net-of-tax rates on different tax
bases to the standard ETI model enables identification of the average income-shifting
elasticity and the average real elasticity. Furthermore, we demonstrate that different
empirical specifications lead to different interpretations of the estimated parameters.
As an empirical example, we estimate both real responses and income-shifting re-
sponses for the owners of privately held corporations in Finland. This group faces large
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incentives and ample possibilities to shift income between different tax bases, which
makes these owners a particularly suitable group for analyzing both income-shifting
and real responses. In the Finnish dual income tax system, the owners of privately
held corporations can withdraw income from their firm as a combination of wages
and dividends, which are taxed with separate tax rate schedules and tax rules. There
are only a few minor legal limitations on whether income is withdrawn as wages or
dividends, and explicit tax rate differences induce clear incentives for tax-motivated
income-shifting. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to explicitly estimate both
real elasticity and income-shifting elasticity separately using a well-defined empirical
model, and individual-level panel data and tax reforms.
We use extensive panel data of Finnish business owners. We link firm-level tax
record information to the owner-level personal tax data, which is a novelty in the ETI
literature. With this data set we are able to richly control for firm-level effects on the
personal income trends of the owners. The comprehensive data along with the dividend
tax reform of 2005 in Finland creates an interesting opportunity to study the role of
both income-shifting and real income creation.
Our results show that the income-shifting responses are highly significant both sta-
tistically and economically. Over two thirds of the overall ETI among Finnish business
owners is due to income-shifting. However, income-shifting does not appear to be the
whole story, as we also find positive real elasticity estimates for dividends. In addition,
real responses are present even when analyzing broader firm-level income components,
such as turnover and profits. These are less subject to tax avoidance than wages and
dividends withdrawn from the firm. The tax elasticities of these firm-level income
components are also rarely analyzed in public finance literature.
Our results highlight that welfare evaluations based on standard ETI estimates
might be misleading for individuals with income-shifting possibilities. For example, the
marginal excess burden of dividend taxes decreases from 0.9 to 0.4 when we account
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for the fact that the shifted income is also taxed. The large income-shifting effect also
affects policy recommendations. Even though dividends appear to be very responsive
as a whole, dividend taxes do not induce substantial distortions in the real economy
among the owners of privately held corporations in Finland.
The ETI literature began to expand after the pioneering studies by Lindsey (1987)
and Feldstein (1995). Feldstein (1995) estimates the taxable income elasticity to be large
in the US, ranging from 1-3 depending on the income group. Many subsequent studies
focus on improving the identification of the ETI model. Along with the refinements, the
estimates have decreased markedly. A wide range of studies report average elasticity
estimates from 0 to 0.6. For example, the widely cited Gruber and Saez (2002) study
finds ETI of 0.2 for mid-income earners, and 0.6 for high-income earners. A review of
earlier empirical results is presented in the recent survey by Saez et al. (2012).
Recently, the literature has identified the behavioral response using income distri-
butions around the discontinuous kink points of the marginal income tax rate schedule.
Saez (2010) shows that excess bunching around kink points is proportional to the local
ETI at the kink. Many studies show that the excess mass around kink points is larger
for self-employed individuals (see Saez 2010, Chetty et al. 2011 and Bastani and Selin
2014). This indicates that the self-employed respond actively to income tax rates, and
have more opportunities to adjust their behavior to them. As an additional analysis, we
also estimate the local tax responsiveness of Finnish business owners using the bunching
method. We find that business owners bunch actively at the dividend income tax rate
kink point, which supports our main results.
Previous studies from different countries indicate that income-shifting between tax
bases is substantial for high-income earners and business owners. For example, Gor-
don and Slemrod (2000) show evidence of active income-shifting between corporate and
personal tax bases in the US. Devereux et al. (2014) show that income-shifting be-
tween corporate and personal tax bases is also active in the UK. In addition, Sivadasan
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and Slemrod (2008) find significant income-shifting responses for partners in partner-
ship firms in India, and Romanov (2006) finds income-shifting between personal and
corporate tax bases among high-income self-employed professionals in Israel.
Piketty et al. (2014) formulate a theoretical framework for analyzing tax avoidance
effects as a part of the ETI of high-income earners. By distinguishing between different
forms of behavioral responses (tax avoidance, real responses and bargaining channels),
they study the implications of optimal income taxation at the upper end of the income
distribution. They also provide empirical cross-country evidence which indicates that
both the real and avoidance responses are small while bargaining effects dominate.
In the Nordic countries, le Maire and Schjerning (2013) derive a dynamic extension
to the bunching method, and show that over half of the bunching effect among Danish
entrepreneurs is due to intertemporal income-shifting. This result suggests that the
excess burden calculated by using the baseline bunching method overestimates the
welfare effect. By using panel data methods, Kleven and Schultz (2013) estimate the
cross-tax elasticities of taxable earned income and taxable capital income components
within the Danish tax system. In general, they find small substitutability between
earned income and capital income, which, however, supports the view that income-
shifting effects exist. In addition, Alstadsæter and Jacob (2012) show that income-
shifting is active among Swedish corporate owners.
In Finland, Harju and Matikka (2012) show that absent any real effects, income-
shifting between tax bases is active among the main owners of privately held corpo-
rations in Finland. Pirttilä and Selin (2011) show evidence of responses to the dual
income tax reform in Finland in 1993. They report that entrepreneurs and business
owners increased their relative share of capital income when capital income tax rates
were decreased.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the theoretical model. Sec-
tion 3.3 presents our empirical model. Section 3.4 describes the Finnish income tax
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system and recent tax reforms. Section 3.5 discusses identification issues, introduces
the data and presents the descriptive statistics. Section 3.6 presents the results, and
Section 3.7 presents the robustness checks. Section 3.8 discusses the main findings and
welfare implications.
3.2. Theoretical model
3.2.1. Taxable income model. Following Piketty et al. (2014), we assume a
quasi-linear utility function of the form ui(c, z) = c− hi(z), where c is consumption, z
is taxable income, and hi(z) denotes the cost of effort to produce income for individual
i. The cost function is assumed to be convex and increasing in z. Utility is maximized
under the budget constraint c = z(1− τ) +R, where (1− τ) is the net-of-tax rate (one
minus the marginal tax rate) on a linear segment of a non-linear tax rate schedule. R
denotes virtual income.
Optimization of the utility function with respect to the budget constraint results in
individuals producing taxable income up to the point where h′i(z) = (1 − τ). Thus in
the absence of income effects, individual taxable income supply is a function of (1− τ).
Next, consider a marginal change in (1− τ). The elasticity of taxable income (ETI)
can be written as
(3.2.1) ez =
(1− τ)
z
dz
d(1− τ)
where ez is the average ETI. In addition to changes in labor supply, ez also covers
changes in, for example, work effort and productivity. In addition, the average ETI
covers tax avoidance and tax evasion.
The intuition behind this Feldstein (1999) framework is that all behavioral responses
affect the excess burden of income taxation. Individuals increase z until its marginal
cost equals the tax rate, and thus the overall inefficiency can be summarized with ETI.
This requires that the marginal cost of effort, the marginal cost of tax avoidance and
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the marginal cost of tax evasion etc. all equal the net-of-tax rate. In other words,
h′i(z) = (1− τ) no matter how z is adjusted, and thus estimating ez is all we need for
welfare analysis.
3.2.2. Taxable income and income-shifting. The standard ETI in equation
(3.2.1) implicitly includes income-shifting from or to another tax base due to a change
in (1− τ). However, among other previous papers that discuss the implications of tax
avoidance in ETI analysis (e.g. Saez et al. 2012, and Chetty 2009), we argue that more
precise modeling of income-shifting is needed. With regard to welfare analysis, this is
essential if ETI is analyzed among individuals who have easy access to differently taxed
tax bases.
Income-shifting can be very difficult for the average wage earner due to the lack of
opportunities to alter her income composition. However, it can have a major impact
for individuals who indeed have these possibilities. In general, high-income earners and
business owners have more ways to affect the composition of their personal income. For
example, in many countries business owners have opportunities to report part of their
personal taxable income as corporate profits, or vice versa.
In particular, income-shifting opportunities are apparent within a dual income tax
system where capital income and wage income are taxed differently with separate tax
rules and regulations. In the Finnish dual income tax system, the most prominent
income-shifting incentives lie between the wage and dividend income of the owners of
privately held corporations. We discuss the Finnish system in more detail in Section
3.4.
We present a static taxable income model with income-shifting opportunities. Our
model is similar to the elasticity of taxable corporate income model by Devereux et
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al. (2014), and the Piketty et al. (2014) model with tax avoidance in the top income
bracket.2
We assume that there are two personal tax bases available, taxable wages zW and
taxable dividends zD. We denote the total taxable income of the owner by zy = zW +zD.
In many tax systems, business owners have many different channels to withdraw income
from their firm. Our model generalizes to any two differently taxed tax bases in which
an individual can legally report income.
Wages are taxed at a tax rate τW , and dividends are taxed at τD. It is possible for
the owner to shift income (at a cost) between the two types of income. The owner has
an incentive to shift income from one tax base to another if the tax rate schedules differ
from each other. Intuitively, income-shifting behavior describes the extent of changing
the composition of income due to differences in τW and τD, while keeping the level of
total taxable income constant.
For simplicity, let us assume for now that tW > tD. This is usually the case in most
dual income tax systems. We assume that both tax rates are exogenous.3
The budget constraint can be written as
(3.2.2) c = (1− τW )(1− α)zy + (1− τD)αzy
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and (1 − α)zy = zW is taxable wages denoted as a share of total
taxable income. Similarly, αzy = zD is taxable dividends.
The utility function of an owner i is
(3.2.3) ui(c, zy, α) = c− θi(zy)− φi(α)
2Other previous papers also consider tax avoidance and income-shifting within the ETI framework,
e.g. Saez (2004) and Chetty (2009).
3Income-shifting from wages to dividends produces more total net income for the owner if τW > τD.
Naturally, the opposite direction for income-shifting holds if τW < τD. If the tax rates are equal, we
are back to the case of one common tax base.
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where θi(zy) is the cost of effort to produce total taxable income, and φi(α) is the cost
of income-shifting between wages and dividends, i.e. changing the composition of total
taxable income. We assume that both cost functions are convex and increasing in zy
and α, respectively.4
The owner chooses zy and α to maximize utility, which gives the following first-order
conditions:
(3.2.4) (1− τW )(1− α) + (1− τD)α = θ′i(zy)
and
(3.2.5) (τW − τD)zy = φ′i(α)
Equation (3.2.4) implies that total taxable income is an increasing function of the net-
of-tax rates. Thus when α is assumed to be fixed, both tax rates affect the total taxable
income, as we have two separately taxed tax bases with no income-shifting possibilities.
Equation (3.2.5) implies that when keeping the amount of total taxable income (zy)
fixed, income-shifting is an increasing function of the tax rate difference. Thus the
difference between the tax rates, (τW − τD), determines the amount of income shifted
from one tax base to another.
Next, we derive elasticities separately for both tax bases. For both zW and zD, we
assume no changes in the tax rate of the other tax base. Following Piketty et al. (2014)
4Alternatively, we could assume that both real wages and real dividends have separate convex cost
functions that reflect real wage and real dividend income based on labor supply and effort, and the
actual return on invested capital. This type of model gives qualitatively similar results as the model
with one cost function for all income. In addition, we could assume that φi is fixed for each i, and does
not depend on α. However, this does not change the welfare conclusions based on estimated average
elasticities (see Section 3.2.3).
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and Devereux et al. (2014), the average net-of-tax rate elasticity for zW is
ezW =
(1− τW )
zW
∂zW
∂(1− τW )(3.2.6)
=
(1− τW )
(1− α)zy
∂zy
∂(1− τW )(1− α) +
(1− τW )
(1− α)zy
∂(1− α)
∂(1− τW )zy
= eW − e(1−α)
where eW = dzy/zy ∗(1−τW )/d(1−τW ), and e(1−α) = d(1−α)/(1−α)∗(1−τW )/d((1−
τD)− (1− τW )).
Equation (3.2.6) implies that we can distinguish the income-shifting effect from the
overall behavioral response ezW . The income-shifting elasticity e(1−α) measures how the
wage tax base reacts to changes in the difference of the net-of-tax rates. We refer to
the other component eW as the real elasticity. It denotes how total income changes as
the wage tax rate changes. We discuss the practical limitations of interpreting eW as
an actual real effect in Section 3.3.
Similarly, we can express the average ETI of dividend income as
ezd =
(1− τD)
zD
∂zD
∂(1− τD)(3.2.7)
=
(1− τD)
αzy
∂zy
∂(1− τD)α +
(1− τD)
αzy
∂α
∂(1− τD)zy
= eD + eα
where eD = dzy/zy ∗ (1 − τD)/d(1 − τD) is the real dividend elasticity, and eα =
dα/α ∗ (1− τD)/d((1− τD)− (1− τW )) is the income-shifting elasticity for dividends.
In summary, equations (3.2.6) and (3.2.7) differ from (3.2.1) as they take income-
shifting explicitly into account. As noted in Piketty et al. (2014), zW and zD are
more responsive to changes in their own net-of-tax rates than without income-shifting
possibilities (or with arbitrarily large costs for income-shifting). However, if income-
shifting is not important in practice, e(1−α) and eα should be small or insignificant.
3.2. Theoretical model 75
3.2.3. Welfare implications. Next, we compare the marginal excess burden in
the traditional ETI model with a model that explicitly includes income-shifting. Our
model for the marginal deadweight loss follows the one presented in Chetty (2009). We
approximate the marginal excess burden by comparing behavioral responses caused by
a tax rate change to a benchmark case which ignores behavioral responses. The same
follows from assuming that the tax revenue collected from wage and dividend taxes is
returned to the owner as a lump-sum transfer.
We use the following welfare function
(3.2.8) w = {(1− τW )(1− α)zy + (1− τD)αzy − θi(zy)− φi(α)}+(1−α)zyτW +αzyτD
where individual utility is presented in curly brackets, and tax revenue collected by the
government is denoted as the sum of the tax revenue from both tax bases. We again
assume that τW > τD.
Let us first consider the standard deadweight loss analysis of wage taxation. Con-
ceptually this refers to the simplified case where α = 0. The same analysis can be
carried out for dividends, but for the sake of brevity we only show the equations for
taxable wage income.
Consider a marginal increase in the wage tax rate, dτW . As the owner is assumed to
optimize her utility, we can use the envelope theorem and denote that the tax increase
has only a first-order effect on individual utility. The first-order effects of the owner’s
utility and the tax revenue of the government cancel each other out. Thus we can write
the excess burden as
(3.2.9)
dw
dτW
= τW
∂zy
∂τW
= zy
τW
(1− τW )ezW
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where ezW denotes the overall elasticity of the wage tax base with respect to (1− τW ).
In equation (3.2.9), ezW refers to the standard ETI in the Feldstein (1999) framework.
Intuitively, in equation (3.2.9), average ETI defines the scope of the marginal excess
burden of the income tax.
Next, consider a more general case where the owner can shift part of her taxable
wage income to the dividend tax base. This refers to the case where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and
owners can adjust α. The deadweight loss is expressed as
dw
dτW
=
∂zy
∂τW
((1− α)τW + ατD) + zy ∂(1− α)
∂τW
(τW − τD)
=zy
[
(1− α)τW + ατD
(1− τW ) eW + (1− α)
(τW − τD)
(1− τW ) e(1−α)
]
(3.2.10)
where eW denotes the average real elasticity, and e(1−α) is the average income-shifting
elasticity.
The key difference between equations (3.2.9) and (3.2.10) is the income-shifting
response. Assume that we observe an overall decrease in taxable wage income due to
an increase in the wage tax rate, ezW > 0. Assume further that part of this response
comes in the form of income-shifting, e(1−α) > 0, and part of the response is due to
changes in real economic behavior, eW > 0. If we ignore the income-shifting response
and use the standard equation (3.2.9) to assess the marginal excess burden, the welfare
effect is approximated to be too large when 0 < τD < τW < 1 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
The size of the marginal excess burden in equation (3.2.10) depends on the following
factors: (1) the size of the income-shifting elasticity (e(1−α)), (2) the size of the real
elasticity (eW ), (3) the difference of the net-of-tax rates (τW − τD), and (4) the initial
size of the tax bases (1 − α). Intuitively, a large e(1−α) relative to eW implies that a
large fraction of the overall response is due to income-shifting, with different efficiency
implications. For a given e(1−α), a small (τW − τD) implies that income-shifting has
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only a small effect on efficiency, and vice versa. In addition, the relative size of the
tax bases further scales the significance of the income-shifting response. To summarize,
if there are large incentives for income-shifting, equation (3.2.10) highlights that it is
important to estimate elasticities for both the real component and the income-shifting
component in order to more accurately analyze the welfare loss of income taxes.
Equation (3.2.10) shows that income-shifting and real responses have different wel-
fare consequences even within the standard excess burden framework when the shifted
income is also taxed. Applying the envelope theorem in the welfare model above im-
plicitly assumes that individuals optimize such that the marginal costs equal the asso-
ciated net-of-tax rates (see the first-order conditions (3.2.4) and (3.2.5) above). Thus
equations (3.2.9) and (3.2.10) hold if individuals optimize as in the standard Feldstein
(1999) framework. However, it is possible that these standard assumptions do not hold
in practice, especially when considering the welfare effects of income-shifting.
Chetty (2009) shows that the Feldstein (1999) formula for the deadweight loss does
not hold if the marginal social cost of income-shifting does not equal the tax rate. For
example, as noted by Chetty (2009), a notable share of the costs related to income-
shifting might be payments to tax consultants, who usually report at least part of
this original cost as their own taxable income. Thus the costs might include transfers
between different agents in the economy, and this fiscal externality is not taken into
account in the standard framework. In the extreme, if income-shifting inflicts no real
social costs, the marginal excess burden reduces to the real effect of taxation, denoted
by the first term on the right-hand side of equation (3.2.10). We further discuss this
and the empirical magnitude of the deadweight loss among Finnish business owners in
Section 3.8.
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3.3. Empirical methodology
3.3.1. Empirical ETI model. A usual approach to estimate ETI with individual-
level panel data and tax reforms is to use a difference-in-differences approach and a
first-differences estimator.5 This method allows time-invariant unobserved individual
characteristics that affect income growth to be canceled out. This is appealing as
these characteristics (for example, innate ability) are potentially correlated with the
progressive marginal tax rate.
Following Saez et al. (2012), the standard empirical ETI equation can be charac-
terized as
(3.3.1) 4ln(z)t,i = ez4ln(1− τ)t,i +4ln(η)t,i +4ln(ε)t,i
where t is a subscript for time and i denotes the individual, and4 denotes the difference
between time t+ k and t. z denotes taxable income, (1− τ) is the net-of-tax rate, and
ez is the (average) elasticity of taxable income. η denotes potential income, i.e. income
without taxes, and ε is the error term, including the transitory income component.
There are many issues that need to be taken into account when defining the actual
empirically implementable version of equation (3.3.1). First, the net-of-tax rate and
transitory income shocks are mechanically correlated within a progressive tax system,
as a positive income shock results in a lower net-of-tax rate. This means that a valid
instrument for the net-of-tax rate is required in order to have a causal interpretation
for ez.
Non-tax-related changes in potential income also need to be taken into account. In
other words, differential income growth trends for different types of individuals need to
5For a more detailed discussion on empirical ETI estimation, including cross-sectional models, see
Saez et al. (2012). We discuss the local estimation of ETI using distributions of taxable income and
bunching around the kink points of the tax rate schedule in Section 3.7.1.
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be controlled for. The usual approach is to add a matrix of individual characteristics
in base year t to the estimable equation
3.3.2. ETI and income-shifting. In this subsection we specify ways of distin-
guishing income-shifting from the overall response using micro-level panel data and
tax reforms. For now we assume that valid net-of-tax rate instruments exist, and that
we can perfectly control for other individual characteristics that affect the growth of
taxable income. These issues will be discussed in detail in Section 3.5.
First, in order to identify different elasticity components, we need to have differential
variation in marginal tax rates among otherwise similar individuals. This variation is
needed for all relevant tax bases. In the case of Finnish business owners, we need
variation in both the wage and dividend tax rates.
By utilizing exogenous variation in the net-of-tax rates on both wages and dividends,
we can write the estimable version of the elasticity of taxable wage income as
(3.3.2)
4ln(zW )t,i =eW4ln(1− τW )t,i − e(1−α)4(ln(1− τD)− ln(1− τW ))t,i
+4ln(ηW )t,i +4ln(ε)t,i
where (1 − τW ) is the net-of-tax rate for taxable wage income, and (1 − τD) is the
net-of-tax rate for dividend income.
Equation (3.3.2) includes the responsiveness of taxable wage income with respect to
income-shifting incentives, namely 4(ln(1−τD)− ln(1−τW ))t,i. Regressing 4ln(zW )t,i
with both 4ln(1 − τW )t,i and 4(ln(1 − τD) − ln(1 − τW ))t,i enables us to estimate
separately both the real elasticity eW and the income-shifting component e(1−α), along
with the associated standard errors. A similar model can also be written for dividend
income. For the sake of brevity, we only cover the wage income model in this section.
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The income-shifting effect can also be estimated by simply adding 4ln(1− τD)t,i to
the standard ETI model for taxable wages. After adding dividend tax rates, we get the
following expression
(3.3.3) 4ln(zW )t,i = ezW4ln(1− τW )t,i− e(1−α)4ln(1− τD)t,i+4ln(ηW )t,i+4ln(ε)t,i
Importantly, adding 4ln(1− τD)t,i to the standard ETI model does not change the
interpretation of the baseline ETI parameter ezW , which captures both real responses
and the income-shifting effect. If income-shifting behavior is significant, the estimated
sum of these elasticity components might not be very informative. Therefore, the
standard ETI model alone or even conditional on the net-of-tax rates in other tax
bases might be misleading when assessing the welfare consequences of income taxation.
Nevertheless, in terms of identifying the income-shifting response, both equations (3.3.2)
and (3.3.3) define the same income-shifting elasticity parameter e(1−α).
Another possibility to separate out the income-shifting response is to study the
elasticity of total taxable income zy = zW + zD with respect to the net-of-tax rate on
wages. In the earlier literature this type of income has in many cases been referred
to as broad income (see e.g. Gruber and Saez 2002). The model for the total taxable
income can be written as
(3.3.4) 4ln(zy)t,i = eW4ln(1− τW )t,i +4ln(ηy)t,i +4ln(ε)t,i
The elasticity coefficient in equation (3.3.4) only includes the real response component,
as any income-shifting is canceled out by definition. In other words, if an increase in the
wage tax rate induces only a pure income-shifting effect, total taxable income remains
unchanged. Thus regressing 4ln(zy)t,i with 4ln(1 − τW )t,i allows us to identify the
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real elasticity component, which can then be compared with the taxable wage income
elasticity in order to outline the relevance of income-shifting behavior.6
To summarize, how well we can estimate both eW and e(1−α) depends on the data
we have. We can outline real responses with total income data including all the relevant
tax bases. In order to analyze both eW and e(1−α), we need information on the wage tax
base separately. Also, differential and independent variation in both marginal tax rates
is necessary for identifying e(1−α) separately. In addition, in order to analyze underlying
differences in the responsiveness of the wage and dividend tax bases, we need to estimate
the dividend tax base elasticities as well. As we meet all the conditions mentioned here
with our data set, we can study how different specifications affect the estimates in our
empirical example. These conditions are also applicable to other tax systems in other
countries.
We are particularly interested in estimating the effect of tax rates on real behavior,
in relation to income-shifting effects. In other words, we want to exclude any other
forms of tax avoidance (or evasion) when estimating eW . Therefore we use gross wage
and gross dividend income subject to taxation as dependent variables when estimating
the models. These income measures do not include potential changes in deduction
behavior. Instead, in the Finnish context, taxable income is defined as gross income
subject to taxation minus deductions and exemptions. Thus taxable income also takes
into account changes in deduction behavior, which presumably also include changes in
tax avoidance activity.
Despite using changes in gross income as the left-hand side variable, interpreting
eW as a true real response includes an implicit assumption that income-shifting and tax
6If we include changes in both net-of-tax rates in equation (3.3.4), we cannot identify both real re-
sponses and income-shifting responses separately. The estimated coefficients would be a mixture of
both real and income-shifting components of wage and dividend taxes, as before in the standard ETI
model (equation (3.3.1)). Therefore, we examine real responses by estimating total income regressions
separately for both net-of-tax rates, which allows us to identify the real response component for both
net-of-tax rates.
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deductions are the only possible margins of tax avoidance. However, other possibilities
to avoid taxes might be included in the estimated real response. For example, if tax
rates increase, owners could increase their consumption within the firm (e.g. in the
form of more office amenities). Also, owners might increase fringe benefits, which are
in many cases not fully included in gross income subject to taxation. Finally, owners
might illegally evade taxes, for example through intentional underreporting of income.
One of the most common examples of other tax avoidance channels affecting eW
is intertemporal (or dynamic) income-shifting. For example, dividend income can be
rather easily shifted across periods using retained earnings. In the Finnish context, Kari
et al. (2008) show evidence that Finnish corporations anticipated the 2005 dividend
tax increase by increasing dividend payments just before the reform. Anticipation was
feasible as the content of the reform was published already in late 2003. Mostly due to
this anticipation possibility, our baseline empirical analysis utilizes a longer time period
of 2002-2007.
Furthermore, in order to assess the real component in a more diverse manner, we
estimate the net-of-tax rate responses for more broadly defined income components at
the firm level. One example of these is net profits before wages. We define net profits as
turnover plus other income of the firm minus all costs except wages. Compared to wages
and dividends withdrawn from the firm, this type of income is not as easily manipulated
using various tax avoidance activities. In addition to wages and dividends, net profits
also includes retained earnings. Intuitively, changes in net profits due to changes in
net-of-tax rates reflect the real effort of the owner.
In addition, we estimate net-of-tax rate elasticities for the turnover of the firm.
Turnover measures the overall sales revenue of the firm, which also reflects real effort
and productivity.7 We futher discuss the details of these estimations in Section 3.6.
7Harju and Kosonen (2013) study the tax responsiveness of turnover among the owners of unincorpo-
rated firms in Finland. They find small real responses for this group.
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3.3.3. Estimable equation. We estimate different variations of the following
equation using a two-stage least squares estimator:
(3.3.5) 4lnTIt,i = α0 + e4ln(1− τ p)t,i + α1f(lnTI)t,i + α2Bt,i + α3Ft,i +4εt,i
In equation (3.3.5),4lnTIt,i is the log change in income between t and t+k. The income
concept varies across different specifications. First, we analyze the responsiveness of
gross wage income and gross dividend income subject to taxation with respect to own
net-of-tax rates and income-shifting incentives. Thus in these cases we set TIt,i =
(zW )t,i for wages, and TIt,i = (zD)t,i for dividends. In addition to the two separate
tax bases, we also regress the change in total income TIt,i = (zW + zD)t,i with changes
in the instrumented net-of-tax rates. We also estimate alternative models for real
responses, where we regress broader firm-level income components, namely turnover
and net profits, with changes in the instrumented net-of-tax rates.
4ln(1 − τ p)t,i is the instrumented change in the log net-of-tax rate (we discuss
the instruments in detail in Section 3.5). Thus e is the coefficient of interest, the
average elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate. When studying income-shifting
responses, we add the difference of the log net-of-tax rates of wages and dividends into
the estimable equation.
Following Gruber and Saez (2002), we add a 10-piece base-year income spline
f(lnTI)t,i to the model. Base-year income controls for unobserved heterogeneity in in-
come growth. We also control for observed individual effects with available background
variables in the tax return data. Matrix Bt,i includes age, age squared, ownership share
of the firm, and county and gender of the owner. In addition, firm-level data allow us to
control for firm-level effects. The firm-level controls Ft,i include total assets, turnover,
profits, industry, number of employees and county of the firm.
84 The elasticity of taxable income and income-shifting
In our baseline model, we analyze a single difference between 2002 and 2007. As
is common procedure in the literature, we focus on the owners at the intensive margin
whose firms are their primary source of income. We limit the analysis to observations
where base-year total income (wages + dividends) is above 25,000 €. In addition,
individuals whose absolute change in total income between 2002 and 2007 is above
50,000 € are dropped from the sample in order to avoid unnecessarily high influence by
outlier observations. We perform several robustness checks on these sample restrictions
in Section 3.7.1.
All the estimates are weighted by the total income of the owner. When considering
the welfare consequences of income taxation, income-weighted uncompensated average
ETI is the parameter of main interest (see Gruber and Saez 2002). However, as in
Gruber and Saez (2002), we censor the weights at 200,000 € in order to avoid giving
unreasonably large weight to a few very high-income individuals in the data.
In addition to first-differences estimation, we also use the distributions of zW and
zD and the kink points in the marginal tax rate schedules to estimate ETI locally. We
discuss this bunching estimation in more detail in Section 3.7.1.
3.4. Finnish income tax system and recent tax reforms
In our empirical example we analyze the owners of privately held corporations in
Finland. Privately held corporations are defined as corporations that are not listed
on a public stock exchange (cf. public or listed corporations). In the Finnish tax
system, dividends from listed and privately owned corporations are taxed at different
tax rates and under different tax regulations. Also, the taxation of privately held
corporations is different from that of other types of private businesses (sole proprietors
and partnerships). Furthermore, we focus on tax reforms that occurred in 2002-2007,
as we use the same time period in our baseline analysis.
3.4. Finnish income tax system and recent tax reforms 85
Since 1993, Finland has applied a dual income tax system where earned income
(wages, pensions, fringe benefits etc.) and capital income (interest income, capital
gains, dividends from listed corporations etc.) are taxed separately. Earned income is
taxed on a progressive tax rate schedule (0-56% in 2007), whereas the capital income
tax rate is flat (28% in 2007).8 A typical feature of the Nordic dual income tax system
is that the top marginal tax rate on earned income is much higher than the flat tax
rate on capital income. The lower flat tax rate on capital income was justified on
various grounds, for example broadening the tax base and decreasing the scope for tax
arbitrage, and increased global capital mobility.
Within the Finnish dual income tax system, wage income and dividend income from
privately held corporations are taxed with separate tax rules and tax rates. In general,
owners of these firms can freely choose the income composition of wages and dividends,
and income-shifting between these tax bases is legitimate. There are only a few minor
legal limitations on whether income is withdrawn as wages or dividends from a privately
held corporation in Finland. Therefore, for example, reporting more dividend income
at the expense of wages induces no fines or penalties.
However, wages cannot be paid without a work contribution for the firm, or else
wages may be considered as veiled distribution of profits. In addition, dividends can
be paid only if the firm has distributable assets. These include, for example, accumu-
lated profits and non-tied equity. Nevertheless, in contrast to wages and dividends,
other alternatives for withdrawing income from the firm are restricted. These include,
for example, shareholder loans and share repurchases. In summary, as income-shifting
responses between wages and dividends are largely unrestricted among the owners of
8As a whole, the Finnish income tax system follows the principle of individual taxation. The income
of a spouse or other family members does not affect the marginal income tax rate of an individual.
However, some tax deductions and social security benefits depend on the total income of the household.
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privately held corporations in Finland, analyzing this group provides an intuitive em-
pirical example to study the significance of both income-shifting and real behavioral
incentives.
3.4.1. Dividend taxation and the dividend tax reform of 2005. The Finnish
dual income tax system includes specific rules for the dividend taxation of the owners
of privately held businesses. Dividends are categorized into two parts according to the
net assets (assets-liabilities) of the firm:9
• The amount of dividends corresponding to an imputed 9% return on the net
assets of the firm are subject to a flat tax rate. The imputed rate of return on
net assets is set by the government, and it is the same for all owners.
• Any dividends exceeding the imputed return are taxed progressively.
For example, with net assets of 400,000 € and the imputed rate of return set at 9%, the
maximum amount of dividends taxed at the flat tax rate is 36,000€ (0.09*400,000=36,000).
In other words, any dividends from the firm up to 36,000 € are taxed at the flat tax
rate. Any dividend income exceeding this amount is taxed according to the progressive
tax rate schedule.
Furthermore, the taxation of dividends exceeding the imputed return is not similar
to that of wage income. Dividends are subject to corporate taxes whereas wages are
not. Also, some tax deductions are only allowed on wage income, whereas dividends
are not subject to firm-level social security contributions.
Before the 2005 tax reform, a full imputation system of corporate taxes was in place.
Within the full imputation system, corporate taxes paid on distributed dividends were
credited back to the shareholder, which led to the effective single taxation of dividend
9The net assets of the firm are calculated using the asset and debt values in the year before. The
individual net asset share of the owner is calculated based on the ownership share of the firm. Also,
there are some individual adjustments to the net assets. For example, if the owner or her family
members live in a dwelling which is owned by the firm, the value of this dwelling is not included in net
assets when calculating the imputed return.
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income. Thus, before 2005, both flat-tax and progressively taxed dividends were only
subject to individual-level taxes.
The reform of 2005 changed the principle of dividend taxation, as the full imputation
system was replaced by double taxation of dividends. After the reform, all dividends
became subject to the 26% corporate tax rate. In addition to corporate taxes, all
dividends are in principle also taxed at the individual level. However, only 70% of
dividend income was subject to individual taxation after the reform.
Nevertheless, single taxation of dividend income was partly retained. Dividends
below the imputed 9% return on net assets and below 90,000 € remained single-taxed
(at the flat 26% corporate tax rate). Therefore, only dividends exceeding the imputed
return or 90,000€ were subject to the double taxation rule.
The reform changed the marginal tax rates (MTR) differently for different types
of owners. In general, changes in the MTR on dividends depend both on the amount
of dividends and the net assets of the firm. Table 1 presents the main changes in the
MTR on dividends for different types of owners.
Effective marginal tax rates on dividends (D)
Before (2002) After (2007)
Type (I): D ≤ Imputed return and D ≤ 90,000€ 29% 26%
Type (II): D ≤ Imputed return and D > 90,000€ 29% 40.5%
Type (III): D > Imputed return
min 0% 26%
max 55% 54%
Table 1. Effective marginal tax rates on dividends before (2002) and
after (2007) the reform of 2005 for different types of owners
The first type of owners (Type (I)) are those who have dividend income below the
9% imputed return on net assets and below 90,000 €. For these owners the effective flat
tax rate on dividends decreased from 29% to 26%. Before the reform, dividends below
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the imputed return were not subject to the corporate tax rate, and were taxed only
at the flat personal capital income tax rate of 29%. After the reform, these dividends
are only subject to the 26% corporate tax rate, and are not taxed at all in individual
taxation.
Type (II) owners are those who have dividend income below the imputed return
on net assets and above 90,000 €. Before the reform, these dividends were taxed at
the flat capital income tax rate. After the reform, 70% of dividends above 90,000 €
are regarded as taxable capital income in personal taxation, in addition to the flat
corporate tax rate of 26%. This results in an effective flat tax rate of 40.5% for these
dividends after the reform, compared to 29% before the reform.
Type (III) owners are those who have dividend income above the imputed return
on net assets. Before the reform, these dividends were only taxed as personal earned
income, subject to a progressive tax rate schedule (0-55%). After the reform, 70% of
dividends above the imputed return are regarded as taxable earned income, in addition
to the flat corporate tax rate of 26%. Therefore, the reform significantly increased the
MTR on small dividends exceeding the imputed return, but the changes in the MTR
were small for large dividends above the imputed return on net assets.
In summary, owners with larger net assets were more likely to be faced with a
decrease in their dividend tax rate. In contrast, owners with smaller net assets were
more likely to face an increase in their marginal dividend tax rate. Therefore, otherwise
similar owners who differ only in the net assets of the firm were faced with different
changes in the marginal tax rate on dividends. This implies that the change in the
MTR on dividends is not directly related to the amount of dividend income, which
alleviates the usual identification issues in the literature. We discuss these in more
detail in Section 3.5.1.
Figure A1 in the Appendix presents the effective marginal tax rates on dividends
in 2002 and 2007 with two levels of net assets, 0 and 250,000 € (approximately the
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average net assets in the estimation sample before the reform). The Figure shows that
most of the MTR increases occur on low and middle dividend income exceeding the
imputed return. Also, the Figure shows the 3 percentage point drop in the flat tax rate
on dividends below the imputed return and 90,000 €.
Plans to abolish the single taxation of dividend income were widely discussed already
in 2002, and more formal propositions were published by the Finnish Government in
late 2003. Thus it was possible for owners to anticipate the shift to the double taxation
system. Therefore, the years right before and right after the reform are not suitable for
empirical analysis that aims at identifying longer-run behavioral parameters.10 Also, in
2005, special transition rules were applied which alleviated the partial double taxation
of dividends. Thus, in our empirical analysis, we exclude the years 2003-2006 from
the regression, and focus on the medium-run effect of the tax reform using a single
difference of 2002-2007.
Finally, the main motivation behind the reform of 2005 was not the economic and
fiscal conditions in Finland. The pre-reform full imputation credit was granted only to
domestic shareholders whose firms operate in Finland. This violated European Union
rules on the equal tax treatment of all EU citizens. Thus Finnish legislators were more
or less forced to change the tax system towards more unified treatment of domestic
and international shareholders. Therefore, the tax reform of 2005 can be considered
exogenous from the point of view of domestic shareholders.
3.4.2. Wage income taxation and variation in wage tax rates. In Finland,
there are three levels of wage income taxes: central government (or state-level) income
taxes, municipal income taxes and mandatory social security contributions. The cen-
tral government income tax rate schedule is progressive, whereas municipal tax rates
and social security contributions are proportional by nature. Municipal tax rates vary
10Kari, Karikallio and Pirttilä (2008) provide empirical evidence of anticipation effects before the tax
reform of 2005 for privately held corporations.
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between different municipalities.11 Social security contributions include, for example,
unemployment insurance payments.
During 2002-2007, there was a general decline in central government income tax
rates throughout the income distribution. Marginal tax rates decreased almost every
year in most income classes within central government taxation. In contrast, municipal
tax rates have changed differently in different municipalities. On average, every fifth
municipality changed its tax rate in each year. Yearly municipal tax rate changes vary
from -1 to +1.5 percentage points, which accounts for roughly 1-10% changes in the
overall net-of-tax rate. On average, the municipal tax rate increased from 17.8% in
2002 to 18.5% in 2007.
Because of different tax rate changes in different municipalities, the marginal wage
tax rates of owners have changed differently. Also, municipal tax rate changes are de-
termined only by the municipality of residence, not by the income level of an individual
owner. Furthermore, since municipal taxation is residence-based, the marginal wage tax
rate of the owner is not determined by the municipality in which the firm is physically
located or registered.
Figure A2 in the Appendix describes the MTR on wage income. The left-hand
side of the figure shows that average marginal wage tax rates decreased throughout the
income distribution in 2002-2007. The right-hand side of Figure A2 shows the actual
marginal tax rates calculated using our data set for the year 2007, highlighting the fact
that individuals with the same income level face different marginal tax rates due to
municipal-level tax rate differences. In addition, owners with the same income level
face different changes in the MTR on wages due to different changes in municipal tax
11There are 336 municipalities in Finland (in 2012). Each democratically elected municipal council
decides on the municipal tax rate on an annual basis. Municipalities can choose their tax rates freely.
However, certain legislative municipal-level duties need to be financed mainly by municipal taxes (e.g.
basic health care and primary education).
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rates. This improves the identification of the elasticity parameter, since a notable part
of the variation in wage tax rates is not directly based on taxable income.
We do not include mandatory pension and health insurance contributions as a direct
tax on wages in this study. The insurance contributions of the owners of privately held
corporations are not levied on actual wage income if the ownership share is above 50%,
and the shareholder holds an executive position in the firm. These owners are termed
YEL owners. YEL owners report a self-selected YEL income from which the insurance
payments are accumulated. The reported YEL income can be above or below the actual
wages paid without implications or sanctions.12
In contrast, insurance contributions are based on actual wage income from the firm
for owners whose ownership share is less than 50% (similarly as in the case of paid
workers with no ownership share). These owners are termed TEL owners. Thus for
TEL owners, insurance contributions increase or decrease based on the wage income
withdrawn from the firm. However, it is not clear whether insurance contributions
are fully regarded as taxes, since owners directly benefit from them in terms of future
pensions or in case of illness. Nevertheless, it is plausible that insurance payments levied
on actual wage income decrease the incentives to pay wages to TEL owners, compared
to YEL owners whose insurance contributions do not depend on wages withdrawn from
the firm. We discuss how we apply this variation in our empirical analysis in Section
3.5.1.13
3.4.3. Tax incentives for income-shifting. The Finnish tax system creates no-
ticeable income-shifting incentives for the owners of privately held corporations. As
12However, there are both lower and upper limits for YEL income, which are both also independent of
actual wage income. Nevertheless, as insurance payments determine pensions after retirement as well
as many income-bound social benefits, YEL owners have incentives to report a realistic YEL income
that reflects the actual earnings potential.
13There were no relevant changes in TEL or YEL insurance payment rates in the time period we study.
The average rate for TEL payments is 21.1% in both 2002 and 2007, and 20.8% in 2007 and 21.1% in
2002 for YEL payments. Insurance contributions are fully deductible from taxable income.
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the tax rate schedules for wages and dividends differ from one another, owners can
minimize income taxes by choosing an optimal combination of wages and dividends as
their personal compensation from the firm. Harju and Matikka (2012) show that the
owners of privately held corporations are active in minimizing tax payments through
income-shifting between wages and dividends.
The 2005 tax reform affected the income-shifting incentives of many owners. In
the light of our analysis, it is significant that the reform changed the income-shifting
incentives differently among otherwise similar owners. Owners with dividends below
the imputed return on net assets and 90,000 € faced only modest changes in their
income-shifting incentives. For these owners, the flat tax rate on dividends decreased
by 3 percentage points, inducing a small change in incentives to increase dividend
compensation at the expense of wages. In contrast, owners with dividends exceeding
the imputed rate of return on net assets faced an increase in dividend tax rates, as these
dividends became double-taxed. For many of these owners, the MTR on dividends
became larger than the MTR on wages, inducing notable changes in the incentives to
shift income between wages and dividends.
Table A1 in the Appendix presents the marginal tax rates on wages and dividends
at different levels of firm net assets. The table highlights that owners with different net
assets have different MTRs on dividends, and faced different changes in marginal tax
rates and income-shifting incentives from the 2005 tax reform.14
3.5. Identification and data
3.5.1. Net-of-tax rate instruments. In a progressive income tax rate schedule,
the marginal tax rate increases as taxable income increases. Therefore, an increase in
taxable income mechanically decreases the net-of-tax rate, causing the tax rate variable
14Harju and Matikka (2012) provide a more detailed discussion on income-shifting incentives within
the Finnish dual income tax system.
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to be endogenous in the empirical model. Thus a valid instrumental variable for the
net-of-tax rate is required.
A common strategy in the ETI literature is to simulate predicted (or synthetic)
tax rates and use them as instruments for the net-of-tax rate (NTR) (see Gruber and
Saez 2002). The basic structure of the predicted NTR variable is the following: Take
pre-reform income in base-year t, and use it to predict the net-of-tax rates for t + k
by using the post-reform tax legislation in t + k. The predicted tax rate instrument
is then defined as the difference between the actual NTR in t and the NTR calculated
with income in t and the tax law for t + k. Intuitively, the predicted NTR instrument
describes the change in tax liability caused by changes in tax legislation, ignoring any
behavioral effects via taxable income responses.
In this study we use the predicted NTR instrument with a few modifications. First,
we need to address the development of net assets when defining the net-of-tax rate
instrument for dividends. Net assets are a key factor determining the marginal tax rate
on dividends (see Section 3.4). As shown in Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix, average
net assets increase in time both in the whole data set and our estimation sample. Thus
we need an estimate for net assets in t + k when defining the NTR instrument for
dividends. Otherwise we would be predicting the effect of the dividend tax rate change
incorrectly for a large number of owners, and the NTR instrument would be too weak.
We predict net assets after the reform for each owner using exogenous pre-reform
characteristics in 2000-2003. We use the same exogenous individual and firm-level vari-
ables as in the baseline ETI regression. These variables include, for example, age, age
squared, gender, turnover, total assets and industry and location dummies. Intuitively,
counterfactual net assets take into account the development of net assets not related
to the tax reform of 2005. The R-squared statistic for the net assets prediction using
OLS is 0.73.
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Second, predicted NTR instruments are better predictors of exogenous tax rate
variation within a single tax base and a single tax bracket of the progressive tax rate
schedule. Intuitively, predicted NTR instruments perform better for changes in income
that are relatively close to the original income level in the base period. However, avail-
able income-shifting opportunities might cause substantial changes in taxable income,
as income-shifting may lead to “jumping” across tax brackets. Therefore, the predicted
net-of-tax rate instruments might be too weak if income-shifting is active.
Therefore, we might need additional instruments to more robustly estimate ETI for
individuals with income-shifting possibilities. The purpose of additional instruments is
to capture the incentives to change the composition of income, which are not necessarily
taken into account when using only the predicted NTR approach.
We use the pension insurance status of the owner as an additional instrument in the
wage regression. Pension insurance status is defined based on the ownership share of
the firm, and the official working status of the owner of the firm. Individuals who work
in their own firm in an executive position and own 50% or more of the firm alone or
together with immediate family members are termed YEL owners. They can choose the
amount of reported YEL income on which mandatory insurance payments are levied. In
contrast, individuals who own less than 50% of the firm pay pension insurance payments
based on the actual wages paid from the firm. These owners are called TEL owners.
YEL/TEL status cannot be freely chosen. Owners satisfying the YEL conditions in a
given year cannot change their status to TEL owners, or vice versa.
We assume that TEL owners who cannot choose the level of insurance payments
would not increase their wage compensation after the reform as much as YEL owners,
for whom wages do not legally affect the level of the insurance contribution. In other
words, the YEL/TEL status affects the incentives to shift income from dividends to
wages because of insurance payments, which are not captured by the predicted net-
of-tax rate instrument. The exclusion restriction behind this instrument is that the
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YEL/TEL status is not itself correlated with transitory income shocks, conditional on
various observed individual and firm-level characteristics.
An essential issue in identifying ETI is the variation in marginal tax rates. With
both wages and dividends, changes in the marginal tax rates vary across the income
distribution. This is important because non-tax-related changes in income are poten-
tially problematic when identifying the elasticity parameters (see Saez et al. 2012). If
the shape of the income distribution varies independently of tax reforms, the analysis
of behavioral responses to tax rate changes might be biased if this variation cannot
be properly taken into account. Non-tax-related changes in the income distribution
are especially problematic if the variation in MTR is focused only on a certain part of
the income distribution, for example the tax rate cuts or increases in the top income
bracket. The fact that both dividend and wage tax rate variation occurs in all income
classes alleviates the potential problems associated with these issues.
Furthermore, the fact that changes in both the MTR on wages and dividends are
not direct functions of income improves the exogeneity of the instrument. As discussed
in the recent ETI literature, there is no proof that the predicted NTR instrument is
exogenous in all cases (Blomquist and Selin 2010, Weber 2014). It is unlikely that the
instrument is correlated similarly with both parts of the transitory income component
(εt+k,i − εt,i) if the NTR is a direct function of income (even conditional on base-year
income splines and other controls).15 This is lessen of an issue in our empirical example,
as changes in the MTR on both dividends and wages also depend on net assets and the
municipality of residence, respectively.
15Blomquist and Selin (2010) use income in the middle year of the difference ((t + k + t)/2) as the
base period when imputing the predicted tax rates for both t + k and t. Weber (2014) proposes an
instrument which exploits years before k as the base period. Both of these approaches aim at reducing
the covariance between the instrument and the transitory error component. However, both of these
strategies provide more or less weaker instruments than the Gruber and Saez (2002) approach, which
might also bias the estimated parameter of interest.
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3.5.2. Data. Our data are from the Finnish Tax Administration, and include in-
formation on the financial statements and tax records of Finnish businesses. The data
include tax record information on both the firm and its main owner from the year 2000
onward. Another unique characteristic of the data is that they include all Finnish busi-
nesses (all public and private corporations, partnerships, sole proprietors etc.). In this
study we focus on the main owners of privately held corporations.
The data set contains all important information for our analysis, for example wages
and dividends paid to the owner by the firm, and income earned by the owner from
other sources. These, together with other tax record information, enable us to define
the marginal tax rates for both the relevant personal tax bases, wages and dividends.
By linking the owner-level and the firm-level data together, we can control for various
individual and firm-level effects in the empirical estimation. This type of detailed
business owner data are rarely used in ETI analysis.
For this study we construct a balanced panel data set for the years 2002-2007. The
main owner data include only those individuals who received positive dividends from
the firm during a tax year. Tables A2 and A3 in Appendix describe the data and the
key variables we use from both 2002 and 2007. Table A2 shows the statistics for the
whole data, and Table A3 for our baseline estimation sample.
3.5.3. Descriptive statistics. Figure 1 describes the means of wage, dividend
and total income (wages+dividends) from 2000 to 2009 for all owners of privately held
corporations. The figure shows that mean wages, mean dividends and mean total
taxable income all increased from 2000 to 2009. Importantly, the figure indicates that
the share of wage income relative to total income has increased from 2005 onwards.
This suggests that the tax reform of 2005 and the abolition of the single taxation of
dividends affected the composition of total income, which gives us the first preliminary
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evidence that income-shifting might be significant. However, based on Figure 1, it
remains unclear whether the tax rate changes also induced real responses.
In addition, Figure 1 shows that mean dividends and mean total income increased in
the year before the reform, and decreased right after the implementation of the reform
of 2005. Plans to abolish the single taxation system were publicly discussed already in
2002, and more formal propositions were published by the Finnish Government in late
2003. The early discussions also included a proposal to increase tax rates on dividends
below the imputed return, which, however, eventually remained single-taxed after the
reform. Nevertheless, from the point of view of business owners, various proposals and
active public discussion increased the uncertainty surrounding the details of the 2005
tax reform.16
For owners with progressively taxed dividends, there were large incentives to with-
draw extra dividend income from the firm before the double taxation came into effect
in 2005. However, many owners with flat-tax dividends also increased dividend payouts
before 2005. This was presumably caused partly by the uncertainty about the actual
implementation of the new dividend tax system. Nevertheless, most owners faced at
least some intertemporal incentives to increase dividend payments before the reform, as
larger dividend payments became subject to higher marginal tax rates after the reform.
Next, we describe how tax incentives affect income withdrawn from the firm. Figure
2 shows the proportional changes in dividends (left-hand side) and total income (right-
hand side) for two groups: those who faced a modest dividend tax decrease or no changes
in the dividend tax rate, and those who faced a dividend tax increase. These groups are
defined based on the predicted tax rate change due to the reform of 2005, calculated
using the income information in 2002.17 In the Figure, the light-gray dashed lines
16Kari et al. (2008) discuss the various proposals and their details more thoroughly.
17The predicted tax rate changes are defined similarly as the net-of-tax rate instruments (see Section
3.5.1 above). Owners with no changes in tax incentives include those with a change below 5% in the
net-of-tax rate on dividends (in either direction). Owners with a dividend tax increase include owners
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Figure 1. Means of wage, dividend and total income in 2000-2009 (in
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denote the anticipation period (2003-2005). The black dotted lines within 2003-2005
characterize the development of dividends and total income ignoring the anticipation
period.
Figure 2 highlights the following issues: First, when comparing dividends in the
pre-reform (2000-2002) and post-reform (2006-2009) periods, we can see that dividends
decreased among owners who faced a predicted dividend tax increase. In comparison,
dividends increased among owners with no tax rate changes or a dividend tax decrease.
This indicates that owners responded to the dividend tax reform according to changes
in tax incentives. Second, dividends increased in both groups in a similar fashion before
2003, which indicates that there were no significant differences in pre-reform income
trends. Third, both groups anticipated the reform by notably increasing dividends
with a positive change above 5%, and owners with a dividend tax decrease include owners with a
negative change above 5% in the predicted net-of-tax rate.
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before the reform. This behavior is consistent with short-run intertemporal income-
shifting incentives.
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Figure 2. Proportional changes in dividends and total income by tax
incentives (estimation sample)
The right-hand side of Figure 2 shows that total income increased very similarly in
both groups before the anticipation period (2000-2002). This ensures that our estima-
tion results are not biased by differing income trends before the reform. Second, both
groups anticipated the future increase in dividend taxation by increasing total income
withdrawn from the firm in 2003-2004. Third, compared to owners with no tax changes
or a dividend tax decrease, owners with a dividend tax increase decreased their total
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income after the reform. This implies that the dividend tax reform also affected the
total income withdrawn from the firm.
In summary, Figure 2 indicates that owners responded to the dividend tax reform
of 2005 according to the tax incentives. Dividends and total income decreased among
those who faced a predicted dividend tax increase, compared to owners with no changes
or a dividend tax decrease. Changes in dividends could be caused by both real responses
and income-shifting. However, changes in total income suggest that at least part of the
effect stemmed from real responses. Nevertheless, in order to identify real responses and
income-shifting separately, we need to estimate the model with simultaneous changes
in both income-shifting and real-term incentives.
3.6. Main Results
3.6.1. ETI and income-shifting. Table 2 presents ETI estimates for wage in-
come and dividend income (gross income subject to taxation) for a single difference
between 2002-2007. Columns (1)-(3) show the results for dividends, and columns (4)-
(6) present wage income elasticities with the full set of control variables.
For dividends, the standard ETI model in column (1) gives average net-of-tax rate
elasticity of over 1.6, which can be considered large. However, as income-shifting pos-
sibilities between dividends and wages are particularly relevant for owners of privately
held corporations in Finland, we need to add the net-of-tax rate of wages into the model
in order to more rigorously analyze tax responsiveness.
Columns (2) and (3) imply that a significant part of the overall behavioral response
of dividends is due to income-shifting between the tax bases. Column (2) shows that the
cross-elasticity of dividends with respect to the net-of-tax rate on wages is almost -1.5
and statistically significant. However, simply adding the tax rate of another tax base
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES lnZD lnZD lnZD lnZW lnZW lnZW
ln(1− tW ) -1.468*** 0.042 0.316 -0.093
(0.376) (0.306) (0.355) (0.300)
ln(1− tD) 1.649*** 1.989*** 0.521* -0.409***
(0.123) (0.163) (0.297) (0.139)
[ln(1− tD)− ln(1− tW )] 1.468*** -0.409***
(0.376) (0.139)
Income spline Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Base-year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st stage F-test for ln(1− tW ) 163.69 226.97 172.00 172.00
1st stage F-test for ln(1− tD) 877.02 601.02 601.02 548.66
1st stage F-test for
[ln(1− tD)− ln(1− tW )]
334.74 333.09
Observations 14,003 14,003 14,003 12,135 12,135 12,135
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates weighted by total income.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
Table 2. ETI estimates for wages and dividends, 2002-2007
to the ETI model for dividends does not change the baseline interpretation of its own
net-of-tax rate elasticity, which still reflects both real and income-shifting responses.
Adding the difference of the instrumented net-of-tax rates to the model changes
the interpretation of the dividend tax rate parameter. Now the coefficient for dividend
net-of-tax rate only includes the real response, which is estimated to be 0.5 and weakly
significant. In terms of identifying the income-shifting response, columns (2) and (3)
use the same tax rate variation, which gives the same estimates for the income-shifting
component. The main difference in the two approaches is the separate estimate for the
real response in column (3).
For wages, columns (4)-(6) show that the only statistically significant effect is the
income-shifting response, which is estimated to be around -0.4. The wage net-of-tax
rate coefficient is insignificant in every specification. The results for the wage income
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regressions highlight that a tax base might be responsive to tax rates in other tax bases
even when its own tax rate elasticity is zero or insignificant.18
In summary, the results in Table 2 show that income-shifting can have substantial
impact on the behavior of individuals with income-shifting possibilities. This result is
in line with previous studies from both the US (e.g. Slemrod 1995, Gordon and Slemrod
2000, Saez 2004) and the Nordic Countries (e.g. Pirttilä and Selin 2011, le Maire and
Schjerning 2013). In addition, we find that different tax bases react differently to tax
rate changes, both in terms of real and income-shifting responses. We further interpret
and discuss our results in Section 3.8.
3.6.2. Real response estimations. As discussed before in Section 3.3, the esti-
mated real response components in Table 2 might not fully reflect the actual real effort
or the productivity of the owner. Real responses in the ETI model might be “contami-
nated” with other tax avoidance measures, such as private consumption within the firm
or fringe benefits.
We estimate the net-of-tax rate elasticities for income components that are broader
than the separate tax bases for wages and dividends in order to assess the real compo-
nent in a more diverse manner. First, we analyze the elasticity of total income (wages
+ dividends). The conclusions based on the estimates in columns (1) and (2) in Table
3 are similar as before. Dividends also appear to affect real behavior, whereas the real
elasticity of wages is close to zero and insignificant. The point estimate for dividend
tax elasticity is 0.7, which can be considered relatively large.
18We also study the heterogeneity of the results across income groups. Following the approach of
Gruber and Saez (2002), we divide the sample to four equal-sized quantiles based on base-year wages
and dividends. In summary, we find that the real elasticity is smaller and income-shifting elasticity
is larger for high-income owners, and vice versa. However, due to the relatively small number of
observations in the subsamples, these elasticity estimates are imprecisely measured.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ln(ZD + ZW ) ln(ZD + ZW ) ln(net profit) ln(net profit) ln(turnover) ln(turnover)
ln(1− tW ) 0.086 0.206 0.178
(0.172) (0.345) (0.313)
ln(1− tD) 0.694*** 0.335** 0.293*
(0.076) (0.169) (0.151)
Income spline Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Base-year
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st stage F-test
for ln(1− tW )
183.29 407.85 409.66
1st stage F-test
for ln(1− tD)
805.69 850.48 791.86
Observations 14,010 14,010 13,507 13,507 13,018 13,018
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates weighted by total income.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
Table 3. Real response estimations, 2002-2007
However, there are still various ways in which owners can affect the amount of re-
ported total income subject to taxation. For example, as shown in Figure 2 above, own-
ers anticipated the dividend tax increase in 2005 by increasing both reported dividends
and total income before the reform. Therefore, we also estimate the tax elasticities
of firm-level income components that are arguably less subject to tax avoidance and
intertemporal shifting of reported income.
First, we estimate the elasticity of net profits with respect to both net-of-tax rates.
Net profits are defined as turnover plus other income of the firm minus all costs ex-
cept wages. Thus net profits include, for example, sales, capital gains and irregular
earnings. Second, we estimate the net-of-tax rate elasticity of the turnover of the firm.
Importantly, compared to total income withdrawn from the firm, both net profits and
turnover also include retained earnings and other income not withdrawn from the firm
in the current period.
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Both of these variables reflect the real effort of the owner. The firms in our esti-
mation sample are relatively small in terms of the number of employees (median no.
of employees is 3 in 2007). Thus the owner contributes significantly to the overall out-
put of the firm. Furthermore, the tax elasticities of these types of firm-level income
components with respect to owner-level tax rates are rarely analyzed in public finance
literature.
Net profits are significantly responsive to dividend taxes, but the point estimate is
half the size of the total income elasticity (column (3)). The point estimate for wage tax
elasticity increases, but it is still statistically insignificant (column (4)). Columns (5)
and (6) present the elasticity estimates for the turnover of the firm. The estimates are
similar, but somewhat smaller than before with net profits. This indicates that dividend
taxes affect the productivity of the firm and the effort of the owner in a statistically
significant manner, whereas wage taxes do not.
However, it is worth noting that the size of the income component might also affect
the estimates. As the underlying tax rate variation is the same in all specifications,
broader tax bases have smaller elasticities if the absolute behavioral response is the
same for different income components. Thus differences in the elasticity estimates for
different income types might not be solely driven by differences in the opportunities to
avoid taxes.
Overall, the results imply that even though income-shifting between tax bases ac-
counts for a large proportion of the elasticity, the responses along the real margin might
still be non-negligible at the same time. Thus for the policy maker, this requires weight-
ing the possible advantages (or disadvantages) stemming from real responses with the
costs of avoiding taxes by income-shifting.
Finally, in addition to effort responses, dividend and wage taxes might affect firm-
level real investment decisions. Investment responses might cause additional welfare
effects, which are not included in our model of the excess burden. However, in order
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to thoroughly analyze the welfare effects of investments, we would need a well-defined
dynamic model. Nevertheless, we address this issue by characterizing investment re-
sponses. Similarly as in Table 3, we regress the change in the fixed assets of the firm19
with the changes in the net-of-tax rates on wages and dividends. In the fixed assets
estimations, the coefficient for dividend taxes is positive and statistically significant
(0.33 (0.17)). For wage taxes, the estimate is very close to zero and insignificant (0.04
(0.37)). These results are well in line with the turnover and net profits estimations, and
highlight that dividend taxes might also significantly affect the real economic decisions
of the owners.
3.7. Alternative specifications and robustness checks
3.7.1. Bunching at kink points. Examining taxable income distributions near
the kink points of the piecewise linear income tax schedule provides a visual and robust
method to analyze the overall ETI. The bunching method provides a local alternative
to the first-differences approach, and allows us to estimate behavioral responses using
cross-sectional variation in tax rates. This avoids some of the critical issues in first-
differences estimation and net-of-tax rate instruments, such as potential mean reversion.
Intuitively, similar general conclusions from the bunching analysis would support our
main results based on panel data regressions.
A seminal contribution by Saez (2010) shows that under normal preferences, we
should observe an excess mass of individuals clustering at the point in the income
distribution where the marginal tax rate exhibits a discontinuous jump if significant
behavioral responses occur. More formally, Saez (2010) shows that the local ETI is
proportional to the excess density mass around the kink point:
19Fixed assets include, for example, machinery and equipment, plants and buildings, and research and
development expenses and other long-term expenses.
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(3.7.1) e w b(k)
k ∗ ln((1− τ1)/(1− τ2))
In equation (3.7.1), b(k) is the excess mass at the kink point k, and (1 − τ1) and
(1− τ2) denote the net-of-tax rates below and above k, respectively. Empirically, b(k)
is estimated by comparing the observed income distribution at the kink point to a
counterfactual income distribution, representing the shape of the distribution in the
absence of a change in the marginal tax rate at k.
Intuitively, given the size of the change in the net-of-tax rate around the kink point,
the implied elasticity is larger the more behavioral responses occur and more bunching
is observed at the kink. Also, with given excess bunching, the elasticity is smaller the
bigger is the difference between the tax rates on both sides of the kink. A more detailed
theoretical background for the bunching approach and the estimation procedure are
presented in the end of the Appendix.
Figure 3 shows the distributions of dividend income around the kink point of flat-
taxed dividends in 2002 and 2007. The figure presents dividend income relative to the
kink for each owner within +/- 5,000 € of the kink in bins of 100 €. Dividend income
below the kink is taxed at the flat tax rate. Dividends exceeding the kink are taxed
progressively. Thus for many owners, the flat-tax kink point induces large changes in
the marginal tax rate on dividends. On average, the increase in the MTR on dividends
at the kink is 13 percentage points in 2002, and 19 percentage points in 2007.
Figure 3 indicates clear bunching at the flat-tax kink point. A large proportion
of the owners are located very close to or exactly at the kink point. This strongly
supports the earlier conclusions that owners are responsive to marginal tax rates on
dividends, and that the dividend tax base is clearly responsive to its marginal tax rate.
We approximate the local ETI of dividend income at the kink point using the average
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Figure 3. Dividend income distribution around the flat-tax rate kink
point, years 2007 (left) and 2002 (right)
marginal tax rate above the kink for owners within the bunching window. We estimate
the ETI to be around 0.9 and statistically significant both in 2002 and 2007.
There are a few aspects that are worth noting when interpreting Figure 3. First,
the flat-tax kink point is not the same for all owners in terms of euros, as the amount
corresponding to the 9% imputed return on the net assets of the firm obviously varies
among different owners. However, Figure 3 implies that owners are very aware of their
individual kink points, as there is no other explicit reason to locate at the kink except
the discontinuous change in the tax rate. Second, the size of the change in the marginal
tax rate on dividends at the kink point also varies among owners, as the marginal tax
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rate on dividends exceeding the kink depends on the total sum of progressively taxed
income (wages and earned income from other sources).
The bunching method identifies the overall effect of the increase in the MTR on
dividends close to the kink, not taking into account potential changes in behavior
elsewhere in the income distribution or in other tax bases. Therefore, the bunching
approach does not enable us to explicitly identify separate estimates for real elasticity
and income-shifting. Nevertheless, the bunching evidence clearly shows that dividend
tax rates induce notable behavioral responses among the owners.
In addition, we conduct an indirect bunching analysis for wages. The exact location
in the taxable income distribution is what matters in terms of bunching at kink points.
Thus it is not relevant to analyze only the distribution of wages from the firm, as other
progressively taxed income also affects the location of the owner in the taxable income
distribution. For simplicity, in the bunching analysis, we only include owners who do
not receive wages or other earned income outside the firm. Nevertheless, the results are
similar when we include all the owners in the data set.
Figure 4 presents the distributions of earned income relative to different kink points
in the marginal tax rate schedule for 2002 and 2007 (+/- 5,000 € in bins of 100 €).
The figure shows that there is no statistically significant excess bunching at the kink
points of the earned income tax schedule. For the sake of brevity, Figure 4 presents
only 3 kink points in both years, but the result of no significant bunching holds for all
kink points.
The evidence from the wage tax rate kink points suggests that owners do not react
actively to marginal wage tax rates, which is in line with the low wage elasticity esti-
mates presented before. Compared to the first-differences analysis, the cross-sectional
bunching approach is not sensitive to the size of the change in the marginal tax rate
between t and t + k. As changes in wage tax rates over time have been modest in
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2002-2007, this might affect the results in Section 3.6.1. Nevertheless, both of these
methods suggest low responsiveness of wage income to the marginal tax rate on wages.
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Figure 4. Taxable earned income distributions relative to different kink
points, years 2002 (above) and 2007 (below)
In summary, the bunching analysis supports the result that dividends are more
responsive to tax rates than wages. We find clear bunching at the flat-tax kink point for
dividends, whereas the earned income tax rate schedule appears not to induce significant
behavioral responses. However, studying excess bunching of dividends and wages does
not give explicit information on the extent of income-shifting between the tax bases.
Nevertheless, the bunching evidence indicates that owners are very aware of the flat-tax
kink point. Given the ample possibilities to shift income between wages and dividends,
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this tentatively suggests that the dividend tax kink also affects wage income and the
overall composition of total income.
3.7.2. Robustness checks and sensitivity analysis. We estimate several dif-
ferent specifications of our estimable equation (3.3.5) in order to assess the robustness
and sensitivity of our baseline results. The results for these estimations are presented
in Tables A4 and A5 in Appendix. In general, our results and main conclusions are
robust to changes in the empirical specification.
In column (1) of Table A4 we estimate the model for dividends, wages and the
turnover of the firm without any control variables. The results without controls are
approximately similar to those with controls. This tentatively indicates that non-tax-
related changes in income do not significantly bias the results. In other words, identifi-
cation appears not be very sensitive to the selected individual and firm-level controls.20
Following Gruber and Saez (2002), our baseline estimates are weighted by total
income. Column (2) in Table A4 shows the unweighted estimates, which are very similar
to the weighted estimates. Columns (3)-(6) show the results with different variations of
income cut-offs. All of these results are statistically equivalent to our baseline model.
However, the point estimates vary somewhat depending on the income cut-offs.
In addition, we test how our modifications to the predicted NTR instrument affect
our results. First, including the YEL/TEL dummy variable as an additional instrument
in the wage regression does not have a significant effect on the point estimates. However,
it improves the precision of the estimation. Second, the prediction of firm net assets
based on pre-reform observed characteristics affects the main results for dividends,
20As an additional robustness check, we add 10-piece splines of firm-level income and asset variables as
control variables in order to more rigorously control for the possibility that changes in individual income
and firm-level characteristics are connected. This might be a concern because firm net assets, which
also reflect the size of the firm, greatly affect changes in the marginal tax rates on dividends. However,
adding firm-level splines does not significantly affect the results. Nevertheless, adding additional splines
increases precision.
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compared to NTR instruments defined with fixed net assets from the base year 2002.
Without predicting the net assets, the F-test for the NTR instrument is very low. This
indicates that the NTR instrument poorly predicts the changes in tax incentives without
taking into account the (counterfactual) growth of net assets, which greatly affects the
realized MTR on dividends.
Finally, Table A5 shows the results for longer-run effects, namely for the years 2002-
2008 and 2002-2009. The estimates suggest that the income-shifting effect somewhat
decreases in the longer run. Otherwise the results are similar to those in our baseline
model. This also implies that anticipation of the 2005 tax reform does not significantly
affect the results, as the estimates for longer time periods imply qualitatively similar
results as our baseline model.
3.8. Discussion
In this paper we show how including income-shifting between tax bases in the widely-
used elasticity of taxable income (ETI) framework affects the interpretation of ETI as
the overall measure of tax efficiency. Based on previous ETI literature, we build an
empirical model that identifies both real responses and income-shifting. As an empirical
example, we analyze real responses and income-shifting between wages and dividends
among the owners of privately held corporations in Finland. To our knowledge, this
paper is the first to explicitly separate these elasticities using a well-defined empirical
model and detailed micro-level panel data and tax reforms.
As shown by Feldstein (1995, 1999), ETI summarizes the overall deadweight loss
of income taxation. The source of the behavioral response is irrelevant as long as
individuals optimize such that the marginal cost of “creating” taxable income through
different margins equals the net-of-tax rate of the tax base.
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However, tax avoidance through income-shifting might distort this line of thought
for at least two reasons. First, if part of the behavioral response is due to income-
shifting between tax bases, the shifted income is usually also taxed. Thus not all
of the overall response is necessarily a deadweight loss. Second, the real social costs
associated with income-shifting might be low, for example due to fiscal externalities
related to payments to tax consultants. This further decreases the efficiency loss. In
the extreme case in which income-shifting induces no social costs at the margin, the
income-shifting response is only a re-allocation of resources between individuals and
the government with no welfare losses (Chetty 2009).
Our results show that income-shifting accounts for a large proportion of the overall
behavioral response among the owners of privately held businesses in Finland. Over
two thirds of the overall dividend income response is due to income-shifting. For wages,
the only statistically significant response comes from the income-shifting margin.
What do the results from our empirical example case imply in terms of the excess
burden analysis? Applying the welfare loss formulas (3.2.9) and (3.2.10) presented
in Section 3.2.3, we can evaluate the marginal excess burden both in the standard
ETI framework and the income-shifting model. We approximate the marginal excess
burden using the average real and income-shifting elasticities, and the average marginal
tax rates on dividend income and wage income (using post-reform values for the whole
data set).
Using the standard ETI framework and the point estimate for the average overall
dividend elasticity in column (1) of Table 2, we approximate the marginal excess burden
of dividend taxation to be around 0.9. When separating the income-shifting effect and
using the average estimates in column (3) of Table 2, the marginal excess burden halves
to 0.4. Thus the standard ETI analysis for the dividend tax base notably overestimates
the deadweight loss, and simply taking into account the fact that the shifted income is
also taxed significantly decreases the evaluated efficiency loss.
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Furthermore, if we assume that income-shifting is purely transferring resources in
the economy with zero social costs, the marginal excess burden of dividend taxes reduces
to the welfare loss induced solely by the real behavioral effect. Using the estimate for
real responses in the dividend tax base model in column (3) of Table 2, we approximate
the marginal deadweight loss to be around 0.3.
However, our estimate for the real response in the single tax base model might be
upwards-biased. The real response estimate might include other tax avoidance chan-
nels. For example, owners can shift reported personal income intertemporally between
different time periods using retained earnings.
We use broader firm-level income components (turnover and net profits) that are
less subject to tax avoidance in order to examine the real effects more diversely. In
addition to income withdrawn from the firm by the owner, turnover and net profits
include retained earnings, and therefore capture the effect of tax rates on effort and
productivity in a more comprehensive manner. The results show that both net profits
and the turnover of the firm appear to be responsive to dividend taxes, which supports
the view that the real responses are non-negligible. In contrast, the effect of wage taxes
does not statistically differ from zero.
Overall, we find that the dividend tax base is more responsive to taxes than the wage
tax base. Also, firm-level income components are more responsive to dividend taxes
compared to wage taxes. There are plausible explanations for these findings. First, the
variation in tax rates is larger for dividends, both over time and between income tax
brackets. If there are underlying optimization frictions, the owners would respond more
to larger changes in tax rates (see e.g. Chetty 2012 and Kleven and Schultz 2013).
Second, there might be practical differences between the two income tax bases.
Decisions on dividend distributions are usually made only once or a few times within a
year. In contrast, wages are normally paid on a monthly or weekly basis. The infrequent
nature of the decision-making process might make dividend income more responsive to
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taxes. Also, owners might be more aware of the dividend tax rate and the dividend tax
rate kink points in the Finnish system, as long as they are aware of the net assets of
their firm. In contrast, the effective marginal wage tax rate schedule including many
deductions and tax credits might be less transparent.
Third, the return on invested income could be inherently more elastic than the
compensation for working. This implies that dividends are simply more responsive to
tax rate changes, given the size of the change in incentives and the transparency of the
tax system.
In summary, this paper highlights the importance of separating different ways of
responding to changes in income tax rates. In terms of welfare analysis, we show that the
distinction between income-shifting and real elasticity components can have substantial
effect on policy conclusions. This approach is applicable to many other reforms in other
countries. For example, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the US drastically decreased
marginal personal tax rates of high-income earners, and induced notable incentives to
shift income from the corporate tax base to the personal tax base. With separate real
and income-shifting elasticities, we could outline the true welfare effect of reducing
personal income tax rates in the US.
In the empirical part, we show that income-shifting and real elasticities can be esti-
mated separately by including the difference of the relevant tax rates into the model. In
addition to clear income-shifting responses, our analysis highlights that it is important
to estimate elasticities separately for all relevant tax bases and tax rates. In theory, we
have no explicit reason to assume symmetric responses between different tax bases or
tax rates. In fact, we find that in Finland the dividend tax base is notably more elastic
than the wage tax base, both at the real and income-shifting margin.
Furthermore, the government cannot easily affect the real response margin of indi-
viduals, as real responses reflect deeper behavioral parameters, such as the opportunity
cost of working (Piketty et al. 2014, Slemrod 1995). However, opportunities for tax
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avoidance are more under the control of the policy maker. For example, limiting the
legal possibilities to avoid taxes presumably decreases income-shifting activity. In the
extreme case, setting τD = τW removes all income-shifting incentives in our example,
and the government can set tax rates based on real responses alone (assuming no other
forms of tax avoidance or evasion).
However, there are also reasons not to set equal tax rates. Within a simple Ramsey
framework, it would be optimal to tax less the tax base with the larger elasticity (Piketty
et al. 2014). Based on our results, this would imply that the optimal policy is to set
τD < τW , at least when income-shifting possibilities are absent or restricted.
Nevertheless, it might be that different tax rates and the possibility to shift income
between tax bases increase overall entrepreneurial activity and effort in the long run.
Theoretically, this refers to a model in which the cost functions of real effort and
income-shifting are not separable, and thus separate elasticity parameters for income-
shifting and real behavior cannot be empirically identified in our framework. In this
generic case, the policy maker needs to balance between the inefficiency and revenue
losses induced by income-shifting, and the potential long-run efficiency gains induced
by setting differential tax rates and allowing for income-shifting.
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Figure A1. Average marginal tax rates on dividends in 2002 and 2007.
No net assets (left-hand side), net assets of 250,000 € (right-hand side)
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ductions and exemptions. MTR also includes social security contributions levied on wage income as well as
firm-level social security contributions.
Figure A2. Average marginal tax rates on wages in 2002 and 2007 (left-
hand side). Marginal tax rates on wages in 2007, including individual
variation in the municipal tax rate (right-hand side)
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MTR on wages MTR on
dividends (no
net assets)
MTR on
dividends
(net assets
250k)
MTR on
dividends
(net assets
1000k)
MTR on
dividends
(net assets
5000k)
Income 2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007
5,000 18.1 11.6 23.1 32.3 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
10,000 23.9 17.0 19.3 35.1 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
15,000 37.4 32.6 36.3 36.6 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
20,000 43.4 32.6 42.3 41.3 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
25,000 43.4 43.1 42.3 46.7 0 32.3 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
30,000 43.4 43.1 42.3 46.7 23.1 35.1 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
35,000 49.4 48.5 48.3 49.5 19.3 36.2 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
40,000 49.4 48.5 48.3 49.5 36.3 41.3 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
45,000 49.4 48.5 48.3 49.5 42.3 46.7 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
50,000 49.4 48.5 48.3 49.5 42.3 46.7 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
55,000 56.4 48.5 55.3 49.5 48.3 46.7 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
60,000 56.4 48.5 55.3 49.5 48.3 49.5 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
65,000 56.4 56.5 55.3 53.7 .48.3 49.5 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
70,000 56.4 56.5 55.3 53.7 48.3 49.5 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
75,000 56.4 56.5 55.3 53.7 48.3 49.5 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
80,000 56.4 55.6 55.3 53.2 55.3 49.5 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
85,000 56.4 55.6 55.3 53.2 55.3 53.7 29.0 26.0 29.0 26.0
90,000 56.4 55.6 55.3 53.2 55.3 53.7 29.0 32.3 29.0 40.5
95,000 56.4 55.6 55.3 53.2 55.3 53.7 29.0 35.1 29.0 40.5
100,000 56.4 54.8 55.3 52.8 55.3 53.2 23.1 36.2 29.0 40.5
Notes:
MTR on wages is calculated with dividend income equal to zero, and vice versa. MTR on wages include average
municipal taxes, central government income taxes, automatic tax deductions and tax credits and average
firm-level social security contributions (3%). MTR on wages does not include pension and health insurance
contributions or any deductions based on insurance contributions. MTR on dividends includes corporate taxes
on withdrawn dividends (after 2005). MTR on dividends include all automatic tax deductions and tax credits.
MTR on progressively taxed dividends include average municipal taxes and central government income taxes.
Marginal tax rates are calculated using Stata and the JUTTA microsimulation model.
Table A1. Marginal tax rates (MTR) on wages and dividends with dif-
ferent levels of firm net assets, 2002 and 2007 (in nominal euros)
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2002 2007
Variable Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD N
Wages 25,862 21,306 34,688 39,101 30,780 25,615 40,964 52,028
Dividends 25,696 8,750 101,722 39,104 22,015 7,523 83,456 52,045
Total income 51,560 35,242 110,046 39,101 52,800 38,458 95,633 52,028
MTR dividends 0.38 0.37 0.11 39,104 0.36 0.26 0.11 52,045
MTR wages 0.47 0.51 0.11 39,104 0.42 0.47 0.13 52,045
YEL 0.35 0 0.48 39,104 0.54 1 0.50 52,045
Ownership share 0.80 0.70 0.35 39,104 0.73 0.80 0.27 52,045
Male 0.82 1 0.38 39,104 0.82 1 0.38 52,045
Age 48.47 49 10.46 39,104 50.42 51 10.78 52,045
Turnover 1,022,725 232,099 5,847,782 39,104 1,064,023 224,399 8,153,712 52,045
Total assets 697,755 167,336 4,410,689 39,104 855,857 196,591 6,140,952 52,045
Net assets 431,001 93,075 3,836,671 39,104 524,072 108,413 4,034,409 52,045
No. of employees 10.74 3 47.76 39,104 9.74 3 51.52 52,045
Table A2. Descriptive statistics, data (in 2002 euros)
2002 2007
Variable Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD N
Wages 27,300 25,000 21,207 14,012 28,992 26,546 24,237 14,010
Dividends 21,028 11,301 32,882 14,012 22,251 11,878 33,858 14,010
Total income 48,328 40,738 38,152 14,012 51,243 44,050 41,118 14,010
MTR dividends 0.40 .42 0.10 14,012 0.37 0.26 0.11 14,010
MTR wages 0.48 0.51 0.09 14,012 0.43 0.47 0.12 14,010
YEL 0.62 1 0.49 14,012 0.62 1 0.49 14,010
Ownership share 0.77 0.80 1.02 14,012 0.76 0.85 0.26 14,010
Male 0.84 1 0.37 14,012 0.84 1 0.37 14,010
Age 47.4 48 9.27 14,012 52.4 53 9.27 14,010
Turnover 764,175 265,622 2,652,496 14,012 852,451 267,531 2,732,651 14,010
Total assets 453,071 190,734 1,686,930 14,012 650,201 250,470 2,612,920 14,010
Net assets 268,107 113,133 837,228 14,012 399,598 154,933 1,634,324 14,010
No. of employees 8.94 4 21.31 14,012 8.84 3 23.21 14,010
Table A3. Descriptive statistics, baseline estimation sample (in 2002 euros)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No controls No weights Small inc limit Large inc limit Small 4inc limit Large 4inc limit
VARIABLES lnZD lnZD lnZD lnZD lnZD lnZD
ln(1− tD) 0.595* 0.542* 0.860*** 0.436 0.753** 0.581**
(0.317) (0.290) (0.259) (0.331) (0.307) (0.293)
[ln(1− tD)−
ln(1− tW )]
1.722*** 1.481*** 1.359*** 1.364*** 1.059*** 1.535***
(0.399) (0.369) (0.333) (0.418) (0.397) (0.369)
Observations 14,003 14,003 16,935 9,888 10,988 14,879
VARIABLES lnZW lnZW lnZW lnZW lnZW lnZW
ln(1− tW ) -0.274 -0.123 -0.193 -0.158 -0.315 0.011
(0.308) (0.299) (0.273) (0.347) (0.296) (0.298)
[ln(1− tD)−
ln(1− tW )]
-0.691*** -0.420*** -0.423*** -0.391*** -0.594*** -0.328**
(0.162) (0.141) (0.136) (0.149) (0.143) (0.138)
Observations 12,135 12,135 14,342 8,535 9,611 12,870
VARIABLES ln(turnover) ln(turnover) ln(turnover) ln(turnover) ln(turnover) ln(turnover)
ln(1− tD) 0.357** 0.291* 0.297** 0.411** 0.217 0.281*
(0.160) (0.149) (0.143) (0.171) (0.169) (0.146)
Observations 13,018 13,018 15,720 9,134 10,252 13,817
VARIABLES ln(turnover) ln(turnover) ln(turnover) ln(turnover) ln(turnover) ln(turnover)
ln(1− tw) 0.148 0.156 0.266 0.136 0.460 0.042
(0.329) (0.306) (0.272) (0.360) (0.337) (0.305)
Observations 13,018 13,018 15,720 9,134 10,252 13,817
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Small income limit (column(3)) = 10,000
€ of total income in base-year. Large income limit (4) = 40,000 € of total income in base-year. Small limit in change
of income (5) = 25,000 €. Large limit in change of income (6) = 75,000 €. Columns (2)-(6) include all individual and
firm-level controls.
Table A4. Robustness checks: Different specifications, 2002-2007
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Years 2002-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES lnZD lnZW lnTI lnTI ln(turnover) ln(turnover)
ln(1− tw) -0.043 -0.015 0.110
(0.261) (0.157) (0.294)
ln(1− tD) 0.625** 0.687*** 0.207
(0.250) (0.083) (0.161)
[ln(1− tD)− ln(1− tW )] 1.408*** -0.359**
(0.315) (0.149)
Observations 12,859 11,012 12,867 12,867 11,840 11,840
Years 2002-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES lnZD lnZW lnTI lnTI ln(turnover) ln(turnover)
ln(1− tw) 0.283 -0.128 0.228
(0.292) (0.163) (0.309)
ln(1− tD) 0.396* 0.487*** 0.329*
(0.225) (0.081) (0.170)
[ln(1− tD)− ln(1− tW )] 0.831*** -0.402**
(0.292) (0.156)
Observations 11,843 9,933 11,851 11,851 10,712 10,712
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates weighted by total income.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Columns (1)-(6) include all individual and firm-level controls
Table A5. Robustness checks: Years 2002-2008 and 2002-2009
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Bunching at kink points
The intuition behind the bunching analysis is the following: Consider a small increase in the marginal tax
rate, dτ , at a point z = k. Below the kink point k taxable income z is taxed with a tax rate τ1, and above the
kink point the tax rate is τ2, such that τ1 < τ2. Assuming individuals with standard preferences as before in
Section 3.2, we can denote the fraction of individuals bunching as B(dz) =
´ k+dz
k
h0(z)dz, where h0(z) is the
pre-reform smooth density function of taxable income. Individuals located within the income interval
(k, k + dz) before the tax rate change bunch at k due to the introduction of the kink point. Individuals
further up in the income distribution z > k + dz or below k do not move to the kink point. The bunching
approach implicitly assumes that individuals in the neighborhood of k are otherwise similar except that they
face a different slope in the budget set.
Empirically, the excess mass at the kink point b(k) = B(dz)/h0(k) is estimated by comparing the actual
density around the kink point to a smooth counterfactual density. The counterfactual density describes how
the income distribution at the kink would have looked like without a change in the tax rate. Due to imperfect
control and uncertainty about the exact amount of income in each year, the usual approach is to use a
“bunching window” around k to estimate the excess mass (see Saez 2010 and Chetty et al. 2011). In other
words, we compare the density of taxpayers within an income interval (k − δ, k + δ) to an estimated
counterfactual density within the same income range.
We use the approach of Chetty et al. (2011) and estimate the counterfactual density non-parametrically. We
fit a flexible polynomial function to the observed density function, excluding the region around the kink point
[k − δ, k + δ] from the regression.
First, we group individuals into small income bins, and estimate a bunching regression of the following form
cj =
p∑
i=0
βi(zj)
i +
k+δ∑
i=k−δ
ηi · 1(zj = i) + εj
where cj is the count of individuals in bin j, and zj denotes the income level in bin j. The order of
polynomial is denoted by p.
The counterfactual density function is estimated by omitting the bunching window from the regression,
cˆj =
∑p
i=0 βi(zj)
i. Thus we can express bunching around k as Bˆ =
∑k+δ
i=k−δ cj − cˆj . Finally, the excess mass
is calculated as
bˆ(k) =
Bˆ∑k+δ
i=k−δ cˆj/(2δ + 1)
As in the earlier literature, parameters δ and p are determined visually and based on the fit of the model. We
use a seventh-order polynomial and a bunching window of +/-700 € from the kink point in our baseline
estimations. Our conclusions are not very sensitive to the bunching window δ or the degree of polynomial p.
As in Chetty et al. (2011), standard errors for bˆ(k) are calculated using a bootstrap procedure where we
generate a large number of income distributions by randomly resampling the residuals from the bunching
regression. The standard errors are defined as the standard deviation in the distribution of bˆ(k).
CHAPTER 4
Taxable Income Elasticity and the Anatomy of Behavioral
Response: Evidence from Finland1
Abstract. This paper uses extensive Finnish panel data to analyze the elasticity of
taxable income (ETI). I use changes in flat municipal income tax rates as an instrument
for the overall changes in marginal tax rates. This instrument is not a function of
individual income, which is the basis for an exogenous instrument in the taxable
income model. In general, instruments used in previous studies do not have this
feature. Furthermore, I estimate behavioral responses using smaller subcomponents
of taxable income, such as working hours, fringe benefits and tax deductions. This
“anatomy” of the overall ETI has been rarely studied in the literature. My preferred
estimate for the average ETI in Finland is 0.27. The preferred specification includes
extensive regional and individual controlling. Subcomponent analysis suggests that
neither work effort nor labor supply respond actively to tax changes. In contrast, it
seems that fringe benefits and tax deductions might have a more considerable effect.
Keywords: income taxation, elasticity of taxable income, excess burden, labor
supply
JEL codes: H21; H24; H31; J22
4.1. Introduction
The elasticity of taxable income (ETI) with respect to the net-of-tax rate (one mi-
nus the marginal tax rate) is a key tax policy parameter and an important element in
the efficiency analysis of income taxation. The practical significance of ETI is straight-
forward: it measures how a one percent change in the net-of-tax rate affects taxable
income. Intuitively, the more elastic taxable income is, the larger the behavioral re-
sponse to a tax reform will be, in terms of a change in the tax base.
Under general conditions, ETI measures the marginal excess burden of income tax-
ation (Feldstein 1995, 1999). In addition to labor supply responses, ETI covers changes
1An earlier version of this paper is published in the Government Institute for Economic Research
Working Papers series, 55, February 2014.
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in, for example, effort and productivity, deduction behavior, tax evasion and tax avoid-
ance. All of these margins are (more or less) important when considering the overall
efficiency of a tax system. From this point of view, a large ETI makes a tax increase rel-
atively costly and a tax decrease less costly, and vice versa. Altogether, good knowledge
of country-specific ETI is essential when deciding on national tax reforms.
This paper studies ETI using Finnish register data. I use changes in flat municipal
income tax rates as instruments for the changes in overall net-of-tax rates. This in-
strument is not based on individual income, which provides the basis for an exogenous
instrument. In addition to average ETI, I study the structure of the overall response
by characterizing how the subcomponents of ETI, such as labor supply and deduction
behavior, react to changes in tax rates.
Earlier empirical literature has mainly focused on estimating the overall elasticity
of taxable income. It is still largely unknown which of the behavioral margins are the
most responsive components of the total elasticity. However, detailed knowledge of
“the anatomy of behavioral response” (Slemrod 1996) is also useful when designing an
income tax system and the detailed structure of tax reforms, especially in the light of
minimizing the excess burden of income taxation.2
Furthermore, analysis of different subcomponents provides information on the eco-
nomic nature of the response. It is rather difficult for the policymaker to influence deep
individual utility arguments, such as the opportunity cost of working. However, for
example, it is easier to influence tax deduction behavior through minor adjustments to
regulations.
2In previous studies, Blomquist and Selin (2010) estimate the elasticity of the hourly wage rate. Using
a Swedish data set, they find a significant wage rate response. Also, Kleven and Schultz (2013) report
that capital income components of taxable income are more responsive than earned income in Denmark.
Previous literature concerning tax reforms in the United States shows that a large proportion of the
behavioral response of high-income individuals has been in the form of tax avoidance via income-
shifting rather than real economic behavior (see for example Slemrod 1995, 1996, Gordon and Slemrod
2000, Goolsbee 2000, Saez 2004, and Saez, Slemrod and Giertz 2012).
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The source of individual variation in tax rates and the endogeneity of the net-of-tax
rate variable are the main issues to focus on when estimating ETI using panel data.
Identification requires variation in income tax rates that is different for individuals
with otherwise similar income trends. Also, due to the progressive income tax rate
schedule, a valid instrument for the net-of-tax rate is usually necessary in order to
derive a consistent elasticity estimator. In this study I use variation in municipal-level
flat income tax rates for both purposes.
Finnish municipal taxation has appealing features from the point of view of empirical
ETI analysis. First, the municipal income tax rate is proportional, which means that
it is independent of individual income level. This is the basis for using changes in
municipal tax rates as an instrument for changes in progressive individual marginal
tax rates. Recent literature highlights that frequently used predicted net-of-tax rate
instruments are not necessarily consistent (see for example Blomquist and Selin (2010)
and Weber (2014)). These instruments are functions of individual income in the base
period, and thus potentially endogenous in a model where changes in taxable income
are regressed with changes in the instrumented net-of-tax rate.
Second, different municipalities have changed their tax rates differently in different
years. In other words, net-of-tax rates have changed differently for otherwise similar
individuals who differ only in location. Moreover, as the municipal income tax rate
does not depend on individual income, changes in municipal taxation have an effect
on net-of-tax rates throughout the income distribution. This enables me to identify
the average elasticity parameter while avoiding some of the usual difficulties in ETI
estimation, namely non-tax-related changes in the shape of the income distribution
and the mean reversion of income. These issues are particularly troublesome if tax
rate variation is concentrated in a single part of the income distribution, such as in the
case of tax reforms affecting only high-income earners. Many earlier studies base their
estimation strategy on tax rate variation that occurs only at certain income levels.
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However, changes in municipal income tax rates are not randomly assigned. Munic-
ipalities might change their tax rates based on, for example, previous trends in average
taxable income in their jurisdiction. This might affect the validity of the instrument.
As a potential solution, the data include a variety of municipal characteristics that I
use to control for municipal-level economic circumstances. In addition, I apply different
combinations of year and regional fixed effects in the estimable equation, and study the
effect of previous income trends on future tax changes in order to assess the exogeneity
of the instrument.
To summarize, this study contributes to the ETI literature in three ways: First,
I use a novel net-of-tax rate instrument based on changes in flat municipal tax rates,
which is uncorrelated with changes in individual income. Second, the differential tax
rate variation used in this study covers the entire income distribution. This improves
the identification of the average ETI, which is the parameter of main interest in this
study. Third, I characterize how different components of taxable income react to tax
rate changes. This subcomponent analysis provides information on what the most
important behavioral margins are. Studying the structure of the elasticity also describes
how much of the response is driven by changes in real-term behavior (hours of work and
work effort), and how much is accounted for by other margins (tax deductions, fringe
benefits). Different components of ETI are rarely analyzed in the empirical literature.
I estimate the average intensive margin ETI in Finland to be 0.27-0.60, depending
on the degree of individual and regional controlling. My preferred estimate is 0.27. The
preferred specification includes extensive regional and individual controlling.
In addition, as in many earlier studies, the average ETI is larger for women than for
men, and larger for high and low-income individuals than for middle-income earners.
Furthermore, I provide clear graphical reduced-form evidence that individuals respond
to changes in municipal income tax rates, and show that the potential policy endogene-
ity of municipal tax rate changes is not driving the results.
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Analysis of the subcomponents of taxable income gives tentative evidence that both
work effort and labor supply are not very responsive to tax rate changes. However,
more irregular components, such as fringe benefits and tax deductions, seem to be more
responsive. These imply that a large proportion of the overall ETI is not stemming from
changes in labor supply behavior.
The empirical ETI literature has grown substantially following the pioneering stud-
ies by Feldstein (1995, 1999). Feldstein (1995) uses panel data to analyze behavioral
responses to the 1986 tax reform in the US. He estimates ETI to be large, ranging
from 1-3, depending on the specification used. Many studies following Feldstein (1995)
focus on improving the elasticity estimation by paying more attention to net-of-tax
rate instruments and non-tax-related changes in the income distribution. Along with
these modifications, the elasticity estimates decreased markedly compared to those in
Feldstein (1995). A wide range of studies report elasticity estimates ranging from 0 to
0.6. For example, the widely cited Gruber and Saez (2002) study reports the ETI of
0.2 for middle-income earners, and 0.6 for high-income earners in the US. An extensive
review of earlier empirical results from the US is presented in a recent survey by Saez,
Slemrod and Giertz (2012).
More recent papers further study the reliability and consistency of the estimation
by utilizing different tax reforms and different net-of-tax rate instruments. This liter-
ature underlines that different tax reforms and more consistent estimation strategies
yield different estimates than the seminal contribution of Gruber and Saez (2002). In
particular, it has been shown that the widely-used predicted net-of-tax rate instruments
built on base-year income are not consistent due to potential endogeneity problems. For
example, Weber (2014) shows that when using a more robust instrumentation strategy,
the ETI estimates are twice as large compared to Gruber and Saez (2002).
A majority of earlier empirical studies estimate ETI using US data sets, while studies
concerning European countries and other regions are less common. In particular, there
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are no earlier Finnish ETI studies available to this day.3 For other Nordic countries,
Blomquist and Selin (2010) estimate ETI of around 0.20 for males and 1 for females in
Sweden. In addition, they document positive elasticity estimates for the hourly wage
rate, and find statistically significant income effects. For Denmark, Kleven and Schultz
(2013) use extensive panel data and many tax reforms to analyze ETI. In general, they
obtain modest elasticity estimates, the upper bound of ETI being 0.3. Also, Chetty et
al. (2011) report small elasticity estimates using Danish data. For Norway, Aarbu and
Thoresen (2001) find only small responses to tax changes. They report that ETI is not
significantly different from zero. In a more recent paper, Thoresen and Vattø (2013)
report elasticities below 0.1 for Norway.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents the conceptual
framework, including the theoretical background and the empirical model. Section
4.3 describes the Finnish income tax system and recent changes in income taxation.
Section 4.4 introduces the data and discusses identification issues. Section 4.5 presents
the results, and Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2. Conceptual framework
4.2.1. Taxable income model. The basic idea of the (static) taxable income
model is that an individual receives positive utility from consumption c and negative
utility from creating and reporting taxable income TI (Feldstein 1999).4 Following
Piketty et al. (2014), the quasi-linear utility function u(c, T I) = c−h(TI) is maximized
under the budget constraint c = TI(1 − τ) + R. The convex cost function of creating
3Pirttilä and Uusitalo (2005) calculate approximate elasticity estimates for Finland. Their results
suggest that the ETI is around 0.3.
4Within this study, taxable income is regarded as taxable earned income. Taxable earned income is
defined as the sum of labor income and taxable non-labor income minus deductions (verotettava tulo).
The legal distinction between earned income and capital income in the Finnish income tax system is
described in the next section.
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taxable income is denoted as h(TI), and (1− τ) denotes the net-of-tax rate on a linear
segment of the tax rate schedule. R denotes virtual income.
Maximization of the utility function with respect to the budget constraint gives the
supply function of taxable income of the form TI = TI((1 − τ)). Next, consider a
marginal decrease in (1− τ) (i.e. a marginal increase in τ). With a quasi-linear utility
model with no income effects, the decreased net-of-tax rate decreases the supply of
taxable income. Thus we get the following expression
(4.2.1)
dTI
TI
= e
d(1− τ)
(1− τ)
where e is the elasticity of taxable income.
As in most earlier studies, I assume no income effects. Earlier literature shows
that income effects are either insignificant or very small (Saez et al. 2012). Thus in
the empirical analysis, ETI is measured by regressing changes in taxable income with
changes in the net-of-tax rate.
4.2.2. The marginal excess burden of income taxation and the compo-
nents of taxable income. As shown in Feldstein (1999), all behavioral responses
reflect the inefficiency of the income tax system. The marginal excess burden of the in-
come tax can be expressed in terms of the elasticity of taxable income and the relevant
income tax rate even when individuals make various decisions in response to income
taxation, such as hours of work, work effort, deduction behavior, education choices and
so on. This result holds when agents do not make optimization errors, and income
taxation or taxable income do not impose any significant externalities.
Following Chetty (2009), consider an individual who makes a vector of decisions
{x1, .., xn} that all affect total taxable income linearly, additively and separately. In this
framework, overall taxable income can be presented as the sum of all behavioral choices,
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Σxi = TI. As in Chetty (2009), I Assume that each choice xi has a convex cost function
gi(xi). Individual maximizes a utility function of the form u(c,Σxi) = c−Σgi(xi) with
respect to c = Σxi(1− τ) +R.
I follow the standard approach in the literature and in Chetty (2009), and assume
that the tax revenue collected by the income tax is returned to the individual as a
lump-sum transfer. Thus any behavioral responses to tax rates induce welfare losses.
The social welfare function used for analyzing the welfare effect is presented as the sum
of individual utility (in the curly brackets) and government tax revenue
(4.2.2) W =
{
(1− τ)
∑
xi +R−
∑
gi(xi)
}
+ τ
∑
xi
Next, consider a small tax increase dτ . As the individual has optimized his/her
bundle of xi, we can write the marginal excess burden of income taxation in the following
form5
(4.2.3) DWL =
dW
dτ
= τ
n∑
i=1
dxi
dτ
= τ
dTI
dτ
Most of the earlier studies focus on estimating the overall average ETI. As underlined
in Feldstein (1999), the substitution elasticities for different choices contributing to TI
are not needed in order to analyze the marginal deadweight loss of income taxation
(as long as individuals behave such that g′i(xi) = τ for all i). However, I argue that
knowledge of dxi/dτ is useful when designing the income tax system and future tax
5Assuming that the individual makes optimal choices for each xi and that there are no externalities
implies that g′i(xi) = τ for all i (Chetty 2009). Thus, based on the envelope theorem, there are no
second-order effects on the individual’s utility. Originally, the main idea of Chetty (2009) is to show
that with weaker assumptions the marginal excess burden is a weighted sum of the total earnings
elasticity and the taxable income elasticity. This result holds when the marginal social cost does not
equal the tax rate for some xi, for example, due to fiscal externalities or optimization errors. As
highlighted in Chetty (2009), this might be the case in the presence of tax avoidance with transfer
costs. Specific theoretical or empirical analysis of this type of framework is, however, out of the scope
of this paper.
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reforms, even without relaxing the underlying assumptions in the Feldstein model. As
pointed out in Blomquist and Selin (2010) and Saez (2003), this information would be
valuable if we assume that taxable income itself is directly controlled by the government,
which is in fact the case in practical tax policy. The endogenous choice of the tax base
is analyzed more thoroughly in Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) and Kopczuk (2005).
Analysis of the subcomponents of taxable income is more relevant when the assump-
tion of the common income tax rate τ is relaxed. In the extreme case, when different
tax rates are applied to all different xi, equation (4.2.3) can be expressed as
(4.2.4) DWL =
n∑
i=1
τi
dxi
dτi
where τi represents the tax rate for each xi.
Abstracting from administrative costs and putting aside tax evasion and tax avoid-
ance, there is no explicit reason to be restricted to a single income tax rate τi = τ for
all of the components of taxable income. Following the assumptions presented so far, in
order to minimize the deadweight loss, tax increases should be targeted at choices that
are less responsive. On the other hand, the largest economic effects can be achieved
when changing the tax rate on the xi associated with the largest elasticities. In addi-
tion to overall ETI estimates, the responsiveness of different types of subcomponents
comprising taxable income are in this case the parameters of interest when designing
an effective income tax system.
In addition to this Ramsey-type welfare motivation6, analysis of the anatomy of ETI
sheds light on the actual economic nature of the behavioral response. Distinguishing
between, for example, real income creation and tax avoidance has important implica-
tions for the evaluation of an income tax system (see e.g. Slemrod 1995, 1996, and
6In short, the well known Ramsey rule (Ramsey 1927) suggests that goods should be taxed in inverse
proportion to their elasticities of demand.
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Piketty et al. 2014). Real responses, such as hours of work and work effort, reflect deep
individual utility parameters, whereas tax avoidance and tax evasion signal an ineffec-
tive and poorly designed tax system. Estimating real and “non-real” subcomponents
separately helps to distinguish between the importance of the two in the sense of the
marginal excess burden of income taxation.
Finally, a thorough analysis of different subcomponents of taxable income would
perhaps call for separate theoretical and empirical frameworks for all of them. How-
ever, for the sake of clarity and comparability, I abstract from separate modeling of the
different components and approximate them in a single ETI framework, both theoreti-
cally and in the empirical model.
4.2.3. Empirical model. This section briefly describes the general empirical method-
ology of estimating ETI using tax reforms and individual-level panel data.7 In short, the
idea is to measure how the net-of-tax rate affects the taxable income of an individual.
Econometrically, this can be described as
(4.2.5) ln(TI)t,i = e ∗ ln(1− τ)t,i + ln(µ)t,i + ln(λ)i + ln(δ)t + ln(ε)t,i
where i denotes the index for individual and t for time. TI is taxable income and (1−τ)
is the net-of-tax rate. µt,i denotes other time-variant individual characteristics that
affect the income level, and λi is a matrix of time-invariant individual characteristics.
δt is the general time trend and εt,i is the individual error term, including the transitory
income component.
In practice, it is difficult to identify the average effect of the net-of-tax rate on
taxable income using equation (4.2.5). Innate ability and many other time-invariant
7For a comprehensive discussion of ETI estimation, including cross-sectional approaches, see Saez et
al. (2012). See Saez (2010) and Chetty et al. (2011) for a discussion on identifying ETI locally using
the distribution of taxable income and the kink points in the marginal income tax rate schedule.
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individual characteristics are unobserved, and at the same time correlated with the
progressive tax rate τ . Therefore, in the presence of an income tax reform, one practical
approach is to use a first-differences estimator of the form
(4.2.6)
ln(TI)t+k,i − ln(TI)t,i =αt + e(ln(1− τ)t+k,i − ln(1− τ)t,i)+
(ln(µ)t+k,i − ln(µ)t,i) + (ln(ε)t+k,i − ln(εt,i))
where e is the average elasticity of taxable income. t+k represents the post-reform pe-
riod, and t represents the pre-reform period. In equation (6), time-invariant individual
characteristics are canceled out by definition.
There are many issues that need to be considered before we can achieve a reliable
estimate of ETI using equation (4.2.6). These are widely discussed in the empirical
ETI literature (see Saez et al. 2012). First, the net-of-tax rate is still endogenous.
(ln(1 − τ)t+k,i − ln(1 − τ)t,,i) and (ln(ε)t+k,i − ln(ε)t,i) are mechanically correlated
due to the progressive nature of the tax rate schedule (i.e. higher taxable income is
taxed at higher marginal tax rates). A positive income shock in year t tends to be
followed by lower income in the next period t+ k, and vice versa. This so-called mean
reversion of income combined with the progressive tax rate schedule might bias the
elasticity estimate. In addition, non-tax-related changes in the shape of the income
distribution need to be taken into account. In particular, if differential variation in
tax rates is concentrated only in a certain part of the income distribution, differential
income growth trends in different parts of the distribution must be carefully controlled
for.
Endogeneity of the net-of-tax rate can be corrected by using instrumental variable
estimators. This obviously requires a valid instrumental variable. Non-tax-related
changes in income are usually controlled for by adding variants of lagged taxable income
and other individual-level controls to the model. Rich individual panel data sets might
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also allow for controlling the transitory elements of income (see for example Kleven and
Schultz 2013). I discuss all of these issues in more detail in Section 4.4.
To summarize, a usual estimable equation for ETI when using individual-level panel
data is of the following form:
(4.2.7) 4ln(TI)t,i = α0 + e4ln(1− τ)t,i + α1ln(B)t,i +4ln(ε)t,i
where 4 denotes the difference in the variables between t + k and t, and (1 − τ) is
the instrumented net-of-tax rate. In this study, I apply the changes in proportional
municipal tax rates as instruments. Bt,i is a matrix of individual base-year control
variables, including base-year income controls.
4.2.4. Components of total taxable income. In addition to overall taxable in-
come, I also estimate the elasticities of various behavioral choices {x1, ..., xn} that com-
prise the overall ETI. The estimable behavioral margins include overall wages, monthly
wage rates, fringe benefits, monthly working hours and two specific tax deductions for
working individuals, a commuting deduction and a work-related expense deduction. A
more detailed description of the components is presented in Table A1 in the Appendix.
The wage rate measures work effort in a broad sense. Separate analysis of fringe
benefits examines whether possible effort responses are driven by more irregular and
non-monetary components of wages rather than regular cash payments.8 As a com-
parison, I estimate the traditional labor supply response in the form of working hours
elasticity. This estimate together with the wage rate elasticity sheds light on the extent
of real economy responses to income tax rate changes.
8Fringe benefit responses can also be considered a type of tax avoidance activity. For example, taxable
benefits from the use of a company car are in many cases below the actual opportunity cost of having
and driving one’s own car. However, the relative advantage of fringe benefits is very case-specific in
the Finnish tax system.
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The analysis of tax deductions partly reveals the responsiveness of tax planning.
A decrease in the net-of-tax rate increases the gains received from decreasing taxable
income, and thus increases the incentives to file more deductions than before. Both
of the deductions examined in this study are not automatically accounted for in indi-
vidual taxation. In other words, in order to be eligible for the commuting or expense
deductions, a taxpayer needs to fill a tax form and substantiate the desired amount of
the deduction.
The list of subcomponents included in the analysis is not exhaustive. This means
that I cannot fully construct the total elasticity of taxable income with the (weighted)
sum of all the margins estimated in this study. Furthermore, register-based data on
hours and wage rates might not be fully reliable, and non-random measurement errors
probably occur. I discuss this issue in more detail in Section 4.5.2. Overall, the analysis
of the subcomponents is only intended for approximating what the most relevant parts
of the behavioral response are in the sense of marginal excess burden.
4.3. Finnish income tax system and recent tax reforms
4.3.1. Institutional setting. I focus on analyzing the behavioral effects of changes
in earned income taxation that occurred between 1995-2007. In Finland, earned income
is taxed according to a progressive tax rate schedule.9 In general, the Finnish income
tax system follows the principle of individual taxation. The income of a spouse or
other family member does not affect the tax rate of an individual. However, some tax
deductions and received social security depend on the total income of the household.
9Since 1993, Finland has applied the principle of Nordic-type dual income taxation, where earned
income (wages, fringe benefits, pensions etc.) and capital income (interest income, capital gains,
dividends from listed corporations etc.) are taxed separately. The capital income tax rate is flat. As is
typical in a dual income tax system, the top marginal tax rate on earned income (54%) is much higher
than the flat tax rate on capital income (28%). Harju and Matikka (2014) present an ETI analysis of
capital income and dividend taxation of Finnish business owners.
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In Finland there are three levels of earned income taxation: central government
(or state-level) income taxes, municipal income taxes, and mandatory social security
contributions. All taxes and social security payments are administered centrally by the
Finnish Tax Administration.
The central government income tax rate schedule is progressive. The nominal central
government income tax rate varies from 0 to 32 per cent10, depending on taxable income.
Social security contributions are proportional. Social security contributions include, for
example, mandatory pension contributions and unemployment insurance payments.
The average rate of social security contributions is around 5 per cent. Social security
contributions are deductible from taxable income. Table A3 in the Appendix presents
the schedule for employee social security contributions in 1995-2007.
Municipal income tax rates are flat. The average nominal municipal tax rate is
18.45 per cent. All regular income earners are subject to municipal income taxation,
with the exception of individuals with very low earned income who are exempt from all
taxes.
There are currently 320 municipalities in Finland (in 2013). Municipalities have
autonomous authority to levy income tax. Municipal council elections are held in every
four years at the same time throughout the country, and each democratically elected
municipal council decides and announces the municipal income tax rate on an annual
basis. Figure A1 in the Appendix presents a map of Finnish municipalities and counties
in 2007.
There are certain legislative duties and public services each municipality has to offer
and fulfill. These include, for example, public health care and social services. These
commitments are partly financed by municipal income taxation.11
10All tax rates presented in this Section are from 2007 if not stated otherwise.
11In addition to municipal income tax revenue, the less well-off municipalities receive benefits through
local tax-sharing and grants from central government. These are not directly related to the municipal
tax rate in the municipality in question. For example, the degree of tax-sharing depends on the
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The structure and framework of municipal income taxation, including the flatness
of the tax rate and the tax deductions and allowances, are regulated at the central
government level. Apart from the need for a certain amount of municipal tax revenue
for legislative duties, and the limitations to alter the frame rules of municipal taxation,
municipalities can set their income tax rates freely. As a demonstration of this argu-
ment, there is a 5 percentage-point difference between the highest (21%) and lowest
(16%) municipal income tax rate.
4.3.2. Recent changes in income tax rates.
Central government income taxation. From the mid-1990s onwards, there has been a
general decline in central government income tax rates in Finland. Central government
tax rates have decreased almost every year in all income classes more or less similarly.
Figure 1 illustrates the changes in average marginal tax rates between the years 1995,
2001 and 2007. These marginal tax rates are calculated with the average municipal
income tax rate in the year in question. Table A2 in the Appendix presents the marginal
tax rate schedule of central government income taxation in 1995-2007.
From the point of view of identification in the empirical ETI model, variation of this
sort is not ideal. Although there are significant changes in central government marginal
tax rates, the generally declining nature of tax rates does not provide much differential
marginal tax rate variation.
Municipal income taxation. Compared to central government income taxes, changes
in municipal income tax rates have been different in nature. In Finland, municipal tax
rates have changed differently in different municipalities in different years.
industrial and demographic structure of the municipality. Within certain limits, municipalities can
also charge usage fees for statutory public services, and assign low real estate taxes. In addition, part
of the corporate tax revenue collected by central government is assigned to municipalities.
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Figure 1. Average marginal tax rates in 1995, 2001 and 2007 (calculated
with the average municipal tax rate in the year in question)
Table 1 below presents the descriptive statistics of municipal-level tax rate changes
in each year. Depending on the year, 10-30 per cent of all municipalities have changed
their tax rates. On average, every fifth municipality has changed its tax rate in each
year. In all of the years in 1995-2007, at least one municipality has decreased its tax
rate, and one has increased it.
Municipal-level tax rate changes vary from -1 to +1.5 percentage points. The av-
erage absolute change is approximately 0.5 percentage points. On average, municipal
tax rates increased within the time period of 1995-2007. The average municipal income
tax rate increased from 17.5% in 1995 to 18.45% in 2007.
There have also been a number of mergers (or consolidations) of two or more neigh-
boring municipalities. Within a merger, the merged municipalities form a new mu-
nicipality and decide on a new municipal tax rate. As a consequence of mergers, the
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total number of municipalities decreased from 455 to 416 in 1995-2007. A more de-
tailed discussion on using the individual-level municipal income tax rate variation in
the empirical analysis is deferred until Section 4.4.2.
Year Mean
absolute
change
in mu-
nicipal
tax rate
(%points)
Std.
Dev.
Min
change
(%
points)
Max
change
(%
points)
Percent
of
munici-
palities
with a
change
in tax
rate
Average
munici-
pal
income
tax rate
1995 0.413 0.166 - 1 0.5 8.9 17.53
1996 0.495 0.220 -1 1 12.0 17.51
1997 0.557 0.207 - 1 1 21.2 17.42
1998 0.548 0.225 - 0.5 1 21.9 17.53
1999 0.558 0.242 - 1 1 21.9 17.60
2000 0.533 0.208 - 1 1 10.3 17.65
2001 0.565 0.219 - 0.5 1.5 25.0 17.67
2002 0.551 0.200 - 0.5 1 20.8 17.78
2003 0.481 0.154 - 0.25 1 11.9 18.04
2004 0.553 0.207 - 0.25 1 31.4 18.12
2005 0.586 0.217 - 0.5 1 31.1 18.29
2006 0.576 0.266 - 0.5 1.5 27.0 18.39
2007 - - - - - 18.45
Overall 0.548 0.220 - 1 1.5 18.7 17.84
Table 1. Municipal income tax rate changes ((t+ 1)− t), 1995-2007
4.4. Data and identification
4.4.1. Data. I use individual-level panel data from 1995-2007, provided by Sta-
tistics Finland. The data set consists of approximately 550,000 observations per year,
which covers roughly 10% of the Finnish population. The data contains a wide variety
of individual-level variables from different statistics. The main statistics used in this
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study are the personal tax record information provided by the Finnish Tax Administra-
tion, the Structure of Earnings statistics collected by Statistics Finland, and available
municipal-level statistics.
The data set contains all the necessary information to study the elasticity of taxable
income, and a substantial amount of individual and municipal-level control variables.
Moreover, the data allow for estimating the tax elasticity of more narrow margins, such
as the elasticity of working hours and wage rates based on the Structure of Earnings
statistics. Table A5 in the Appendix presents the summary statistics of the key variables
used in this study for individuals between 25-60 years of age. Table A5 also includes
the descriptive statistics for the key municipal-level variables.
4.4.2. Individual tax rate variation. One of the key issues in identifying ETI is
the source of variation in net-of-tax rates. In short, differential variation in net-of-tax
rates for otherwise similar individuals is needed when estimating ETI using individual
panel data and tax reforms. This study uses changes in municipal income tax rates as
the main source of this variation. In the Finnish context, changes in municipal income
tax rates are the main source of tax rate variation, as central government income tax
rates have decreased rather similarly in all income classes.12
Compared to many of the earlier ETI studies, municipal tax rate variation has some
very appealing features. First, municipal tax rate changes occur in all of the years in
the data (1995-2007). There are also both increases and decreases in municipal tax
rates in all of the years.
Second, changes in municipal tax rates affect individuals throughout the income
distribution. Thus, in all income classes there are some individuals whose municipal
income tax rate has changed, and some individuals faced no changes in municipal income
12To my knowledge, Pirttilä and Uusitalo (2005) first proposed the use of municipal income tax rate
changes as a source of differential income tax rate variation in Finland.
4.4. Data and identification 145
taxation. This alleviates the potential problems associated with non-tax-related changes
in the income distribution, which are critical in many earlier studies.
If the shape of the income distribution varies independently of tax reforms, the
analysis of behavioral responses to tax changes might give inaccurate results if this
variation cannot be properly taken into account.13 As changes in municipal income tax
rates are not concentrated in certain income classes in any of the years, non-tax-related
changes in the income distribution do not bias the elasticity estimates (at least after
including appropriate covariates in the model). If nothing else, this bias is certainly
smaller than in many of the earlier studies. Furthermore, tax rate variation across
the whole income distribution identifies the parameter of main interest, the average
elasticity of taxable income.
Figure 2 presents the actual individual marginal income tax rates at different in-
come levels, highlighting the regional variation in marginal income tax rates. As can
be seen from this figure, individuals with the same level of income face different mar-
ginal tax rates depending on the municipality of residence. Moreover, with regard to
identification, individuals with the same income level face different changes in overall
marginal tax rates due to differential changes in municipal tax rates over time.
Table 2 describes the overall individual variation in municipal income tax rates. In
addition to tax rate changes within a municipality, Table 2 includes individuals who
faced a change in their municipal tax rate as a result of a change in their municipality
of residence, or as a consequence of merger of two or more neighboring municipalities.
In the data set, 3.3% of individuals changed their municipality of residence between
t and t + 1 (on average). This number does not include mergers of municipalities. I
13In Finland, the overall income distribution somewhat polarized between 1995-2007 (see Riihelä,
Sullström and Suoniemi 2008). However, changes in the distribution are mostly driven by changes in
capital income, not by changes in earned income, to which I focus on in this study. Changes in the
income distribution are also relatively modest compared to, for example, the US in the 1980s.
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Figure 2. Actual marginal tax rates in 2007, including individual mu-
nicipal income tax rates
discuss the implications of individuals changing their municipality of residence in the
next subsection.
As can be seen from Table 2, approximately every fifth individual experienced a
change in his/her municipal income tax rate each year. On average, the absolute change
in the municipal tax rate was 0.6 percentage points for those individuals who faced a
change in their municipal tax rate. There is a more distinctive difference between the
smallest negative (-4.25 percentage points) and largest positive (3.75 percentage points)
change in the municipal tax rate. The largest absolute changes are caused by changes
in the municipality of residence.
Individual changes in municipal income tax rates are not very large in size. The
majority of changes are between +/- 0.25-1 percentage points. When the whole net-of-
tax rate is accounted for (municipal taxes + central government taxes + social security
contributions), most of the changes are around +/- 1-10 as a percentage. The largest
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Year Mean
absolute
change
in mu-
nicipal
tax rate
(%points)
Std.
Dev.
min
change
of
munic.
tax
rate
(%
points)
max
change
of
munic.
tax
rate
(%
points)
Percent
of indi-
viduals
with a
change
in mu-
nicipal
tax rate
1995 0.533 0.331 -3.25 3.75 9.6
1996 0.508 0.250 -3.25 3.5 22.2
1997 0.632 0.272 -3 2.75 24.2
1998 0.601 0.289 -3 3.5 20.4
1999 0.564 0.307 -3.25 3.75 17.5
2000 0.608 0.341 -3.75 3.5 11.7
2001 0.605 0.291 -3.25 3.25 23.4
2002 0.716 0.301 -3 3.5 30.6
2003 0.581 0.243 -2.75 3.0 17.7
2004 0.634 0.246 -3.5 3.25 29.7
2005 0.596 0.260 -3.5 3 22.2
2006 0.599 .0316 -4.25 3.75 15.2
Overall 0.608 0.288 -4.25 3.75 18.7
Table 2. Individual-level tax rate variation ((t+ 1)− t), 1995-2007
changes in municipal tax rates correspond to changes in overall net-of-tax rates of +/-
5-15%.
Some recent studies (e.g. Chetty 2012, Chetty et al. 2011, Kleven and Schultz 2013)
underline that optimization frictions have an effect on the estimated taxable income
elasticity. In short, if costs related to responding to tax changes (adjustment costs, job
search costs, paying attention to tax code, filing deductions etc.) are large, they might
attenuate the observed elasticities and make them less than the structural elasticities
derived in a frictionless benchmark case.
In general, most of the frictions are more relevant when changes in the tax rate
schedule are small. Small tax rate changes might induce only small utility benefits from
changing behavior, and this utility gain might be smaller than the associated (fixed)
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costs. Thus small changes in tax rates tend to lead to smaller changes in observed
behavior (on average).14 This is a valid point in this setup, as the variation in overall
net-of-tax rates is relatively small, at least when compared to many earlier studies.
Therefore, assuming that adjustment costs or other frictions matter, we would expect
to get smaller ETI estimates in this study.
On the other hand, small tax rate changes have high policy relevance. Usually
income tax reforms are not particularly large. Many recent reforms in industrialized
countries can be regarded more or less as fine-tuning of the tax systems. Therefore, a
careful study of smaller-scale tax reforms might have greater practical relevance than
analysis of more extensive and unique reforms, such as the tax rate cut of 1986 in the
US.
In addition, it might be that the short-run response to a small change in the net-
of-tax rate differs significantly from the longer-run effect, especially in the case of ad-
justment or search costs. Adjustment to a new level of income tax rate might take
more than 1-3 years, particularly if the short-run gains from the behavioral response
are relatively small. In the empirical part, I also test the effect of changing the time
horizon in the elasticity estimate.15
Finally, as highlighted by Kopczuk (2005), changes in the tax base and the definition
of taxable income probably affect the ETI estimate. In Finland, the definition of taxable
earned income has remained relatively constant between 1995-2007. Furthermore, the
minor changes in the tax base are, at least to some extent, unrelated to the main source
of differential tax rate variation. This is due to the fact that the tax base and basic rules
14Using Danish data, Chetty et al. (2011) and Kleven and Schultz (2013) show evidence that the
observed elasticity estimate depends positively on the size of the change in the net-of-tax rate.
15However, as noted in Gruber and Saez (2002), theoretical prediction of the effect of the time window
on the elasticity estimate is not clear. It might also be that individuals react to tax rate changes
actively in the short run, and then return to their original level of taxable income in the longer run
(see for example Goolsbee 2000). Gruber and Saez (2002) find no significant time horizon effects in
their study. In contrast, Giertz (2010) reports that elasticity tends to increase as the time horizon
increases.
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of municipal income taxation, including tax deductions and allowances, are regulated
at the central government level.
4.4.3. Net-of-tax rate instrument. In a progressive income tax rate schedule,
the marginal income tax rate increases as taxable income increases. Therefore, a change
in taxable income endogenously defines the change in the net-of-tax rate. Thus the
elasticity coefficient in equation (4.2.6) is very unlikely to capture the actual behavioral
response to a tax rate change without using an instrumental variable estimator, and
therefore a valid instrumental variable for (1− τ) is required.
A common strategy in the earlier literature is to simulate predicted or synthetic net-
of-tax rates, and use them as instruments for the actual net-of-tax rate changes (see
for example Gruber and Saez 2002). The basic structure of a predicted net-of-tax rate
variable is the following: take base year t income and use it to predict the net-of-tax
rates for t+k by using the post-reform tax legislation in t+k. The synthetic net-of-tax
rate instrument is then the difference between the actual net-of-tax rate in t and the
net-of-tax rate calculated with income in t and the tax law for t + k. The intuition
is that the predicted difference describes the exogenous change in tax liability caused
by changes in tax legislation, while ignoring any behavioral effects by keeping taxable
income constant.
However, the predicted net-of-tax rate variable is a function of individual taxable
income in year t, and there is no proof that this instrument is exogenous in the empirical
model. Following Blomquist and Selin (2010) and Moffit and Wilhelm (2000), it is
unlikely that the predicted net-of-tax rate instrument is correlated similarly with both
εt+k,i and εt,i in equation (4.2.7), as taxable income in year t defines the marginal tax
rate in both t and t + k. In addition, there is no general proof that the usually added
controls, mainly base-year taxable income and other individual characteristics, correct
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this endogeneity problem (see Weber 2014). All in all, there is concern about the
validity of instruments that are explicit functions of the dependent variable.16
In this study I use an instrument for the net-of-tax rate changes which is not a
function of taxable income, namely changes in proportional municipal income tax rates.
As the municipal income tax rate is flat, the tax rate is the same in all income classes
within each municipality. In other words, at the individual level, the only determinant
of the municipal income tax rate is the municipality of residence.17
Compared to previous studies, I do not have to make assumptions about the time
structure of the individual transitory income component in order to ensure the exogene-
ity of the instrument. In addition, as municipal income tax rates affect the net-of-tax
rates in all income classes, I do not have to explicitly control for the non-tax-related
changes in the income distribution in order to guarantee the causality of the behavioral
parameter. Furthermore, mean reversion does not pose a notable problem, as yearly
fluctuation in individual income does not affect the instrument.
Even though the municipal tax rate instrument is not a direct function of the de-
pendent variable in any period, there are some concerns that the instrument is not
exogenous as such. The main concern is the possible policy endogeneity of municipal
tax rate changes. In other words, municipal tax rate changes are probably not randomly
assigned in the population.
16In Blomquist and Selin (2010), the middle-year characteristics (i.e. (t+ t+ k)/2) are used to define
imputed taxable income for both t and t + k, from which the net-of-tax rate instrument is then
calculated. Blomquist and Selin (2010) show that this strategy produces exogenous instruments under
relatively general assumptions about the autoregressive structure of the transitory income component.
Weber (2014) shows that using lagged income (t− 1, t− 2 etc.) to derive the instrument enhances the
validity of the predicted instrument. Nevertheless, the validity of these types of predicted net-of-tax
rate instruments is still dependent on the serial correlation pattern of εt,i.
17The earned income tax allowance in municipal taxation depends (inversely) on earned income. This
mainly affects low-income individuals. The effect of the allowance on the effective overall net-of-tax
rate is trivial for taxable income over 14,000 euros. The earned income tax allowance in municipal
taxation is described in detail in Table A4 in the Appendix.
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In order to alleviate potential policy endogeneity, I include various municipal-level
covariates to the model, such as municipal-level unemployment and employment rates,
net migration and the level of net debt (per capita). All of these variables have a
presumable effect on total taxable income within a municipality, as well as average
individual taxable income. For example, municipalities might increase tax rates when
future tax revenue losses are predicted. This can be caused by decreased employment
in the jurisdiction. Because low employment might also decrease individual taxable
income (on average), the elasticity estimate may be upward-biased. By including a set
of municipal-level covariates and regional income trends in the model, I can, at least
to a reasonable extent, separate the possible municipal and other regional-level effects
from the individual-level behavioral responses. Furthermore, in Section 4.4.4, I test the
supposition that future tax increases (or decreases) are more common when taxable
income has decreased (Figure 4).
Another cause for concern is the possibility that individuals select into the “treat-
ment” by changing their municipality of residence. First, we might worry that indi-
viduals consistently move to municipalities with lower (or higher) tax rates. However,
with regard to identification in the ETI model, this is not very relevant in itself.18
A more serious concern would be that changes in taxable income are systematically
correlated with the moving decision, and especially with the municipal tax rate in the
destination municipality (i.e. the tax rate instrument is correlated with the transitory
18For example, if an individual moves to a municipality with a lower tax rate but does not change
his/her current job (or more precisely, taxable income does not change), ETI for this individual will
be zero by definition, even though the total taxes paid are now lower than before. Thus, this kind
of purely tax-motivated migration is not an issue in this framework. Also, we might suspect that
there is a classical selection problem in equation (4.2.5). The conceivable selection bias comes from
the possibility that individuals who prefer low income taxation choose to reside in a municipality with
a low tax rate. Preference for low income taxation is likely to be positively correlated with taxable
income, causing the elasticity estimate to be biased. However, as the empirical model in question is
identified by individual changes in both municipal tax rates and taxable income, this is not a very
serious concern.
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income component). For example, a new, better paid job might be a good reason for
moving to another municipality. At the same time, it could be that municipalities with
a lot of open highly paid vacancies have a relatively low or high municipal tax rate,
which would cause bias in the elasticity estimate. This is a relevant concern in the
Finnish case, as the municipal income tax rates are below the average in high-wage
regions such as the capital city area (Helsinki-Espoo-Vantaa).
Therefore, in the preferred empirical specification, I drop individuals who change
their municipality of residence between t and t+ k in order to avoid mechanical corre-
lation between the instrument and the transitory income component.19 The downside
of this approach is that it does not take into account the potential (but somewhat
unlikely) effect of moving and decreasing (increasing) income because of a municipal
tax increase (decrease) in the base-year municipality of residence. In other words, the
model without changes in the municipality of residence does not include all potential
behavioral margins. I further discuss this issue in Section 4.5.3.
4.4.4. Descriptive statistics. Figure 3 describes the connection between changes
in individual taxable income and changes in municipal tax rates. In the Figure, I plot
mean changes in log taxable income by different changes in the municipal tax rate
between t+ 1 and t. Plotting mean changes in taxable income by changes in municipal
tax rates is feasible as changes in municipal tax rates occur in 0.25 percentage point
intervals (0.25, 0.5, 0.75 etc.). For example, the point on the vertical dash-line in the
Figure denotes the average log change in taxable income between t+ 1 and t for those
individuals who faced no changes in their municipal tax rate in the same time period.
From Figure 3 we can see that relative changes in taxable income are, on average,
more negative the larger the positive changes in municipal tax rates are. In other words,
19In order to test the effect of moving individuals, I also estimate the model with the movers included.
In this case, I add an individual moving dummy to the estimable equation, along with the interaction
terms of the moving dummy and the destination county. This controls for the average effect of moving
to a certain region on individual income (given other individual characteristics).
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Figure 3. Changes in taxable income and changes in municipal tax rates
positive changes in municipal tax rates induce negative changes in taxable income. This
reduced-form type evidence suggests that individuals respond to incentives created by
changes in municipal tax rates. In addition, Figure 3 graphically illustrates the extent of
municipal tax rate variation for the baseline estimation sample included in the Figure.
Figure 4 shows the mean changes in log taxable income with respect to future
changes in the municipal tax rate, i.e. changes in the municipal tax rate between t+ 2
and t + 1. Intuitively, if municipalities respond to a decrease in taxable income in the
past by increasing the municipal tax rate in the future, we should see that future tax
increases are more common when there is a decreasing trend in average taxable income
(and vice versa).
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Figure 4. Changes in taxable income and future changes in municipal
tax rates
Figure 4 does not support this policy endogeneity channel. There is no statistical
difference between the changes in taxable income with respect to future changes in
municipal tax rates of different size, which suggests that future tax changes are not
determined by past changes in individual taxable income. Nevertheless, in order to
take into account possible policy endogeneity, I add municipal-level covariates and other
regional controls in the preferred empirical specification.
Figures 3 and 4 include the baseline estimation sample where individuals who change
their municipality of residence between t and t + 1 are dropped out. Figure A2 in the
Appendix shows a similar picture for the sample including the movers. The Figure
including the movers delivers similar conclusions as before. The left-hand side of Figure
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A2 shows that tax increases lead to a negative change in mean taxable income, and
vice versa. From the right-hand side of Figure A2 we can see that endogeneity based
on past changes in average taxable income is not the driving force behind the results.
4.4.5. Estimable equation. I estimate different variations of the following equa-
tion using a two-stage least squares estimator
(4.4.1)
4ln(TI)t,i =α0 + e4ln(1− τ)t,i + α1f(lnTI)t,i+
α2Bt,i + α3Mt,m +
∑
j
α4jY EARj +4εt,i
In equation (4.4.1), 4ln(TI)t,i is the change in taxable income between t and t+ k
for individual i. 4ln(1 − τ)t,i is the change in the net-of-tax rate instrumented with
the change in the municipal net-of-tax rate. Thus e is the coefficient of interest, the
average elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate.
Despite the fact that in this setup the non-tax-related changes in the income dis-
tribution and mean reversion are not as problematic as in many earlier studies, I add
a ten-piece base-year taxable income spline variable (denoted by f(lnTI)t,i) into the
model in some specifications. This income control serves as a proxy for individual
unobserved heterogeneity in income growth (Blomquist and Selin 2010).
Base-year variablesBt,i control for observed individual heterogeneity affecting changes
in taxable income. Bt,i includes age, age squared, county of residence, sex, level of ed-
ucation (highest degree), marital status, size of the household and dummy variables
indicating whether the individual has received any taxable social security benefits in
the base year.20 I also include interaction terms of sex and other controls in the model
20Social security benefits include unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, parental leave benefits and
study grants.The marital status dummies include married couples, unmarried couples, singles, divorced
singles and widows/widowers. There are 21 counties in Finland. Figure A1 in the Appendix presents
a map of the counties.
156 Taxable income elasticity
(age, education, household size and marital status). Importantly, I also add county-year
fixed effects, which control for different income trends in different parts of the country
at different times.
To control for the possible policy endogeneity of the net-of-tax rate instrument, I
add municipal-level (m) characteristics Mt,m to the estimable equation in some specifi-
cations. Mt,m includes base-year values of municipal-level employment, unemployment,
net migration and net loan positions. These variables reflect the actual publicly avail-
able information that the decision-making bodies in each municipality have on the local
economy. Finally, I add year dummies to control for time.
I limit the analysis to observations where base-year taxable income is above 20,000
euros. First, the income cut-off is needed in order to eliminate any notable effect of
the municipal earned income tax allowance on the net-of-tax rate instrument. Second,
I focus on the intensive margin behavioral responses, which emphasizes the need for
an income cut-off. Many of the social security benefits in Finland (e.g. unemployment
benefits and sickness benefits) are regarded as taxable income, which creates relatively
low but positive taxable income also for individuals fully or partly outside the labor
force.
In addition, I drop pensioners and people under the age of 24 and over the age
of 60 out of the estimation sample. Also, following earlier literature, the analysis is
limited to individuals whose absolute change in log taxable income between t and t+ k
is below 8.5, and whose marital status is unchanged between the two years. Finally,
in the baseline analysis, I drop individuals who change their municipality of residence
between t and t + k. However, the sample includes individuals whose municipality of
residence changed due to a municipality merger.21
21As a sensitivity check, I also estimate the model with movers included. For the models including
the movers, Bt,i also contains a dummy variable denoting whether an individual has changed his/her
municipality of residence between t and t + k, and the interaction terms of the moving dummy and
the county of residence in t+ k.
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The baseline time horizon used is three years, which is customary in the literature.
In order to be able to separate this middle-term elasticity from the shorter-run effects,
I drop all the observations where the individual municipal income tax rate also changed
between t+1 and t+2, or t+2 and t+3. Finally, as sensitivity checks, one and five-year
difference models are also estimated along with other alternative specifications.
Equation (4.4.1) is also used to estimate the subcomponents of overall taxable in-
come. The subcomponents include overall wage income, monthly wage rates, taxable
fringe benefits, hours of work and two itemized work-related tax deductions (commut-
ing cost and work-related expense allowances). The same set of controls and sample
limitations are applied in the estimation of these margins.
4.5. Results
4.5.1. Taxable income elasticity. Table 3 shows the results for the three-year
difference model with different specifications.22
First, column (1) shows the ETI estimate with only year fixed effects included in
the regression. This estimate is approximately 0.6 and statistically significant at the
1% level. Adding controls in columns (2)-(4) decreases the point estimate. In column
(2), the point estimate is 0.38 and statistically significant when the 10-piece base-year
income spline variable and individual base-year controls are included.
In column (3) I do not include base-year income splines in the equation. Without
income splines the estimate is close to that with the splines included (0.33). First, this
implies that income controlling does not have much effect on the ETI estimate in this
particular case in which the net-of-tax rate instrument is unrelated to individual income.
This can also be seen as tentative evidence that non-tax-related changes in the income
22The F-statistics for the first stage of the two-stage least squares routine are very large and highly
significant in all specifications. The first-stage result for the baseline specification is presented in Table
A6 in the Appendix. The standard errors are clustered at the municipal level in every specification.
Clustering is needed because the error terms might be correlated between individuals residing in the
same municipality. However, clustering has only a small increasing effect on the standard errors.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES TI TI TI TI
Elasticity 0.618*** 0.383*** 0.332** 0.266**
(0.227) (0.139) (0.151) (0.132)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
County F.E. No Yes Yes Yes
County-Year F.E. No No No Yes
Base-year income spline No Yes No No
Other base-year
controls
No Yes Yes Yes
Municipal-level controls No No No Yes
Observations 414,645 413,862 414,221 413,482
Robust and municipal-level clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3. ETI estimates
distribution do not notably affect the elasticity estimates when tax rate variation occurs
at all income levels. Second, base-year income is not an exogenous variable in the first-
differences setup, and thus not an optimal choice as a control variable. Therefore, there
are no explicit reasons why these variables need to be added to the ETI model in this
case, and thus I prefer a specification in which income splines are not included.
Column (4) in Table 3 shows the preferred empirical specification with extensive
regional controlling. First, I add the interactions of county and year fixed effects to
control for different income trends in different years in different regions. Second, I add
base-year municipal-level variables. As mentioned before, there are reasons to suspect
that municipal tax rate variation is not randomly assigned across individuals in dif-
ferent municipalities (given other individual characteristics). Therefore, controlling for
municipal-level characteristics Mm,t might be needed in order to alleviate this potential
policy endogeneity.
After adding county-year fixed effects and municipal controls, the ETI estimate
is 0.27 and statistically significant at the 5% level. This estimate is broadly in line
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with many previous ETI studies, although it is larger than the average ETI in most
recent papers from other Nordic countries (Kleven and Schultz 2013, Thoresen and
Vattø 2013). One of the reasons for the larger point estimate might be the different
identification strategy. Instead of using the predicted net-of-tax rate, I use changes in
flat municipal tax rates as the net-of-tax rate instruments. I further discuss this issue
in Section 4.5.3.
4.5.2. Subcomponents of taxable income. The results for subcomponents of
overall taxable income are presented in Table 4. All of the models include year, county
and county-year fixed effects, individual base-year controls and municipal controls.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Wage
income
Monthly
wage
Monthly
hours
Fringe
benefits
Work
related
expenses
Commuting
expenses
Elasticity 0.485* -0.03 0.178 1.00 -0.298** -0.923
(0.247) (0.133) (0.138) (1.301) (0.138) (1.919)
Observations 399,417 244,116 242,412 121,576 398,324 123,919
Robust and municipal-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include year, county and county-year fixed effects, individual base-year controls
and municipal controls.
Table 4. Elasticity estimates for subcomponents of taxable income
First, column (1) shows the elasticity estimate for the overall yearly wage income.
The wage income information comes from the Finnish Tax Administration.23 Yearly
wage income includes fringe benefits and other irregular earnings categorized as com-
pensation for working. The elasticity of wage income is relatively large (0.49), which
implies that wage income as a whole responds to the income tax rate.
23The separation of wage income and other earned income is important in the Finnish tax system. For
example, some tax deductions are only based on wage income, and not other types of earned income
such as taxable social benefits.
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Columns (2) and (3) show the elasticity estimates for monthly wage rates and
monthly hours. The information on monthly wages and monthly hours comes from
the Structure of Earnings statistics collected by Statistics Finland. Monthly wage rates
include both regular and irregular earnings as well as fringe benefits. Monthly working
hours include regular hours and overtime working hours.
The point estimate for the wage rate is close to zero (-0.03), and insignificant.
However, monthly hours appear to be moderately responsive, although the estimate
(0.18) is not statistically significant. These estimates imply that both work effort and
labor supply are not very responsive to income taxation, suggesting that the real-term
responses are small or moderate at the most.
There is a slight conflict between the estimates in column (1) and columns (2) and
(3). It seems that while yearly wage income is relatively responsive to taxes, the wage
rate and working hours are not. There are plausible data-driven explanations for this
finding. First, information on monthly wages and monthly hours are only collected for
a selected sample of full-time workers in companies with more than five workers. This
might affect the results if part-time workers or workers in smaller firms can respond
more flexibly to tax incentives. This assumption is also supported by the data. The
ETI estimate for the subgroup with non-missing monthly hours is 0.22 (0.11), which is
lower than the baseline estimate in column (4) of Table 3 above. This indicates that
individuals included in the Structure of Earnings statistics have, on average, somewhat
lower responsiveness to tax incentives.
Furthermore, wage rates and working hours are mainly based on the situation in
October in each year, which might not reflect the actual yearly responses, especially
with respect to more irregular components such as fringe benefits or overtime hours.
In addition, working hours and wage rates are reported by employers, and thus they
might not precisely measure the actual wage rates or working hours of each individual
worker, especially if wages are not directly based on actual hours worked (i.e. workers
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with a fixed monthly salary with no overtime compensations). Nevertheless, given
the limitations of the Structure of Earnings data, I find no evidence of extensive and
significant effort or labor supply responses to tax changes. Based on this evidence, it
seems that more irregular and flexible components of taxable income and total wage
income might drive the results.
To further study the potential effects of other components, I estimate separate
elasticities for fringe benefits and two specific tax deductions for working individuals, the
work-related expenses deduction (tulonhankkimisvähennys) and commuting expense
deduction (työmatkavähennys). Both these deductions are not automatically accounted
for in personal income taxation, and need to be itemized by the taxpayer in order to
qualify for the deduction (for more details, see Table A1 in the Appendix). The data on
taxable fringe benefits and tax deductions come from the Finnish Tax Administration.
Column (4) of Table 4 presents the elasticity estimate for taxable fringe benefits.
The responsiveness of fringe benefits seems to be relatively large (elasticity of 1), al-
though the effect is imprecisely measured. This evidence tentatively supports the view
that the response might come through more irregular earnings channels.
Columns (5) and (6) show the estimates for the deductions. Both deductions seem
to be rather responsive to tax rate changes, and the elasticity of work-related expenses is
statistically significant at the 5% level. In contrast, the commuting deduction response
is very imprecisely measured (mostly due to the relatively small number of observations
in the data). The signs of both deduction responses are intuitive, however. Basic
taxable income theory predicts that the amount of tax deductions will increase as the
net-of-tax rate decreases, and vice versa. This evidence together with the relatively
large fringe benefit response tentatively imply that the overall ETI is driven by tax
deduction behavior and irregular earnings rather than conspicuous changes in labor
supply or work effort.
162 Taxable income elasticity
4.5.3. Alternative specifications and sensitivity checks. Table A6 in the Ap-
pendix presents the results for alternative specifications and sensitivity checks for the
average ETI model. First, column (1) in Table A6 shows the estimate for the baseline
specification including individuals who move from one municipality to another between
t and t + 3. The ETI estimate increases to over 0.6 when movers are included in the
sample. This implies notable effects for individuals who changed their municipality of
residence. As mentioned in Section 4.4.3, the elasticity estimate might be larger for
movers due to possible mechanical correlation between the instrument and transitory
income that cannot be fully taken into account with the available covariates.24
On the other hand, the smaller point estimates in Table 3 might also indicate
that costs and benefits related to optimization behavior matter, and individuals do not
respond as actively to smaller changes in marginal tax rates. Individuals who move face
larger changes in their net-of-tax rates (on average), which provides greater incentives
to alter their behavior as well.
Column (2) shows the elasticity estimate for gross earned income subject to taxation,
which is a broader income concept than taxable income. The point estimate for gross
earned income is slightly lower (0.20) than for taxable income. This is an expected
result because, for example, taxable income is subject to more deductions than gross
earned income. Column (3) shows the elasticity estimate with income weights. The
24As a further robustness check, I also estimate the model without individuals who move to the largest
county in Finland, which includes the capital city area (Uusimaa). The average point estimate for this
model is 0.43, which is lower than the estimate when all movers are included. This supports the view
that mechanical correlation between the lower-than-average municipal tax rates and higher wage levels
in larger cities might bias the results when moving individuals are included to the model. Second, I
estimate the preferred model including the movers by using a municipal tax rate instrument based on
only the tax rate changes in the base-year municipality of residence. In this model, the tax rate of
the destination municipality is not taken into account for movers, as the tax rate instrument is not
affected by the moving decision. This model gives a similar ETI estimate (0.29 (0.18)) as the baseline
model. This supports the view that the potential effect of both moving and altering taxable income
due to changes in the tax rate of the base-year municipality of residence is not very relevant.
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income-weighted point estimate (0.27) does not significantly differ from the unweighted
baseline estimate.
Columns (4) and (5) present the estimates separately for men and women. The
results show that the point estimate for men (0.23) is smaller than for women (0.43).
Columns (6)-(8) present the estimates for three different income levels: low income
(10k-25k euros), middle income (25k-40k euros) and high income (over 40k euros). The
results show that low-income (point estimate 0.33) and high-income (0.97) individuals
seem to be more responsive to income taxes than middle-income individuals (0.13).
This tentatively suggests that the elasticity follows a U-shaped curve in which low and
high-income individuals have the largest elasticities.
Column (9) shows the baseline estimate without including individuals in the capital
city area (Helsinki, Vantaa, Espoo and Kauniainen). Average income levels and income
growth are higher in the capital city area, and it also might be that individuals in this
area respond differently to tax changes. However, dropping the capital city area form
the estimation sample does not significantly affect the point estimate (0.25).
Columns (10)-(12) study different time horizons. Column (10) presents the ETI
estimate for the one-year difference model (0.43), which is slightly larger than the
baseline three-year estimate. Column (11) shows the estimate for the five-year model.
In general, the five-year model produces very imprecise results, the point estimate being
-0.1. The reason for this is the chosen identification strategy where I have dropped all
individuals whose municipal income tax rate has also changed between t+ 1 and t+ 2,
or t + 2 and t + 3 in the baseline three-year model. Extending this condition to the
five-year setup substantially reduces the number of observations available, and produces
a selective sample of individuals in municipalities with only a few tax rate changes in
1995-2007.
Alternatively, in order to estimate a longer-run response, I pool two six-year dif-
ferences (2001-1996 and 2007-2002) together and estimate the model without dropping
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individuals with changes in municipal tax rates in the middle of the differences. Col-
umn (12) shows that the point estimate for this regression is 0.67, and statistically
significant at the 5% level. Thus it seems that the longer-run response is larger than
the short-run, although the point estimate from this particular model is a mixture of
both long and short-run responses.
Column (13) shows the estimate when using the standard Gruber and Saez (2002)
type predicted net-of-tax rate instrument discussed above in Section 4.4.3. Similarly
as in Blomquist and Selin (2010), I get a negative point estimate when applying this
instrument (-0.23). This implies that there might be a bias in the ETI estimate when
using the predicted net-of-tax rate instrument. This is especially plausible in the Finnish
setting. For example, on average, net-of-tax rates increased in all income classes in
1995-2007. However, the relative growth in net-of-tax rates was larger for middle and
low-income earners compared to high-income earners (see for example Table A2 in
the Appendix). Thus we might get biased estimates if high-income earners have even
slightly faster non-tax-related income growth which we cannot fully control for with the
available controls.
This is also supported by the data. Using the same income classification as above,
the point estimates for low and middle-income are close to zero (-0.057 and -0.022,
respectively) when using the predicted tax rate instrument. In contrast, the estimate
for high-income individuals is -0.61. This indicates that the negative average effect of
the predicted tax rate instrument is driven by high-income earners in the top income
brackets.
I further study the predicted instrument by omitting the municipal tax rate variation
when constructing the predicted tax rate instrument. In other words, I apply average
municipal tax rates in each year, and use only the variation stemming from recurrent
decreases in the progressive central government earned income tax rates (see Table A2
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in the Appendix) when deriving the instrument. Results show that omitting the vari-
ation in flat tax rates further decreases the average point estimate with the predicted
instrument (-0.38). Point estimates also decrease in different income classes (-0.19, -0.15
and -0.76 for low, middle and high-income earners, respectively). To summarize, these
observations confirm the results from earlier studies (Weber 2014, Blomquist and Selin
2010) which highlight the potential inconsistency of predicted net-of-tax rate instru-
ments derived using base-year taxable income and variation stemming from different
tax rate changes in different income groups.
Finally, columns (14)-(16) show the OLS, first-stage and reduced-form results, re-
spectively. First, column (14) shows that the OLS estimate for the ETI model provides
a highly counterintuitive result with a large negative point estimate (-2.9), which high-
lights the need for a valid instrumental variable. Column (15) shows that the first-stage
results are strong. The first-stage estimate implies that a 1% increase in the municipal
tax rate accounts for an approximately 1.4% increase in the overall net-of-tax rate.
Given the general pattern of the central government tax rate changes and the three-
year time window, this estimate is reasonable in size. Also, as mentioned before, the
F-statistics for the first-stage models are large and highly significant in all specifica-
tions (824 in column (15)). Column (16) shows the results for the reduced-form model
where the log change in taxable income is regressed directly with the log change in the
net-of-municipal tax rate. The results show that, on average, individuals respond to
municipal tax rate changes actively and in a statistically significant manner, which is
also illustrated above in Figure 3.
4.6. Conclusions
In this study I analyze the key tax policy parameter, the elasticity of taxable income
(ETI), using Finnish panel data from 1995-2007. In addition to overall ETI estimates,
I outline the responsiveness of various subcomponents of taxable income, such as labor
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supply and tax deductions. This anatomy of the overall responses is rarely analyzed in
the ETI literature.
I use variation in flat municipal income tax rates as an instrument for the changes
in overall net-of-tax rates. The flat municipal income tax rate is not a function of
individual taxable income in any period. Also, changes in municipal income tax rates
occur in all income classes in all years, and in both directions. Therefore, non-tax-
related changes in the shape of the income distribution and mean reversion are not
problematic, as the instrument is unrelated to the level of individual income, and the
net-of-tax rates vary differently throughout the income distribution. The novel ap-
proach of using changes in municipal tax rates as instruments underlines that different
institutional features can provide useful and practical variation in terms of estimating
sufficient statistics for welfare analysis.
My preferred estimate for the average ETI in Finland is 0.27. This estimate is in
line with many previous studies from other countries. Interestingly, the estimate is
somewhat larger than recent estimates from other Nordic countries (see for example
Kleven and Schultz 2013). This might be partly due to different estimation strategies.
It is possible that the net-of-tax rate instruments used in previous studies provide
estimates that are more or less biased.
The ETI of 0.27 suggests that the welfare loss of income taxation is moderate in
Finland. At the average point, the ETI estimate implies a marginal excess burden
of around 15% (see Section 4.2.2), which is in line with many previous ETI studies.
Intuitively, this implies that increasing income taxes in Finland would induce non-
negligible but not extensive efficiency losses.
The subcomponent analysis suggests that real behavioral margins, such as working
hours and wage rates, respond less than tax deductions and more irregular forms of
compensation such as fringe benefits. The results show no extensive or statistically
significant responses to register-based monthly hours and monthly wages, whereas the
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point estimates for tax deductions and fringe benefits are large, although mostly im-
precisely measured. This tentatively implies that the overall behavioral response is not
driven by profound economic parameters such as the opportunity cost of working. Thus
even though the average ETI estimate is not trivial, changing the income tax rate seems
to have only a limited effect on labor supply and work effort, especially for full-time
workers in larger firms.
However, the results from the subcomponent analysis need to be interpreted with
some caution. It is possible that register-based data on working hours and wage rates
are not sufficient to adequately measure real behavioral margins. Thus, in future work,
we need richer data on various behavioral margins in order to provide more accurate
conclusions on the effect of different types of behavioral changes on the overall elasticity
of taxable income.

Bibliography
[1] Aarbu, K. and T. Thoresen. (2001). Income responses to tax changes – Evidence from the
Norwegian tax reform. National Tax Journal, 54(2): 319–334.
[2] Blomquist, S. and H. Selin. (2010). Hourly wage rate and taxable labor income responsiveness
to changes in marginal tax rates. Journal of Public Economics, 94(11-12): 878–889.
[3] Chetty, R. (2012). Bounds on elasticities with optimization frictions: A synthesis of micro and
macro evidence on labor supply. Econometrica, 80(3): 969–1018.
[4] Chetty, R. (2009). Is the taxable income elasticity sufficient to calculate the deadweight loss?
The implications of evasion and avoidance. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 1(2):
31–52.
[5] Chetty, R., J. Friedman, T. Olsen and L. Pistaferri. (2011). Adjustment costs, firm responses, and
micro vs. macro labor supply elasticities: Evidence from Danish tax records. Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 126(2): 749–804.
[6] Feldstein, M. (1999). Tax avoidance and the deadweight loss of the income tax. Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, 81(4): 674–680.
[7] Feldstein, M. (1995). The effect of marginal tax rates on taxable income: A panel study of the
1986 Tax Reform Act. Journal of Political Economy, 103(3): 551–572.
[8] Giertz, S. (2010). The elasticity of taxable income during the 1990s: New estimates and sensitivity
analyses. Southern Economic Journal, 77(2): 406–433.
[9] Goolsbee, A. (2000). What happens when you tax the rich? Evidence from executive compen-
sation. Journal of Political Economy, 108(2): 352–378.
[10] Gordon, R. and J. Slemrod. (2000). Are ’real’ responses to taxes simply income shifting between
corporate and personal tax bases?, in J. Slemrod (ed.), Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic Conse-
quences of Taxing the Rich. New York: Harvard University Press and Russell Sage Foundation,
2000, 240–280.
169
170 Taxable income elasticity
[11] Gruber, J. and E. Saez. (2002). The elasticity of taxable income: Evidence and implications.
Journal of Public Economics, 84: 1–32.
[12] Harju, J. and T. Matikka. (2014). The elasticity of taxable income and income-shifting: What
is “real” and what is not? CESifo Working Paper 4905.
[13] Kleven, H. and E. Schultz. (2013). Estimating taxable income responses using Danish tax reforms.
Forthcoming, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy.
[14] Kopczuk, W. (2005). Tax bases, tax rates and the elasticity of reported income. Journal of Public
Economics, 89(11-12): 2093–2119.
[15] Moffit, R. and M. Wilhelm. (2000). Taxation and the labor supply decisions of the aﬄuent. In J.
Slemrod (ed.), Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich. New York:
Harvard University Press and Russell Sage Foundation, 2000, 193–234.
[16] Piketty, T., E. Saez and S. Stantcheva. (2014). Optimal taxation of top labor incomes: A tale of
three elasticities. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 6(1): 230–271.
[17] Pirttilä, J. and R. Uusitalo. (2005). Veronalennukset vähentävät verotuloja. Kansantaloudellinen
aikakauskirja, 4/2005 (in Finnish).
[18] Ramsey, F.P. (1927). A contribution to the theory of taxation. Economic Journal, 37: 47–61.
[19] Riihelä, M., R. Sullström and I. Suoniemi. (2008). Tax progressivity and recent evolution of the
Finnish income inequality. Government Institute for Economic Research Discussion Papers 460.
[20] Saez, E. (2010). Do taxpayers bunch at kink points? American Economic Journal: Economic
Policy, 2(3): 180–212
[21] Saez, E. (2004). Reported income and marginal tax rates, 1960-2000: Evidence and policy im-
plications. NBER Working Paper 10273.
[22] Saez, E. (2003). The effect of marginal tax rates on income: A panel study of ’bracket creep’.
Journal of Public Economics, 87: 1231–1258.
[23] Saez, E., J. Slemrod and S. Giertz. (2012). The elasticity of taxable income with respect to
marginal tax rates: A critical review. Journal of Economic Literature, 50(1): 3–50.
[24] Slemrod, J. (1996). High income families and the tax changes of the 1980s: The anatomy of
behavioral response. In Feldstein M. and J. Poterba (eds). Empirical Foundations of Household
Taxation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996, 169–192.
[25] Slemrod, J. (1995). Income creation or income shifting? Behavioral responses to the Tax Reform
Act of 1986. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 85(2): 175–180.
171
[26] Slemrod, J. and W. Kopczuk. (2002). The optimal elasticity of taxable income. Journal of Public
Economics, 84(1): 91–112.
[27] Thoresen, T. and T. Vattø. (2013). Validation of structural labor supply model by the elasticity
of taxable income. Statistics Norway Research Department Discussion Papers No. 738.
[28] Weber, C. (2014). Toward obtaining a consistent estimate of the elasticity of taxable income
using difference-in-differences. Forthcoming, Journal of Public Economics.
172 Taxable income elasticity
Appendix
Figure A1. Finnish municipalities and counties in 2007 (Source: Na-
tional Land Survey of Finland)
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Variable Description
Yearly wages (Palkkatulot) Income regarded as compensation for working in the
definition of the Finnish Tax Administration.
Includes e.g. wages from primary and secondary
jobs and fringe benefits.
Monthly wage rate (Kuukausiansio) Monthly earnings for full-time workers. Includes
wages from regular working hours and overtime
work and other additional wage income, including
taxable fringe benefits.
Monthly working hours (Kokonaistyöaika) Working hours for full-time workers. Includes
regular working hours (4.35*regular weekly hours)
and overtime hours.
Fringe benefits (Luontoisedut) Taxable fringe benefits for a tax year, including
realized options. Fringe benefits include, for
example, company cars, phones, apartments, and
meals provided by the employer. Usually, the value
of taxable fringe benefits is less than the face value
of the good, for example in the case of luncheon
vouchers provided by the employer. Detailed
guidelines are provided by the Finnish Tax
Administration.
Work-related expenses (Tulonhankkimisvähennys) The approved amount of tax-deductible
work-related expenses for a tax year. Work-related
expenses are deductible from gross earned income.
Usual work-related expenses include, for example,
the purchasing price of equipment or tools such as
computers and professional literature, and office
costs if a working space is not provided by the
employer. Detailed guidelines are provided by the
Finnish Tax Administration.
Commuting expenses (Kodin ja työpaikan välisten
matkakustannusten vähennys)
The approved amount of tax-deductible commuting
expenses for a tax year. Only the amount exceeding
a fixed sum can be deducted (600 euros in 2012).
The amount of the deduction is dependent on the
mode of transport (public transport, private vehicle
or a combination of the two). Detailed guidelines
are provided by the Finnish Tax Administration.
Notes: Monthly wage rate and monthly working hours are from the Structure of Earnings statistics
(Palkkarakennetilasto), and yearly wages, fringe benefits, work-related expenses and commuting expenses are
from the tax statistics produced by the Finnish Tax Administration. The structure of Earnings statistics are
based on a sample collected by Statistics Finland. The sample includes both private and public sector workers.
The private sector includes only workers in companies with five workers or more. The working hours and wage
rate information is mainly based on the situation in October each year. Information on wages and working
hours is provided by employers.
Table A1. Subcomponents of taxable income
174 Taxable income elasticity
Year Taxable income Tax rate Year Taxable income Tax rate
1995 7,063-9,754 7 2004 11,700-14,500 11
9,754-12,110 17 14,500-20,200 15
12,110-17,155 21 20,200-31,500 21
17,155-26,910 27 31,500-55,800 27
26,910-47,934 33 55,800- 34
47,934- 39 2007 12,400-20,400 9
1998 7,737-10,428 6 20,400-33,400 19,5
10,428-13,119 16 33,400-60,800 24
13,119-18,500 20 60,800 - 32
18,500-29,096 26
29,096-51,466 32
51,466- 38
2001 11,100-14,296 14
14,296-19,678 18
19,678-30,947 24
30,947-54,661 30
54,661- 37
Note: Finnish marks converted to euros before 2002.
Table A2. Central government income tax rate schedules in 1995, 1998,
2001, 2004 and 2007
Mandatory pension
insurance
contributions
Unemployment
insurance
contributions
Health insurance payments
1995 4.0% 1.87% 1.9% (3.8% for income >
13,455e )
1998 4.7% 1.4% 1.5% (1.95% for income >
13,455e)
2001 4.5% 0.7% 1.5%
2004 4.6% 0.25% 1.5%
2007 4.3% (5.6% if older
than 53 years)
0.58% 1.28%
Notes: Pension and unemployment insurance contributions are levied on wage income. Health insurance
payments are paid on the basis of taxable income.
Table A3. Social security contributions in 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2007
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Phase-in
threshold
1
Phase-in
threshold
2
Phase-
out
threshold
Phase-in
rate 1
Phase-in
rate 2
Phase-
out
rate
Max.
allowance
1995 3,364 - 13,455 0,05 - 0,05 336
1998 2,523 - 7,232 0,2 - 0,02 925
2001 2,523 - 12,614 0,35 - 0,035 1,648
2004 2,500 7,230 14,000 0,47 0,23 0,04 3,550
2007 2,500 7,230 14,000 0,49 0,26 0,04 3,250
Notes:
Before 2002 (example year 1998): for all wage income earners, a certain amount is deducted from adjusted gross
income (gross earned income minus expense deductions) in municipal income taxation as an earned income tax
allowance. The allowance is 20% (Phase-in rate 1) of income above 2,523 euros (Phase-in threshold 1). The
maximum amount of the allowance is 1,648 euros (Max allowance). For income above 7,232 euros (Phase-out
threshold), the allowance decreases by 2% (Phase-out rate). After 2002 (example year 2004): the allowance
rate is 47% (Phase-in rate 1) of income between 2,500 euros (Phase-in threshold 1) and 7,230 euros (Phase-in
threshold 2). The allowance rate is 23% (Phase-in rate 2) of income above 7,230 euros. The maximum amount
of the allowance is 3,550 euros (Max allowance). For income above 14,000 euros (Phase-out threshold), the
allowance decreases by 4% (Phase-out rate).
Table A4. Earned income tax allowance in municipal taxation in 1995,
1998, 2001, 2004 and 2007
-
.
6
-
.
5
-
.
4
-
.
3
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
Lo
g 
ch
a
n
ge
 
in
 
ta
xa
bl
e 
in
co
m
e
-2.75 -2.25 -1.75 -1.25 -.75 -.25 .25 .75 1.25 1.75 2.25 2.75
Change in the municipal tax rate
Mean CI
1995-2007
Changes in taxable income and the municipal tax rate
-
.
6
-
.
5
-
.
4
-
.
3
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
Lo
g 
ch
an
ge
 
in
 
ta
xa
bl
e 
in
co
m
e
-2.75 -2.25 -1.75 -1.25 -.75 -.25 .25 .75 1.25 1.75 2.25 2.75
Future change in the municipal tax rate (t+1)
Mean CI
1995-2007
Changes in taxable income and future change in the municipal tax rate
Notes: The baseline sample includes observations where base-year taxable income is above 20,000 euros.
Pensioners and people under the age of 24 and over the age of 60 are not included in the sample. Also, the
sample is limited to individuals whose absolute change in log taxable income between t and t+ 1 is below 8.5,
and whose marital status is unchanged between the two years.
Figure A2. Log changes in taxable income and changes in municipal
tax rates, movers included
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Individuals
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Taxable earned income 3,116,040 20,893 28,275.61 0 1.88e+07
Gross earned income 3,116,040 24,726 29,134.99 0 1.89e+07
Total taxable income
(earned+capital income)
3,116,040 22,080 48,116.18 0 3.35e+07
Wage income 3,123,447 20,287 29,522.76 0 1.88e+07
Commuting expense
deduction
3,111,906 332.60 859.57 0 7,000
Work-related expense
deduction
3,111,906 107.35 699.12 0 268,400
Fringe benefits 3,123,447 447.50 19,635.25 0 1.87e+07
Monthly wage 1,398,846 2,320 1,233.83 0 221,100
Monthly working hours 1,397,291 156 32.77 0 250
Age 3,127,819 42.06 9.46 25 60
Female 3,127,819 0.50 0.5 0 1
Size of the household 3,105,782 3.56 1.65 1 25
Municipal tax rate 3,127,340 17.95 0.77 16 21
Marginal tax rate 3,127,340 0.393 0.13 0 0.668
Municipalities
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Municipal income tax rate 5,733 18.29 .77 16 21
Average individual taxable
income
5,734 12,933.40 2,868.85 5,509 56,055
Net loans position (per
capita)
4,690 1,925.73 2,102.40 -1 30,453
Employment rate 5,734 0.617 .075 0.391 0.840
Unemployment rate 5,726 0.141 .06 0.004 0.400
Net migration 5,676 -0.003 .011 -0.074 0.061
Notes: Income variables in 2007 euros. Individual statistics are calculated for individuals aged 25-60.
Individual maximum values shown in the table are rounded to the nearest 10 or 100. The average taxable
income within a municipality includes all individuals.
Table A5. Summary statistics (whole data), 1995-2007
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Movers
included
Gross
earned
income
Income-
weighted
Men Women Low income
(10k-25k)
Elasticity 0.629*** 0.198* 0.274** 0.234 0.431** 0.333**
(0.154) (0.119) (0.135) (0.158) (0.209) (0.140)
Observations 426,714 413,480 413,482 268,805 144,677 501,725
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Mid.
income
(25k-40k)
High
income
(>40k)
Without
capital city
area
1-year 5-year 1996-2001
and
2002-2007
Elasticity 0.128 0.973** 0.248 0.431*** -0.104 0.670**
(0.179) (0.492) (0.174) (0.084) (0.247) (0.266)
Observations 187,834 72,874 297,919 932,319 158,609 108,023
(13) (14) (15) (16)
Gruber and
Saez
instrument
OLS First-stage Reduced-
form
Elasticity -0.234*** -2.878*** 1.425*** 0.379**
(0.027) (0.019) (0.046) (0.180)
Observations 413,122 654,438 413,482 413,482
Robust municipal-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include year, county and county-year fixed effects, individual base-year controls and municipal controls.
Column (13) also includes income splines.
Notes: The dependent variable is log change in taxable income if not mentioned otherwise. The dependent
variable in (2) is gross earned income subject to taxation. The capital city area in column (9) includes
Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa and Kauniainen. Column (12) shows the results for the pooled regression of two
six-year differences (1996-2001 and 2002-2007). The estimation sample in column (13) follows the baseline
sample where individuals with municipal tax rate changes in the middle of the difference are not included. The
dependent variable in (15) is the change in the overall net-of-tax rate. The F-test statistic in (15) is 824.45
(0.000).
Table A6. Alternative specifications

CHAPTER 5
Unwilling, Unable or Unaware? The Role of Different
Behavioral Factors in Responding to Tax Incentives1
Abstract. This paper characterizes how various behavioral factors affect individual
responses to different tax incentives. This is important because different reasons for
responding and not responding might have different policy implications and welfare
conclusions. Our analysis compares the empirical significance of the inability to re-
spond to tax incentives and unawareness of tax rules. Using population-wide Finnish
panel data, we estimate behavioral responses to kinks and notches within the tax and
transfer system among similar or even the same individuals. We find that taxpayers
do not respond at all to small incentives induced by kink points, but do respond to
larger incentives induced by notches. The patterns of responding suggest that some
taxpayers are unable to respond even to large incentives, and that unawareness might
also affect the negligible response to kink points.
Keywords: income taxation, income transfers, behavioral responses, frictions
JEL codes: H21; H24; H31
5.1. Introduction
Existing studies find varying responses to similar income tax incentives (see Saez et
al. 2012 and Meghir and Phillips 2010 for surveys). While these divergent responses
are traditionally explained by heterogeneous preferences, recent literature adds opti-
mization frictions to explain differences in observed behavior. Optimization frictions
potentially prevent taxpayers from fully responding to tax incentives according to their
underlying preferences (Chetty 2012, Kleven and Waseem 2013). One example of these
frictions is job search costs (Chetty et al. 2011), which reduce the willingness to switch
jobs when tax incentives change. Other examples in previous literature are insuffi-
cient knowledge of tax rules, inattention and the salience of tax regulations (Chetty
1This essay is joint work with Tuomas Kosonen (Government Institute for Economic Research VATT).
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et al. 2013, Chetty and Saez 2013, Chetty et al. 2009). Although different institu-
tional settings could feature different optimization frictions, the literature has not thus
far systematically addressed their role in explaining heterogeneous responses to tax
incentives.
Understanding the role of various optimization frictions has important policy im-
plications. Different frictions might imply different patterns of responding to similar
tax incentives (Reck 2014, Chetty et al. 2009 and 2007). For example, when observed
behavioral responses are attenuated by the inability to respond immediately because
of rigid labor demand, we would expect individuals to adjust their behavior in the
future, and this adjustment might cause notable welfare losses. On the other hand,
when responses are attenuated by unawareness of tax regulations or inattention, it is
not clear whether individuals would be more aware or attentive over time (and change
their behavior accordingly). Therefore, if individuals do not even know or understand
that there has been a change in tax incentives, it is not certain that welfare losses occur
either. The extent of the welfare loss matters, among other policy-relevant issues, for
the design of optimal tax schedules.
In this paper we study to what extent and in what manner taxpayers respond to
different tax incentives. We use local variation in tax incentives created by different
tax and transfer schemes. First, we study discontinuous jumps in marginal income
tax rates (kinks). Under standard labor-leisure preferences, if individuals bunch at
these kink points, it can be seen as clear evidence that marginal tax rates affect the
behavior of taxpayers (Saez 2010). However, if taxpayers do not bunch, it remains an
open question whether the tax incentives are inherently not large enough to induce
responses, optimization frictions eliminate the observed response, or the underlying
structural model is not correctly specified.
Second, we utilize a stronger variation in tax incentives created by a means-tested
income transfer, the study subsidy. In Finland, all university students can apply for a
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substantial study subsidy (approx. 500 euros/month). However, earning income above
an income limit results in losing part of this subsidy, which creates a jump in the average
tax rate, called a notch (see Slemrod 2010).
Similarly, bunching at a notch in the tax schedule provides clear evidence that in-
dividuals respond to tax incentives. However, there are two key differences between
responses to notches and kinks. First, notches create much stronger variation in incen-
tives than kinks. Thus comparing responses to kinks with responses to notches allows
us to outline the role of the strength of the tax incentive in explaining taxpayer re-
sponses. Second, according to standard economic theory, taxpayers should never locate
themselves just above the notch where they lose disposable income compared to the
notch point. Utilizing this so-called dominated region and the shape of the income
distribution around the notch allow us to characterize the role of optimization frictions.
There is no such dominated region of behavior associated with kink points.
We use register-based panel data on all Finnish taxpayers from 1999-2011. The data
include detailed tax and transfer variables from official registers. These data allow us
to accurately analyze bunching behavior associated with various kinks and notches.
One particular advantage is that we can compare how similar or even the same
taxpayers react to different tax incentives, whilst keeping other institutional features
constant. Also, the large and extensive data set allows us to conduct the bunching
analysis for various subgroups, such as wage earners, self-employed individuals and
students with different characteristics.
Our findings support the view that frictions play an important role in explaining
taxpayer responses to tax incentives. First, we do not find any bunching at kink points.
This result holds for any tax rate kink and for any subgroup. This implies that either
the structural elasticity is small or optimization frictions play an important role, or
both.
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Interestingly, we find no bunching at kink points for the self-employed (sole propri-
etors and partners of partnership firms). However, we find that self-employed individ-
uals bunch actively at round numbers (e.g. multiples of 10,000 euros) of personal gross
earned income. Thus they are at least somewhat able to alter their reported income,
but despite this they choose not to report income that is close to tax rate kink points.
In general, the ability to affect reported income suggests that inability to respond does
not prevent the self-employed from bunching more prominently at the marginal tax rate
kink points.
Second, we find that income notches related to the study subsidy system create
significant bunching behavior among students. This indicates that given strong enough
incentives, taxpayers do react to local variation in the tax schedule. However, although
the bunching behavior is evident, the local changes in tax incentives are so large that
the implied observed earnings elasticities are in general small (<0.1).
As for other groups, we do not find any bunching at the marginal tax rate kink points
for students. However, bunching at the notch reveals that at least some students are
able to respond to tax incentives, and thus no bunching at kink points is not completely
driven by the inability to respond to any local tax incentive.
Furthermore, despite the distinctive bunching behavior, we find that many students
are located in the dominated region just above the notch. This is compelling evidence in
favor of notable optimization frictions (Kleven and Waseem 2013). To characterize the
source of the friction, we turn to institutional features associated with the study subsidy
and the labor market students are in. We hypothesize that most of the friction is due
to the inability to respond. Compared to the self-employed, it is difficult for students
to choose or report any income they want. Instead, they have a limited number of wage
and hours contracts to choose from, and it could be costly to search for a new job or
to stop working abruptly at a certain point of time during the year when the income
limit is reached.
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We hypothesize that unawareness of study subsidy rules is not the main friction.
Notches created by the study subsidy system are fairly simple and transparent. First,
students need to apply for the subsidy, which makes it an active choice. Second, when
they get their acceptance decision, the income limits are stated in the notification letter.
Third, the Social Insurance Institution reclaims the subsidy if students earn income
above the limit. In comparison, taxpayers might not be aware of marginal tax rates, or
correctly understand what changes in marginal tax rates indicate. The fact that we do
not find any bunching at kink points for students or even for the self-employed supports
this view.
In order to further support the view that inability to respond is the source of frictions
for students as opposed to unawareness of the rules, we study how changes in the
location of the notch point affect the behavior of students The income limits were not
changed even in nominal terms for several years. However, in 2008, the income limits
were adjusted upwards by 30%. We find that students start bunching at the new income
limit immediately, indicating that they are aware of the rules.
In addition to optimization frictions, this study contributes to the literature on
observed responses to kinks and notches. This study is the first to analyze bunching
at marginal tax rate kink points in Finland. Many previous studies find no or only
little bunching at the kink points of the marginal tax rate schedule for wage earners,
but significant and sharp bunching for the self-employed (Saez 2010, Bastani and Selin
2014 and Chetty et al. 2011). One intriguing finding in this study compared to the
earlier literature is that we find only negligible if any bunching at marginal tax rate
kink points for the self-employed.
Kleven and Waseem (2013) show that wage earners bunch actively at income tax
notches in Pakistan. We add to this study by estimating responses to income notches in
a developed country where the tax system is strongly enforced, and thus the responses
are more related to labor supply decisions as opposed to reporting behavior. Other
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existing evidence on responses to notches comes from a range of institutions, for example
the medicaid notch in the US (Yelowitz 1995), eligibility for in-work benefits in the UK
(Blundell and Hoynes 2004, Blundell and Shepard 2012), social security and financial
incentives in retirement rules (Gruber and Wise 1998, Manoli and Weber 2011), and
car taxes affecting the fuel economy of cars (Sallee and Slemrod 2012).
This paper proceeds by presenting the relevant institutions in Section 5.2. In Section
5.3 we present the conceptual background to responding to kinks and notches, and
discuss the role of behavioral frictions. We then present the empirical methodology
and data in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 presents the results. Section 5.6 discusses the
implications and concludes the study.
5.2. Institutions
5.2.1. Income taxation and marginal tax rate kink points. We study the
marginal tax rate (MTR) kink points created by the central government income tax
schedule.2 Small amounts of earned income are not taxed by central government. The
first kink appears at a point where the central government tax rate first applies. After
the central government tax rate is first applied, it increases in a stepwise manner. This
results in 4-6 kink points in the MTR schedule, depending on the year in question.
Various kink points are associated with MTR increases between 4-11 percentage
points. At the first income threshold, there is a clear increase in the overall MTR.
2The Finnish income tax system comprises three components: progressive central government income
taxes, proportional municipal taxes and mandatory social security contributions. The average munici-
pal income tax rate is 18.3%, and the average social security contribution rate is 5.1% (in 1999-2011).
In general, municipal income taxation and social security contributions do not induce kink points since
they are proportional. The main exception is the municipal earned income tax allowance, which will
be briefly discussed in Section 5.5. Since 1993, Finland has applied a dual income tax system. In dual
income taxation, earned income (wages, fringe benefits, pensions etc.) is taxed at a progressive tax
schedule, and capital income (interest income, dividends from listed corporations etc.) is taxed at a
flat tax rate. In this study we focus on the details of the earned income tax schedule. However, the
dual income tax system affects the tax rules of self-employed individuals, which we discuss at the end
of this section.
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In 1999-2011, the increase in the MTR associated with the first income threshold has
varied between 6-14 percentage points, which relates to a 22-53% decrease in the overall
net-of-tax rate (1-MTR) on average (excluding employer social security payments). In
addition to the first kink point, the last kink involves the most salient and distinctive
increase in the MTR. The last kink point is associated with a 6-9 percentage point
increase in the MTR, and a 9-16% decrease in the overall net-of-tax rate.
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Figure 1. Marginal income tax rate schedule (year 2007)
As an example, Figure 1 presents the marginal income tax rate schedule for 2007.
The Figure illustrates the discontinuous changes in the income tax rate at different
levels of taxable income. Taxable income is the basis of central government taxation,
and it is roughly defined as gross earned income minus deductions.
In order to take into account the general increase in wages and other prices over
time, the nominal income thresholds have moved upwards over time. However, increases
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in the income thresholds are not tied to any price or wage index, and are announced
by the government on annual basis. Table A1 in the Appendix presents the nominal
MTR schedules of central government income taxation in 1999-2011. Figure A1 in the
Appendix presents the overall nominal average marginal income tax rates in 1999, 2007
and 2011 (including average municipal tax rates and social security contributions).
In addition to wage earners, we study the behavior of self-employed individuals. In
this study self-employed individuals include sole proprietors and partners of partnership
firms (all non-corporate entrepreneurs in Finland). The annual reported income of
these individuals is based on the reported profits (earnings-costs) of their firms. In the
Finnish dual income tax system, with separate tax rate schedules for earned and capital
income, these profits are mechanically divided into capital income and earned income
components.
Profits are divided into capital income and earned income according to the net
assets of the firm (assets-liabilities from the year before). An amount corresponding to
20% of net assets is considered flat-taxed capital income, and any profits exceeding this
amount are progressively taxed as earned income.3 In the case of zero or negative net
assets, the profits are taxed completely as earned income.
As an example, consider a self-employed individual who is the sole owner of a firm,
and has net assets of 100,000€ and profits of 30,000€. In this case, 20,000€ of the
profits are flat-taxed, and the remaining 10,000€ are taxed on a progressive tax rate
schedule, illustrated in Figure 1. Without any net assets, the whole 30,000€ is taxed
as earned income.
Intuitively, all self-employed individuals face similar local incentives within the
earned income MTR schedule as regular wage earners. Even though profits are partly
flat-taxed, the kink points of the earned income tax schedule provide similar marginal
3The flat capital income tax rate was 28% in 1999, and 29% in 2000-2004. In 2005-2011, the rate was
reduced to 28%.
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changes in incentives. Furthermore, as the maximum amount of flat-taxed capital in-
come is predetermined based on net assets from the year before, there is no possibility
for static income-shifting between tax bases among sole proprietors and partners of
partnership firms in Finland.
5.2.2. Study subsidy. In Finland, all students enrolled in a university or poly-
technic can apply for a monthly-based study subsidy.4 The maximum amount of the
subsidy is 461€ per month in the academic year 2006/2007.5 Students can apply for
the subsidy for a limited number of months per degree (max. 55 months).
The study subsidy is typically available when a student is accepted to study for a
university or college degree. The default number of study subsidy months per study
year is 9 (fall + spring semester), which most students also receive. Study subsidy
eligibility depends on academic progress6, and is reduced if the yearly gross earned
income of the student is too high.
Students can earn a certain amount of gross income (earned income + capital in-
come) per calendar year without an effect on the study subsidy. With the typical
9 months of the subsidy per calendar year, the annual gross income limit is 9,260€
(in 2006/2007). Students can alter the number of subsidy months from the default 9
months by making an application beforehand, or by returning already granted subsidies
4The study subsidy is intended to enhance equal opportunities to acquire higher education, and to
provide income support for students who often have low disposable income. In Finland, university
education is publicly provided, and consequently there are no tuition fees. A large proportion of
individuals receive higher education in Finland (ca. 40% of individuals aged 25-34 have a degree), and
the study subsidy program is widely used among students.
5The full study subsidy includes a study grant and housing benefit. The standard study grant is
259€/month (in 2006/2007). The housing benefit depends on rent payments and other housing details.
The maximum housing benefit is 202€/month (in 2006/2007). In addition to the study subsidy,
students can apply for repayable student loans which are secured by the central government.
6The academic progress criteria requires that a student completes a certain number of credit points
per academic year in order to be eligible for the subsidy.
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by the end of March in the next calendar year. More study subsidy months decreases
the income limit, and less study subsidy months increases it.7
The gross income limit in the study subsidy program creates a significant notch in
the tax system. If the income limit is exceeded, one month‘s study subsidy is reclaimed
by the Social Insurance Institution. An additional month of subsidy is reclaimed for an
additional 1,010€ of gross income over the threshold.
Students face large local incentives not to exceed the income limit. Since earning
just a little over the limit results in losing one study subsidy month, this results in an
implied marginal tax rate of over 100% just above the notch. Thus the study subsidy
notch induces a strictly dominated region above the notch where students can earn
more disposable income by decreasing their gross income level.
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Figure 2. Disposable income around the study subsidy notch (left-hand
side) and the first MTR kink point (right-hand side), year 2007
The left-hand side of Figure 2 illustrates the effect of the study subsidy notch on
disposable income with the standard case of 9 study subsidy months (in 2007). In
the Figure, the vertical axis denotes disposable income including the subsidy, and the
horizontal axis denotes gross income relative to the notch point (9,260€). The Figure
7The formula for the annual gross income limit is the following: 505€ per study subsidy month plus
a fixed amount of 170€, and 1,515€ per month without the study subsidy (in 2006/2007).
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shows that once the gross income limit is exceeded, reclaiming of the study subsidy
causes a dip in disposable income. At the margin, earning 100€ above the threshold
results in a loss of 360€ in disposable income.
The right-hand side of Figure 2 illustrates the effect of the first marginal income tax
rate kink point on disposable income. Earning income after the kink point results in
less disposable income than before the kink. For example, 100€ of gross income above
the kink results in 9€ less disposable income than below the kink.
Figure 2 highlights that the difference between the study subsidy notch and the
MTR kink points is notable. Even though kink points also change the incentives at the
margin, the effect of the study subsidy notch is significantly larger.
The study subsidy program was reformed in 2008. The main outcome of the reform
was that the income limits were increased by approximately 30%. The default income
limit for 9 study subsidy months increased from 9,260€ to 12,070€8 In addition, the
monthly study subsidy was increased from 461€ to 500€ per month. In general, other
details of the system were not changed, including the academic criteria and the loss of
one month‘s subsidy if the income limit is exceeded.9 Finally, Table A2 in the Appendix
shows the income limits for differing number of study subsidy months, and the relative
loss incurred when the income limit is exceeded both before and after the reform.
5.3. Conceptual framework
5.3.1. Behavioral responses to kinks and notches. We analyze taxpayer re-
sponses to kinks and notches in the tax schedule using a static model that closely
follows Saez (2010) and Kleven and Waseem (2013). In short, the model shows that
if behavioral responses are notable, we should find individuals bunching in the income
8After 2008, the gross income limits are 660€ (before 505€) per study subsidy month plus a fixed
amount of 220€ (170€), and 1,970€ (1,515€) per month when no study subsidies are claimed.
9After 2008, an additional month of the subsidy is reclaimed for an additional 1,310€ of gross income
over the threshold, compared to 1,010€ before 2008.
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distribution at the kink and notch points. We first analyze behavioral responses without
frictions and then discuss how different frictions alter the baseline bunching formula.
We assume that individuals have a quasi-linear utility (no income effects). Individ-
uals have homogenous tastes and labor supply elasticities but different abilities, which
gives rise to the shape of the income distribution. The iso-elastic utility function is of
the form
u(c, z) = c− 1
1 + 1/e
z
n
1+1/e
where c is consumption, z is gross earnings, e is the earnings elasticity and n is ability.
Individuals maximize utility with respect to a budget constraint c = z(1 − t) + R,
where R denotes virtual income. We focus on linear income tax rates t to simplify the
problem. Maximizing utility with respect to the constraint gives the following earnings
supply function
z = n(1− t)e
We assume that there is a continuous distribution of abilities, giving rise to a density
function f(n) and a distribution function F (n). For a baseline tax system which is linear
and has no kink points, there is an earnings distribution associated with a density and
distribution function, H0(z) = F (z/(1−t)e) and h0(z) = H ′0(z) = f(z/(1−t)e)/(1−t)e.
Next, we look at how kinks and notches transform the underlying distributions with
no kinks or notches. For kink points, consider a small increase in the marginal tax rate,
dt, at a point z = k. At k income is taxed at a tax rate t1, and above the kink point
the tax rate is t2 = t1 + dt. Individuals who were previously located at the kink do not
need to change their behavior, but individuals above the kink face a higher tax rate
than before. dz denotes the behavioral changes in gross earnings as a response to the
increased tax rate. In terms of the earnings elasticity e, the behavioral responses can
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be written as
dz
k
= e
dt
1− t1
(1- T(z))z
zk k+dz
Indiff.
curve for 
type L 
Indiff. 
curves for 
type H
Slope 1-τ1
Slope 1-τ2
Figure 3. Bunching at a kink point
Figure 3 illustrates the bunching effect in the absence of frictions. The vertical
axis denotes net-of-tax income, and the horizontal axis denotes pre-tax income. The
straight blue lines illustrate the tax rates, and the curvy red lines the indifference curves.
As a result of the behavioral response to the introduced kink point k, individuals
located within the income interval (k, k + dz) now bunch at k. In the Figure, an
individual of type H is the highest pre-tax income individual to move to the kink point.
Individuals further up in the income distribution z > k + dz do not move to the kink
point, and individuals originally located below or at the kink point (Type L) do not
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change their behavior either. Thus we can express the extent of bunching behavior as
B(dz) =
´ k+dz
k
h0(z)dz.
Notches can be analyzed in a similar fashion. The tax schedule above the notch
point at z = j is characterized as t + ∆t. For z <= j, the income tax rate is t. When
z > j, income is taxed at a tax rate t plus an additional tax of ∆t. In the case of
income transfers with income limits, ∆t can be thought of as the forfeit transfer when
the income limit is exceeded.
Notches create a so-called dominated region just above the notch point where indi-
viduals can increase their net-of-tax income by moving to the notch point and earning
less pre-tax income. Under normal preferences and in the absence of any frictions, no
individuals should locate themselves within the dominated region.
zj j+ ∆z
(1- T(z))z
Slope 1-τ
j+∆zD
∆τ
Indiff. 
curve for 
type L 
Indiff. 
curves for 
type H
Figure 4. Bunching at a notch point
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Figure 4 illustrates the bunching effect related to notches. Individuals located within
(j, j+∆z) will bunch at the notch point, and type H individual is the last to move to the
notch. Thus type H individual represents the marginal buncher with the highest pre-tax
income before the implementation of the notch. The bunching behavior is denoted as
B(∆z) =
´ j+∆z
j
h0(z)dz.
In the figure, the dominated region is denoted as (j, j + ∆zD]. Throughout the
paper, we define the dominated region such that the upper limit of the region is a point
where the net-of-tax income equals the net-of-tax income at the notch. By definition,
all points between the notch and the upper limit of the dominated region produce less
net-of-tax income compared to the notch point.
5.3.2. Earnings elasticities based on observed bunching. Following Saez
(2010), using the expression for excess bunching B(dz) along with the taxable income
elasticity formula by Feldstein (1999), we can express the local average elasticity of
taxable income (ETI) at the kink point in proportion to the number of individuals
bunching at the kink point
(5.3.1) e(k) ' B(dz)
k × h0(k)× log(1−τ11−τ2 )
In equation (5.3.1), k is the kink point, h0(k) denotes the counterfactual density in the
absence of the kink point, and (1 − τ1) and (1 − τ2) denote the net-of-tax rates below
and above the kink point, respectively.
Intuitively, larger B(dz) indicates larger behavioral responses and larger local elas-
ticity, and vice versa. Also, with a given B(dz) and h0(k), a smaller difference between
the tax rates τ1 and τ2 indicates larger local elasticity. As underlined in Feldstein (1999),
this elasticity measure is directly proportional to the excess burden of the income tax.
Thus, in the absence of frictions, we can measure the excess burden with e(k).
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As the behavioral response to a notch is related to changes in average tax rates
rather than marginal tax rates, deriving the implied elasticity using excess bunching
at notches is less straightforward. However, the earnings elasticity at a notch can be
approximated in terms of the excess mass at the notch point and the implied change
in the marginal tax rate above the notch.
We approximate the earnings elasticity at the study subsidy notch using a similar
approach as Kleven and Waseem (2013). We derive an upper-bound reduced-form
earnings elasticity by relating the earnings response of a marginal buncher at j+ ∆z to
the implicit change in tax liability between the notch point j and j+∆z. The marginal
buncher represents the individual with the highest income to move to the notch point,
compared to a counterfactual state in the absence of the notch (see Figure 4).
Intuitively, this approach treats the notch as a hypothetical kink which creates
a jump in the implied marginal tax rate. More formally, the reduced-form earnings
elasticity is calculated with a quadratic formula
(5.3.2) e(j) ≈ (4z/j)2/(4t/(1− t))
where (1 − t) is the net-of-tax rate at the notch, and 4t defines the change in the
implied marginal tax rate for the marginal buncher with an earnings response of ∆z.
5.3.3. Frictions. In the forthcoming analysis, we decompose behavioral frictions
into two broadly defined components: unawareness of tax rules and regulations and
inability to respond to tax incentives. Unawareness of tax rules covers the lack of
knowledge that taxpayers might have about tax regulations. This includes both pure
inattention to tax rules and failure to understand them even when general knowledge
about tax regulations is available. For example, taxpayers might not know that kink or
notch points even exist, or not know the correct income base determining their location
in the income tax schedule.
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Unawareness also includes any mistakes that taxpayers might make in interpreting
the actual incentives. A well-known example is the confusion between marginal and
average tax rates (see e.g. Chetty and Saez 2013, and Liebman and Zeckhauser 2004).
Misunderstanding of marginal changes in incentives might induce individuals not to
respond to local changes in incentives.
The inability to respond covers a range of reasons why taxpayers are not able to flex-
ibly respond to tax incentives. These include factors constraining behavioral responses
even when taxpayers are aware of local incentives. The inability to respond might stem
from institutional factors as well as individual constraints. For example, due to fixed
long-term contracts, wage earners might not be able to alter their working hours easily.
Also, it might be costly to search for a new job providing more suitable working hours
and wage rates in terms of tax incentives (see e.g. Chetty et al. 2011). Intuitively,
when inability frictions are present, large local changes in incentives should produce
more observed bunching than small changes, since it is on average more profitable to
overcome the inability friction when payoffs from changing behavior are larger (Chetty
2012).
In general, compared to underlying structural responses in the frictionless bench-
mark (Figures 3 and 4), frictions attenuate the observed behavioral responses. However,
different frictions potentially cause different patterns of observed behavior. If individ-
uals are both aware of tax changes and able to respond to them, we should observe
sharp bunching at kinks and notches if the underlying elasticity is significant. If some
or all individuals are unaware of tax rules, this would either mitigate or eliminate the
sharp response. In contrast, if individuals are aware but not able to fully respond, the
observed bunching response would not be sharp but more scattered around kinks and
notches.
Furthermore, different frictions imply different reasons for responding or not re-
sponding to tax incentives. Consequently, different frictions hold potentially different
196 Unwilling, unable or unaware?
policy implications and long-run welfare conclusions. We discuss these in more detail
when we interpret and discuss the results in Section 5.6.
Finally, we include optimization frictions in the theoretical analysis. Since all fric-
tions have an a priori similar effect on average responses in a cross-sectional context,
we denote frictions by a single term a, 0 < a < 1. The higher a is, the larger the fric-
tions are and the less individuals respond to tax incentives. The fraction of individuals
responding to tax incentives in the presence of frictions is denoted as (1− a).
After including the frictions, the two bunching formulas become Ba(dz) =
´ k+dz
k
(1−
a)h0(z)dz, and Ba(∆z) =
´ j+∆z
j
(1 − a)h0(z)dz. It is evident that bunching behavior
is reduced when frictions exist. Nevertheless, the behavioral response in the absence
of frictions might still be non-negligible, giving rise to a baseline long-run structural
earnings elasticity.
5.4. Empirical methodology and data
5.4.1. Bunching at kinks and notches. With both kinks and notches it is
straightforward to verify visually whether there is bunching or not. The challenge is in
estimating the size of the excess mass in relation to the counterfactual state of no kinks
or notches. In short, the excess mass of individuals at a kink or a notch is estimated
by comparing the actual density function around the discontinuity point k to a smooth
counterfactual density. The counterfactual density function describes what the income
distribution at the notch or kink would have looked like without a change in the tax
rate. The bunching method implicitly assumes that individuals in the neighborhood of
a kink or a notch are otherwise similar except that they face a different slope or shape
in their budget set.
Due to imperfect control and uncertainty about the exact amount of income in each
year, the usual approach is to use a “bunching window” around k to estimate the excess
mass (see Saez 2010). Thus when analyzing kink points, we compare the density of
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taxpayers within an income interval (k − δL, k + δH) to an estimated counterfactual
density within the same income range. δL denotes the lower income limit on the left of
the kink, and δH denotes the income limit above k.
We follow Chetty et al. (2011) to estimate excess bunching at kink points. The
counterfactual density is estimated by fitting a flexible polynomial function to the ob-
served density function, excluding the region [δL, δH ] from the regression. First, we
re-center income in terms of the discontinuity point, and group individuals into small
income bins of 100€. Next, we estimate a counterfactual density by regressing the
following equation
(5.4.1) cj =
p∑
i=0
βi(zj)
i +
δH∑
i=δL
ηi · 1(zj = i) + εj
and by omitting the bunching window (k− δL, k+ δH) from the regression. In equation
(5.4.1), cj is the count of individuals in bin j, and zj denotes the income level in
bin j. The order of the polynomial is denoted by p. Thus the fitted values for the
counterfactual density are given by
(5.4.2) cˆj =
p∑
i=0
βi(zj)
i
The relative difference between the observed individuals and the counterfactual
density within the bunching window defines the excess bunching. More formally, for
kink points, excess bunching is calculated as
(5.4.3) bˆ(k) =
∑δH
i=δL
(cj − cˆj)∑δH
i=δL
cˆj/(δH − δL + 1)
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As in the earlier literature, parameters δL, δH and p are determined visually and
based on the fit of the model. In general, our results are not very sensitive to the choice
of the omitted region or the degree of the polynomial.10
The method for analyzing excess mass at notches is based on similar principles. The
main difference with notches is that the excess mass should locate below the notch and
not as a diffuse mass around both sides of it. Thus in the case of notches, the excess
bunching is measured by comparing the observed distribution and the counterfactual
within the interval (k − δL, k), where δL is the lower limit of the interval and k refers
to the notch point.
With notches it is less straightforward to define the income limit above the notch
point when estimating the counterfactual density. We follow Kleven and Waseem
(2013) and define the upper limit for the excluded region δH such that the excess mass
bˆE(k) = (
∑k
i=δL
cj−cˆj) equals the missing mass above the notch bˆM(k) = (
∑δH
z>k cˆj−cj).
This procedure is implemented by starting from a small value of δH and increasing it
incrementally until bˆE(k) ≈ bˆM(k). Intuitively, this convergence condition implies that
the excess mass below the notch comes from the missing mass above the notch, and that
we can define the earnings response 4z and the marginal buncher using the estimated
excess mass. This definition for δH also denotes the upper bound of the excluded range
(Kleven and Waseem 2013).
In order to assess frictions related to responding to notches, we measure the relative
proportion of individuals who locate at the dominated region just above the notch. Fol-
lowing Kleven and Waseem (2013), individuals at the dominated region are inherently
not able to respond to the notch because of frictions, as these individuals would have
10Chetty et al. (2011) adjust the counterfactual density above the kink such that it includes the excess
bunch at the kink, making the estimated counterfactual density equal to the observed density. Due
to the small observed excess bunching at kink points, this has only a trivial effect for our empirical
analysis, and thus we estimate the counterfactual for kink points by simply excluding the bunching
window from the regression as described above. Intuitively, our approach provides an upper bound
estimate for excess bunching at kink points.
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more disposable income by earning (marginally) less. We define the share of individuals
in the dominated region as a = cD/cˆD, where cD is the observed number of individ-
uals in the dominated region (k, k + D), and cˆD is the counterfactual estimate of the
individuals within the same region. D denotes the upper limit of the dominated region.
Similarly as in Chetty et al. (2011) and Kleven and Waseem (2013), the standard
errors for all the estimates are calculated using a bootstrap procedure. We generate
a large number of earnings distributions by randomly resampling the residuals from
equation (5.4.1), and generate a large number of new estimates of cˆj based on the
resampled distributions to evaluate variation in the estimates of interest. The standard
errors for each estimate (bˆ(k) and eˆ(k) for kinks, and bˆE(k), δˆH , aˆ and eˆ(k) for notches)
are defined as the standard deviation in the distribution of the estimate.
5.4.2. Data. We use panel data on all working-aged individuals (15-70 years) living
in Finland in 1999-2011. The data set is based on the Finnish Longitudinal Employer-
Employee Data (FLEED). To this data we have linked a variety of essential register-
based variables, such as detailed tax register data for 1999-2011, and information on
students and the study subsidy program for 1999-2010. With this data we can reliably
and accurately analyze local changes in incentives among various subgroups of taxpay-
ers. To analyze self-employed individuals, we use panel data on all main owners of
Finnish businesses from 1999-2010, provided by the Finnish Tax Administration.
Table A3 in the Appendix presents the key summary statistics for all taxpayers. Ta-
ble A4 shows the summary statistics for students. The average gross income of students
excluding the study subsidy is 7,600€ per year. This implies that many students have
part-time or full-time jobs during their studies and breaks between semesters, which is
very typical among Finnish university students. Finally, Table A5 presents the sum-
mary statistics for self-employed individuals, including key firm-level characteristics.
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5.5. Results
5.5.1. Baseline results. This section presents the overall results on bunching at
MTR kink points and the study subsidy notch. We characterize the role and significance
of frictions in the following sections.
Marginal tax rate kink points . First, we present taxable income distributions around
different MTR kink points for all taxpayers. The figures plot the observed income
distributions and counterfactual distributions relative to each MTR kink point in bins
of 100€ in the range of +/- 5000€ from the kink. The figures denote the excess mass
estimates (with standard errors), and the implied elasticity estimates based on observed
excess bunching.
In each graph, the kink point is marked with a dashed vertical line. The excluded
counterfactual region (the bunching window) is marked with solid vertical lines. In each
graph, the bunching window is +/- 7 bins from the kink. The counterfactual density is
estimated using a 7th-order polynomial function. Our results are not sensitive to the
choice of the bunching window or the order of the polynomial.
Figure 5 presents the income distributions around different kink points of the central
government income tax rate schedule for all taxpayers. The Figure illustrates bunching
at the first, second, third and last kink point using pooled data for the years 1999-2011.
As shown in Table A1 in the Appendix, the number of kink points has decreased from
6 to 4 in the period we study. Throughout the study, the first MTR kink point always
includes the threshold where the central government income tax rate first applies. The
other kink points in Figure 5 correspond to the kink points still existing after 2007.
The Figure shows that there is no bunching at the marginal tax rate kink points
in Finland. The only conceivable exception might be the second kink. However, the
second kink is likely to produce upward-biased excess bunching because of the locally
5.5. Results 201
hollow shape of the income distribution around the kink. Consequently, the elasticity
estimates are zero or very close to zero at all MTR kink points.
In terms of the size of the tax rate change and the characteristics of the Finnish tax
system, we should in particular find excess bunching at the first and last kink point of the
tax schedule. However, there seem to be no significant responses at these kink points.
The income distribution around the first kink point does not include individuals with
means-tested social benefits, such as unemployment insurance payments and housing
benefits. These benefits are regarded as taxable income, and they tend to cluster at
certain income levels, causing a lot of noise in the low end of the income distribution.
Importantly, there is no significant bunching at the first MTR kink even if we include
individuals with these taxable benefits.
The result of no bunching also holds for all other central government kink points
that are not shown in Figure 5. Also, there is no significant bunching at any kink point
in any separate year. Thus there is no increase in excess bunching over time, and no
differences in responses to kinks of different sizes. In addition to central government
taxation, we find no bunching at the MTR kink points associated with graduated tax
credits or allowances, including the municipal earned income tax allowance.
The result of no bunching at MTR kink points in Figure 5 indicates that marginal
tax rates do not induce local behavioral responses. This could be explained by both the
low underlying (local) tax elasticity and various behavioral frictions. It might be that
the relatively small changes in incentives induce no behavioral responses, even in the
absence of frictions. However, it might be that taxpayers cannot adjust their reported
income or working hours with reasonable costs. Finally, it might be that taxpayers do
not know or understand the details of the MTR schedule. We study these hypotheses by
utilizing students and self-employed individuals as example groups in the next section.
Study subsidy notch. Next, we study behavioral responses around the notch points
of the study subsidy system among Finnish university students. Figure 6 shows the
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Figure 5. Income distributions around MTR kink points, 1999-2011
gross income distribution around the notch point (relative to the notch in bins of 100€
in the range of +/- 5000€ from the notch). The Figure presents the distribution of
all students (left-hand side) and students with the default number of 9 study subsidy
months (right-hand side) in 1999-2010. In the Figure, the dashed vertical line denotes
the notch point above which a student loses one month of the subsidy. The solid vertical
lines denote the excluded range (see Section 5.4 for details on defining the upper limit
of the excluded range). The dash-point vertical line above the notch shows the upper
limit of the dominated region.
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The figure also includes the estimates and standard errors for the excess mass at
the notch, the share of individuals in the dominated region, and the upper limit of the
counterfactual and ∆z. In each figure the counterfactual density is estimated using
a 7th-order polynomial function. Our main conclusions are not very sensitive to this
choice, although the point estimates vary somewhat with different choices of the degree
of the polynomial.
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Figure 6. Bunching at the study subsidy notch, 1999-2010
Figure 6 indicates a clear and statistically significant excess mass on the left of
the notch for both all students (1.8) and students with the default subsidy (2.0). This
indicates that students are both aware of the notch and respond to the strong incentives
created by it. However, the implied earnings elasticities are rather low, 0.083 (0.019)
and 0.065 (0.007) for all students and students with 9 subsidy months, respectively
(standard errors in parenthesis).11 Thus even though excess bunching is evident and
notable earnings responses occur (4z is around 15% of disposable income at the notch),
the observed elasticities are still small. This stems from the fact that the changes in
11Earnings elasticity for all students is calculated using the average number of study subsidy months
(7). All elasticities at study subsidy notches are calculated using the SISU microsimulation model
and the average number of subsidy months. We thank Markus Paasiniemi for research assistance on
calculating the elasticities.
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incentives are also very distinctive, as notches induce very high implicit marginal tax
rates above the income limit.12
5.5.2. Inability to respond.
Students . Figure 6 implies that students are aware of the incentives and respond
to the notch created by the income limit of the study subsidy program. However, the
Figure also suggests that students cannot affect their working hours or reported income
very precisely. First, the excess mass below the notch is rather diffuse. This indicates
that it is difficult for students to control or predict annual income very precisely. Second,
there is an economically and statistically significant mass of students at the strictly
dominated region above the notch where students can increase their net income by
lowering their gross income. This indicates that in addition to the inability to respond,
some students might not be aware of the notch, at least when exceeding the income
limit for the first time.
To study the inability to respond, we first divide students into two groups based
on the number of years they have studied: students with under three study years and
students with more than (or equal to) three study years.13 It is likely that the ability to
adjust and predict annual income improves over time, therefore inducing the inability
friction to decrease in the course of the study years. If the inability to respond decreases
over time, we would expect that students with more study years bunch more actively,
and that less students are located in the dominated region. In contrast, we have no
12In addition, implicit marginal tax rates remain relatively high (>50%) even further away above the
notch, as an extra month of the subsidy is reclaimed after additional 1,010€ above the income limit
(1,310€ after 2008). Thus, the effective tax schedule for students inherently includes multiple notches.
However, we only observe significant bunching at the first notch, which justifies the analysis of the
first notch only. The analysis of the first notch is also rationalized by the fact that students can alter
the number of study subsidy months during the year.
13In order to eliminate the effect of dropouts and graduates, we include only students who also study
in the next year.
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clear reason to assume that willingness to respond would be different locally around the
notch point for students with more or less study years.
Figure 7 weakly supports the above hypothesis. There is more excess bunching for
more senior students, but the difference is not statistically significant.14 Also, the share
of individuals in the dominated region is practically unaffected. This suggests that a
notable fraction of students are (still) not able to respond by adjusting their working
hours. In addition, it might be that students with more experience of the study subsidy
program are more aware of its details, and thus would respond more prominently. We
study awareness of the study subsidy rules in more detail in the next subsection.
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Figure 7. Bunching at the study subsidy notch: Students with more or
less than 3 study years, 1999-2010
Next, we compare the responses of students around the study subsidy notch and
the MTR kink points. There is a striking difference between bunching at notches and
bunching at MTR kinks. Figure 8 shows the income distributions around MTR kink
points for current students (first kink), university graduates (last kink) and students
14The earnings elasticities are 0.083 (0.035) and 0.083 (0.018) for students with less or more than three
study years, respectively. Both elasticities are calculated using the average number of study subsidy
months.
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who previously bunched at the study subsidy notch (first kink). For all of these groups
we find no significant bunching at any MTR kink point in any year.
Even though students are clearly responding to large incentives induced by the
notch, they do not respond to smaller incentives created by MTR kinks. For current
students this cannot be explained by an inability to respond to any local incentives,
as we observe similar or even the same individuals bunching at income notches. In
other words, there is no fundamental reason to assume that students are less able to
affect their labor supply around the MTR kink compared to the study subsidy notch.
Nevertheless, this result does not indicate that students would not respond to MTR
kinks of any size. Larger changes in the MTR might induce larger observed behavioral
responses, as with larger kinks it becomes more profitable to adjust labor supply (see
Chetty et al. 2011, and Chetty 2012). However, in addition to the size of the incentive,
the underlying elasticity and the inability frictions, it might be that the MTR schedule
is too obscure for many students.
To further characterize the effect of the size of the incentive and the inability friction,
we divide students into two groups by the number of study subsidy months they apply
for. The default number of study subsidy months is 9, which students receive every year
while studying if they do not wish to apply for additional subsidy months (up to 12),
or decrease the number of subsidy months. There is a different income limit associated
with each number of subsidy months which is inversely related to the number of months.
In other words, less annual study subsidy gives a higher income limit. Table A2 in the
Appendix shows the income limits for different numbers of study subsidy months and
the relative loss incurred when the income limit is exceeded (both before and after the
reform of 2008).
We analyze students with 2-5 or 6-8 study subsidy months. Both of these groups
have made an active decision to opt out from the default option. Therefore, the differ-
ence between these groups is that the size of the tax incentive at the notch is weaker for
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Figure 8. Bunching at MTR kink points: Current students, graduates
and students who bunched at the study subsidy notch, 1999-2010
the group that had only a few months of the study subsidy, compared to the group that
applied for more subsidy months. Importantly, both groups still lose disposable income
if they earn marginally over the limit. In order to eliminate the possible peculiar effects
of dropouts and graduates, we only include students who also study in the next year.
Figure 9 presents the bunching evidence at the study subsidy notch for students
with different numbers of study subsidy months. Students with 2-5 subsidy months
respond moderately, whereas for students with 6-8 months there seems to be a clear
response at the notch. The observed elasticities are 0.07 (0.034) and 0.125 (0.042) for
students with 2-5 and 6-8 subsidy months, respectively. However, it should be noted
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that the non-monotonic shape of the income distribution around the notch for students
with 6-8 study subsidy months is not ideal when applying the bunching method, and
there is large variation in the estimate of the counterfactual density when the degree of
the polynomial is varied. Therefore, the estimates need to be interpreted with caution.
However, the Figure clearly illustrates the notable behavioral response to the notch.
These findings support the notion that the relative strength of tax incentives mat-
ters, which corresponds to larger responses for larger tax incentives. This result also
suggests that inability to respond matters. When inability to respond occurs, we should
find more observed bunching at larger local changes in incentives. Furthermore, we have
no explicit reason to assume that the two groups differ in awareness, especially as both
groups have actively deviated from the default option. However, it is a possible that
the inability to respond increases along with income for some students (i.e. along with
more permanent or more highly paid jobs and more regular working hours). This would
also indicate lower bunching when the income limit is higher.
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Figure 9. Bunching at the study subsidy notch: Students with different
number of study subsidy months, 1999-2010
Self-employed individuals . Next we study the behavior of self-employed individuals.
In this study, the self-employed include sole proprietors and partners of partnership
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firms (all non-corporate entrepreneurs in Finland). In many previous studies, the self-
employed bunch much more actively at MTR kink points than regular wage earners.
Saez (2010) finds clear and significant excess bunching for the self-employed in the US,
Chetty et al. (2011) in Denmark, and Bastani and Selin (2014) in Sweden. One expla-
nation for this finding is that entrepreneurs can more easily affect their labor supply
and effort. Also, self-employed individuals have more opportunities to adjust their re-
ported incomes. Combining the ability to respond and the large observed changes in
behavior, earlier results indicate that entrepreneurs are aware of the incentives around
kink points and respond to them actively.
In contrast to earlier findings form other Nordic countries (Chetty et al. 2011, and
Bastani and Selin 2014), we do not find sharp and distinctive excess bunching for the
self-employed at the kink points of the earned income tax rate schedule. This result
holds for all kink points and, for example, for self-employed individuals in different
industries and counties. As an example, the two graphs in Figure 10 show the income
distributions around the first and last kink point for all Finnish self-employed individ-
uals in 1999-2011. For the first kink point, the excess bunch estimate is statistically
significant. However, the relatively large overall variation in the income distribution
makes the evaluation sensitive to choices regarding the bunching window and the degree
of the polynomial. For example, when decreasing the order of polynomial of the coun-
terfactual density from 7 to 5, the excess mass at the first kink decreases to 0.083 (0.08).
Thus we can conclude that MTR kink points do not induce robust and significant local
responses among the self-employed individuals in Finland.
In order to assess the ability to affect reported income among self-employed individ-
uals, we study bunching at round numbers in terms of personal gross earned income.15
15The connection between gross earned income and taxable earned income is that taxable earned
income is calculated by deducting individual tax allowances and tax deductions from gross earned
income.
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Figure 10. Bunching at MTR kink points: Self-employed individuals,
1999-2011
Significant round-number bunching would indicate that at least some self-employed in-
dividuals can affect the gross income they report to the tax authorities. Thus if we
find evidence of self-employed bunching at convenient round numbers, it suggests that
entrepreneurs have some ability to affect their location in the income distribution.
Figure 11 shows that the self-employed bunch sharply at gross earned income of
10,000€ and 20,000€.16 This behavior also occurs at larger round numbers (30k, 40k,
50k etc.) as well as at round numbers of Finnish marks (100k, 200k, 300k) before the
implementation of the euro in 2002. Furthermore, we find that significant round-number
bunching never occurs among regular wage earners.
Combining the evidence from Figures 10 and 11 suggests that inability to respond
might not explain the no-bunching result at kink points for self-employed individuals.
In contrast to different responses among students at notches and MTR kink points
which both induce changes in tax incentives, there is no “payoff” from bunching at
round numbers. Based on standard economic theory, locating just below the kink point
instead of a round number would induce some (small) utility gain. Overall, it seems
16As round-number bunching is very sharp by nature, we use a bunching window of +/- 100€ on both
sides when defining excess bunching at round numbers.
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Figure 11. Round-number bunching, gross earned income: Self-
employed individuals, 2002-2011
that either unawareness of the details of the MTR schedule or low underlying elasticity
at smaller changes in incentives might be driving the results, but we cannot precisely
separate between the two mechanisms. However, we discuss the potential issues related
to awareness of the tax rules in the next subsection.
5.5.3. Unawareness.
Students . To study the unawareness friction, we first analyze students who previ-
ously located themselves in the dominated region just above the notch. In this region,
students could earn more disposable income by earning less gross income. In addition,
students who exceed the income limit receive a letter from the Social Security Institu-
tion which states that (at least) one month of the subsidy needs to be paid back (with
15% interest). Thus for the students who are just over the income limit, there are both
large incentives to adjust behavior in the future as well as increased awareness of the
incentives and the existence of the income limit due to the letter they receive.
Figure 12 shows the income distribution around the notch for those students who
were located in the dominated region in any of the three previous years. The Figure
shows that students bunch actively at the notch after locating in the dominated region
212 Unwilling, unable or unaware?
before. The elasticity estimate at the notch for this group is 0.112 (0.051). However,
a notable share of individuals still fail to optimize and are located in the dominated
region also in future years. This suggests that inability to respond is a prominent
feature even with large incentives and when awareness is generally increased. However,
the non-monotonic shape of the income distribution around the notch for this particular
group induces notable variation in the estimates, which thus need to be interpreted with
caution.
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Figure 12. Bunching at the study subsidy notch: Students who were in
previous years in the dominated region (t− 1, t− 2 or t− 3,), 1999-2010
Second, we characterize the effects of the study subsidy reform of 2008. In the
reform, the income limits increased by approximately 30%. For the default 9 months
of the subsidy, the reform increased the income limit from 9,260€ to 12,070€. At the
same time, the overall study subsidy was increased from 461€ to 500€ per month.
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First, Figure 13 shows the income distribution around the study subsidy notch point
for all students before (1999-2007) and after (2008-2010) the reform. From the Figure
we can see that there is excess mass at the notch point both after and before the reform.
This indicates that students are aware of the income limit and its changes. Furthermore,
the excess mass at the old income limit disappears immediately after the reform. Figure
A2 in the Appendix shows the income distribution around the old income limit for all
students in 2008-2010.
However, compared to 1999-2007, the excess mass is smaller after the reform. This
tentatively suggests that either students are not as aware of the new notch point as
they are of the old one, or it takes time to learn the new rules. Supporting this, the
elasticity estimate from before the reform (0.092(0.011)) is somewhat larger than the
observed elasticity at the notch after 2008 (0.054 (0.013)).
Gradual learning and a gradual increase in awareness over time are also tentatively
supported when we study how students respond to the notch in different years before
2008. The study subsidy system with the current income limits was introduced in 1998.
Thus the system was still relatively new in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Indeed,
Figure A3 in the Appendix shows that the excess mass has increased over time when
we compare the years 1999-2001, 2002-2004 and 2005-2007, but the differences are in
general not statistically significant. Importantly, we have no general reason to assume
that the ability to respond to the notch would be different between different years.
Furthermore, the income limits have remained unchanged over this time period, with
the exception of minor adjustments after the implementation of the euro in 2002.
Nevertheless, when comparing excess bunching at the notch before and after the
reform of 2008, it might be that the observed behavioral responses are different at
higher income levels due to different inability frictions. We discussed this issue in
the previous section when characterizing the effect of different study subsidy months
(Figure 9).
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Figure 13. Bunching at the study subsidy notch: Before the reform
1999-2007 (left-hand side) and after the reform 2008-2010 (right-hand
side)
To characterize the effect of the change in the income limit more closely, we analyze
the income distribution around the notch point after the reform of 2008 among those
students who bunched at the income notch in any of the years 2005-2007 before the
reform. Figure 14 shows that students who bunched at the lower income limit before also
bunch actively when the income limit is increased. The observed earnings elasticity at
the notch for this group is 0.067 (0.027). One implication of this result is that students
are in general aware of the income limit, and actively adjust their behavior to changes
in study subsidy regulations. However, from the Figure we can again see that a large
number of students are located in the dominated region above the notch. Thus this
behavior occurs even among the same individuals who were before located just below
the notch. This lends more support to the earlier conclusion that inability frictions
related to real labor supply decisions play an important role even with large behavioral
incentives which taxpayers are in general aware of.
Self-employed individuals . Our finding of no distinctive bunching behavior among
self-employed individuals differs from recent studies in other Nordic countries. In con-
trast to Sweden (Bastani and Selin 2014) and Denmark (Chetty et al. 2011), we do not
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Figure 14. Bunching at the study subsidy notch: Students who bunched
before the reform (2005-2007), 2008-2010
find sharp bunching at MTR kink points for the self-employed. This is especially in-
triguing since, for example, Finland and Sweden have rather similar overall tax systems
and other institutional features.
One issue explaining the different responses could be the size of the local change in
incentives. However, the relative size of the kink points is rather similar in Denmark
and Sweden compared to the largest kink points in Finland. For Denmark, the first
jump in the MTR causes (approximately) a 11% fall in the net-of-tax rate, and the
second kink 30% (Chetty et al. 2011). For Sweden, the first kink point decreases net-
of-tax rates by around 34%, and the second kink by 10% (Bastani and Selin 2014). In
Finland, the first kink point causes a decrease of 22-53% in net-of-tax rates, and the
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last kink decreases net-of-tax rates by 9-16% (depending on the year in question). Thus
there is no dramatic difference between the size of the change in incentives.
However, one important difference could be the number of kink points and the
salience of the tax schedule. Compared to Sweden and Denmark, the Finnish income
tax schedule includes more kink points. In Sweden and Denmark there are only two
distinctive jumps in marginal tax rates (Chetty et al. 2011 and Bastani and Selin
2014). In Finland, there are 4-6 kink points in the central government tax schedule in
the period we study. At least to some extent, the small number of kinks might make
the tax schedule more transparent in Denmark and Sweden compared to the Finnish
tax schedule. Thus assuming that self-employed individuals have similar underlying
preferences in Finland and Sweden, the difference of the response might be due to
lower awareness and transparency of the tax system in Finland. However, as discussed
in Bastani and Selin (2014), there might be relevant differences between the tax systems
with respect to the ability to affect reported income through, for example, tax avoidance
or tax evasion. This might also have a notable effect on observed bunching.
Overall, as noted before, the negligible bunching at MTR kink points among the
self-employed might be due to different frictions, and it is challenging to distinguish
between different mechanisms. In future work we aim at a more careful distinction
between different frictions by analyzing different subgroups of self-employed individuals,
including the owners of privately held corporations.
5.6. Implications and conclusions
In this paper we study the role of individual preferences and different optimization
frictions in explaining taxpayer responses to tax incentives. We compare the behavioral
effects induced by various tax incentives within the same institutions and subpopula-
tions. We apply the bunching method to kinks and notches of different strength in
order to produce clear, comparable and visually convincing evidence.
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We find no bunching at kink points of the marginal income tax rate schedule. This
result holds for any subgroup we study, and for kink points of any size in any year. In-
triguingly, the result of negligible bunching holds for the self-employed, although earlier
studies find notable and sharp bunching behavior among this group (see e.g. Chetty
et al. 2011 for Denmark, and Bastani and Selin 2014 for Sweden). We present clear
evidence that the self-employed in Finland are able to control their reported income, as
they actively bunch at round numbers of reported gross income. This evidence suggests
that the inability to respond does not fully explain the lack of bunching at kink points.
We find that students bunch actively at the income notch induced by the study
subsidy system. Since even the same students who bunch at the notch do not bunch
at marginal tax rate kink points, we focus on explaining why the behavioral responses
differ. First, notches induce considerably larger incentives, and should in theory create
more significant bunching behavior. However, even with a relatively small elasticity
we should observe at least some bunching at kink points, which we can, however, rule
out with our large data set. Therefore, different frictions related to these different
institutions might explain the differences.
One important factor is the visibility of tax incentives and awareness of tax rules.
The study subsidy, like many other means-tested benefits, needs to be applied for.
Moreover, the income limit is relatively salient, and we find that students clearly no-
ticed recent changes in the income limits. However, the marginal tax rate schedule is
presumably less salient, and unawareness might partly explain the non-response at kink
points. Importantly, for students we can hold the inability to respond constant, as they
are in principle as able to bunch at the notch as they are at the kink point.
We observe that many students are located in the dominated region above the
notch. This holds even for the same students who optimized and located at the notch
in previous years. This evidence suggests that the inability to respond related to labor
market rigidities plays an important role. The majority of students who work are wage
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earners, and altering reported income is not easy for them in the Finnish context. If
students want to affect their annual income, they can, for example, either find another
job or stop working abruptly at a certain point of time during the year when the
income limit is reached. These types of decisions might have relatively large costs,
which translates into large frictions.
Our results so far point to the following implications: First, behavioral responses
to kink points might be at least partly attenuated because of frictions related to un-
awareness. Unaware individuals do not respond to tax incentives, and it is possible
that they will not respond in the future either, at least without a considerable change
in awareness of the regulations. Then the long-run elasticity would be close to the ob-
served behavioral responses locally at kink points. This would indicate near zero local
elasticity of taxable income, at least for small changes in incentives.
Second, when individuals are aware of incentives that are strong enough, we observe
clear behavioral responses. These stronger responses are associated with changes in
average tax rates. However, our empirical evidence suggests that these responses are
attenuated by the inability to respond, and that the underlying long-run structural
elasticity might be somewhat larger than the observed one if taxpayers can adjust their
behavior over time.
In summary, different reasons for responding and not responding to tax incentives
can entail different welfare and policy implications. Therefore, it is important to dis-
tinguish what types of taxes create behavioral responses, and what types of frictions
affect individual behavior in different institutional contexts. In future work we aim at
a more careful distinction between different frictions by using changes in policy rules
and a more careful divided sample analysis.
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Appendix
Year Taxable income (in euros) Marginal tax rate Year Taxable income (in euros) Marginal tax rate
1999 7,905-10,596 5,5 2005 12,000-15,400 10,5
10,596-13,455 15,5 15,400-20,500 15
13,455-18,837 19,5 20,500-32,100 20,5
18,837-29,601 25,5 32,100-56,900 26,5
29,601-52,466 31,5 56,900- 33,5
52,461- 38 2006 12,200-17,000 9
2000 8,006-10,697 5 17,000-20,000 14
10,697-13,623 15 20,000-32,800 19,5
13,623-19,005 19 32,800-58,200 25
19,005-29,937 25 58,200- 32,5
29,937-52,979 31 2007 12,400-20,400 9
52,979- 37,5 20,400-33,400 19,5
2001 11,100-14,296 14 33,400-60,800 24
14,296-19,678 18 60,800 - 32
19,678-30,947 24 2008 12,600-20,800 8,5
30,947-54,661 30 20,800-34,000 19,0
54,661- 37 34,000-62,000 23,5
2002 11,500-14,300 13 62,000 - 31,5
14,300-19,700 17 2009 13,100-21,700 7
19,700-30,900 23 21,700-35,300 18
30,900-54,700 29 35,300-64,500 24
54,700- 36 64,500 - 30,5
2003 11,600-14,400 12 2010 15,200-22,600 6,5
14,400-20,000 16 22,600-36,800 17,5
20,000-31,200 22 36,800-66,400 22,5
31,200-55,200 28 66,400 - 30
55,200- 35 2011 15,600-23,200 6,5
2004 11,700-14,500 11 23,200-37,800 17,5
14,500-20,200 15 37,800-68,200 22,5
20,200-31,500 21 68,200 - 30
31,500-55,800 27
55,800- 34
Note: Finnish marks are converted to euros before 2002.
Table A1. Central government marginal income tax rates, 1999-2011
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Figure A1. Nominal marginal tax rates (MTR) on earned income, years
1999, 2005 and 2011
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Before 2008 After 2008
Study subsidy months Income limit Relative income
loss at the
margin if income
limit is exceeded
Income limit Relative income
loss at the
margin if income
limit is exceeded
1 17,340 3.1% 22,550 2.5%
2 16,330 3.2% 21,190 2.7%
3 15,320 3.5% 19,930 2.9%
4 14,310 3.7% 18,620 3.1%
5 13,300 4.0% 17,310 3.3%
6 12,290 4.3% 16,000 3.6%
7 11,280 4.7% 14,690 3.9%
8 10,270 5.2% 13,380 4.3%
9 9,260 5.7% 12,070 4.8%
Note: The relative loss from marginally exceeding the income limit is calculated using the full
study subsidy (461 euros and 500 euros before and after 2008, respectively) plus 15% interest
charged by the Social Insurance Institution.
Table A2. Income limits in the study subsidy system and the relative
marginal loss if the income limit is exceeded (in proportion to gross in-
come at the limit), before and after the reform of 2008 (academic years
2006/2007 and 2008/2009, respectively)
Variable N Mean Std. Dev.
Taxable earned income 45,494,860 22,981 31,048.75
Gross earned income 45,494,615 25,520 31,986.62
Taxable capital income 45,494,860 1,803 50,947.13
Age 45,494,860 43.06 14.816
Female 45,494,860 0.498 .50
Size of the household 44,963,949 2.68 1.438
Table A3. Summary statistics, all taxpayers, 1999-2011
224 Unwilling, unable or unaware?
All students N Mean Std. Dev.
Taxable income 3,970,775 6,115 5,072.32
Gross income (subject to income limit) 2,711,754 7,614 8,619.77
Age 3,980,502 23.30 5.093
Subsidy months 3,255,567 7.15 2.762
Income limit 3,249,902 11,730 3,206.64
Students with 9 months of study subsidy N Mean SD
Taxable income 1,163,189 5,024 3,879.44
Gross income (subject to income limit) 708,525 5,587 6,492.77
Age 1,163,617 22.54 4.486
Subsidy months 1,163,617 9 0
Income limit 1,163,189 9,770 1,083.15
Table A4. Summary statistics, students, 1999-2010
Variable N Mean Std. Dev.
Taxable earned income 3,351,466 25,601 26,860
Gross earned income 3,385,734 26,970 27,734.4
Capital income 2,236,182 7,096 561,620.2
Turnover (firm-level) 3445810 149,931 663,409.8
Net assets (firm-level) 2956521 15,211 217,001.8
No. of employees
(firm-level)
2189383 .661 2.587
Table A5. Summary statistics, self-employed (sole proprietors and part-
ners of partnership firms), 1999-2011
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226 Unwilling, unable or unaware?
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
Fr
e
qu
e
n
cy
-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50
Distance from the notch
Observed Counterfactual
Excess mass: 1.323 (.571), Share in the dominated region: .947 (.135)
Upper limit: 24 (8.275)
Study subsidy notch, all students 1999-2001
0
10
00
20
00
30
00
Fr
e
qu
e
n
cy
-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50
Distance from the notch
Observed Counterfactual
Excess mass: 2.084 (.265), Share in the dominated region: .921 (.037)
Upper limit: 25 (3.577)
Study subsidy notch, all students 2002-2004
20
00
40
00
60
00
80
00
Fr
e
qu
e
n
cy
-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50
Distance from the notch
Observed Counterfactual
Excess mass: 2.136 (.322), Share in the dominated region: .931 (.05)
Upper limit: 26 (4.45)
Study subsidy notch, all students 2005-2007
Figure A3. Bunching at the study subsidy notch in different years
